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ABSTRACT

Gender is a pervasive and regulating social institution that is operationalized in
mainstream Western culture as a natural extension of the ontological difference perceived
to exist between the binarily sexed bodies of male and female. Feminist theory has
widely established, however, that gender is done - i.e., gender is not a naturally occurring
phenomenon, but is an ongoing construction engaged and replicated by individual actors
and which, while compulsory, is nevertheless optional. Within this canon is a small
number of feminist theorists, notably Judith Lorber, Judith Bulter, and Nancy Tuana, who
argue that the constructive manifestations of gender performativity (that is, doing of
gender) are not limited to the social sphere. They argue the role of gender in the
production of the material body, asserting that doing gender has a constructive role in
physical embodiment: what we do influences, and in fact creates, what our bodies are.
This study engages the feminist theory on the production of the body through a
qualitative exploration of the lived experience of gendered bodily change, as described in
the first-hand narratives of trans-identified individuals. I predict that the analysis of the
narratives in the sample will show that in comparison to cisgender individuals, trans
individuals possess a heightened awareness of the performative nature of gender, and that
trans individuals consciously engage performativity in order to conform to the normative
expectations associated with the desired gender role.

I further predict that trans
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individuals experience sexually dimorphic bodily change to be a direct result of changes
to their gender identity.
The interview analysis findings provide mixed support for the first hypothesis,
demonstrating that while trans individuals in the sample do demonstrate a heightened
awareness of the ways in which gender is performed, the respondents' insights came
largely from their experiences in their compulsorily cisgender, pre-transition lives, rather
than their current gender embodiments. The concept of performativity and its perceived
implication of artificiality clashed with the respondents' sense of their gendered actions as
an expression of an authentic self, and my analysis thus addresses performativity as a
necessarily polemic concept located between the subjectivity of the individual narratives
and the theoretical position that gender is done. The findings provide a substantial level
of support for the second hypothesis that trans individuals understand experienced bodily
change to be a direct result of changes in gender identity.
This study's exploration of trans experiences of lived bodily change contributes a
narrative perspective to the ongoing discussion in feminist theory which surrounds the
role of gender in the production of the material body.
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GLOSSARY

Cisgender:

This term refers to individuals whose sex category is cohesively aligned
with their gender identity (i.e., male/man, female/woman). Cis is a Latin
prefix meaning “on this side” or “on the same side.” In their article
"Doing Gender, Doing Heteronormativity: 'Gender Normals,' Transgender
People, and the Social Maintenance of Heterosexuality," Kristen Schilt
and Laurel Westbrook defined cisgender as a label for "individuals who
have a match between the gender they were assigned at birth, their bodies,
and their personal identity" (2009: 440).
The term "cisgender" is also used to discussed the larger concept: just as
"gender" can refer to both individual identity and a general social
phenomenon, cisgender is at times used to collectively discuss those who
consider their sex and gender to be cohesive.

Transgender: This term refers to individuals whose gender identity is not cohesive with
sex category as assessed at birth. They do not identify with the gender
traditionally ascribed to their sex category, and instead identify with the
gender.
In the theoretical context, the term "transgender" is used to refer to the
larger phenomenon of gender transgression, specifically as it relates to
moving from one socially-accepted gender role to the other.

Sex:

This term refers to biological sex, which can include consideration of
anatomical genitalia, chromosomal karyotype, and/or endrocrinological/
hormonal typing. Culturally, "sex" is understood to be limited to an
exclusive male-female dichotomy. However, this narrow conception
neglects the true spectrum of human diversity and the prevalence (and,
indeed, the existence of) intersexuality. Though presumed to be a
naturally occurring "fact," sex is also a phenomenon subject to social
interaction. As Candace West and Don Zimmerman (1987) write, "Sex is
a determination made through the application of socially agreed upon
biological criteria for classifying persons as females or males" (127).
Herein, "sex" will be used to refer both to biological sex and to sociallyassigned sex categories in cases of intersexuality and/or "ambiguous"
genitalia.
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Gender:

Gender is a social phenomenon not empirically related to sex. To again
quote West and Zimmerman (1987), gender "is the activity of managing
situated conduct in light of normative conceptions of attitudes and
activities appropriate for one's sex category" (127). Culturally, gender is
understood to be limited to an exclusive male-female dichotomy, though
many other gender identities exist. Herein, "gender" will be used to refer
to the full spectrum of gender identities, including but not limited to male,
female, trans, transgender, transsexual, androgyny, and genderqueer.

Sexual
Dimorphism: In this study, the term sexual dimorphism refers not to genital binary (i.e.,
male/female), but rather to the non-genital physical differential that is
observed between the sexes of the same species.
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CHAPTER ONE
Introduction

Anatomy is destiny.
SIGMUND FREUD, COLLECTED WRITINGS, 1924
And yet we are told that femininity is in danger; we are exhorted to be women, remain women,
become women. It would appear, then, that every female human being is not necessarily a
woman; to be so considered she must share in that mysterious and threatened reality known as
femininity. ... One is not born, but rather becomes, a woman.
SIMONE DEBEAUVIOR, THE SECOND SEX, 1952

In her chapter “Night to his Day,” Judith Lorber (1994) writes that in our culture,
it is as easy for us to talk about gender as it would be for fish to talk about water. We are
as immersed in gender as fish are in water; it surrounds us to such an extent that, like
oxygen, one may never perceive its ubiquity until something occurs that abruptly makes
its presence - or absence - apparent. Gender is a pervasive force in our lives; as perhaps
the most primary method of social organization, it has a measurable influence upon
behavior, action, and, as will be seen, even the physical nature of our bodies.
The feminist canon posits that gender is a social institution distinct from sex:
whereas sex refers to genital anatomy, gender is a schema that, independently of sex,
regulates appearance, dress, behavior, relationships, speech, aspirations, and virtually
every other aspect of social being.

In West and Zimmerman's foundational article,

"Doing Gender (1987)," they write,
... there was sex and there was gender. Those of us who taught courses in the
1960s and 1970s were careful to distinguish one from the other. Sex, we told
students, was what was ascribed by biology: anatomy, hormones, and physiology.
S. K. Lewis - Gendering the Body / Chapter One: Introduction
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Gender, we said, was an achieved status: that which is constructed through
psychological, cultural, and social means. (P. 125)

The authors go on to describe their students' confusion; they write that the gender
socialization theories of the time "conveyed the strong message that while gender may be
'achieved,' by about age five it was fixed, unvarying, and static - much like sex" (126).
The authors used an ethnomethodological approach to demonstrate that although gender
seems so firmly installed as to be immutable, it is in fact a routine, methodical, and
recurring accomplishment (126) that is actively - though perhaps unknowingly - engaged
by participants. The terminology they invoked to describe this voluntary yet complex
action was, accurately, "doing gender." West & Zimmerman ultimately conclude that
doing gender is unavoidable on the basis that gender is unavoidably a legitimating factor
in a person's social intelligibility. Their work aptly recognizes both the inherent plasticity
of gender and its socially constructed impenetrability: "the doing of gender is undertaken
by women and men whose competence as members of society is hostage to its
production" (126). We can nevertheless extrapolate from their findings that gender, as a
series of actions which are ingrained but nevertheless voluntary, may in fact be "done" in
a variety of ways - "done" in ways, it would follow, that may be inconsistent with the
implied limits of gender-cohesive sex category.
The oxygen-like quality of gender (or water-like, in keeping with Lorber's fish
analogy) is well-served by the poststructuralist terminology metanarrative.

A

metanarrative is a "big" story, theory, or ideology that posits itself to be above ordinary
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("small") accounts of social life; it is an over-arching view that unifies and describes
taxonomically smaller stories. John Stephens and Robyn McCallum (1998) describe it as
"a global or totalizing cultural narrative schema which orders and explains knowledge
and experience" (6). As a part of this ordering and explanation, metanarratives endeavor
to prevent micro-narratives deemed as marginal from upsetting or subverting the cultural
order. Gender is, in a way, the ultimate metanarrative: it is a big story that organizes all
the little stories, a finely woven mesh fabric encircling all aspects of social life, acting, as
Judith Butler (1999 [1990]) writes, as a grid of intelligibility. Bodies, the people who
occupy them, and the actions they produce are all socially unintelligible without
conformity to or participation in the gender metanarrative.
The central theme of the Western gender metanarrative is that of inviolable
gender binary: man/woman, male/female, masculine/feminine.

In the tradition of

sociobiology, the metanarrative holds that gender flows naturally from sex, to the extent
that no distinction can be made between them; gender is in fact used as a metonym for
sex: gender is presumed a cohesive attribute of sex, and gender in fact refers (and infers)
anatomical sex as much as it does the social enactment of gender roles. The precept that
there are two and only two genders, cohesively aligned to two and only two anatomical
sexes, is widely broadcast and firmly regulated.

The two genders are thus

metanarratively operationalized as the discrete derivatives of sex.
Similarly manifest in the metanarrative are notions of essential, naturallyoccurring, fundamental and (it is implied) insurmountable differences between the
S. K. Lewis - Gendering the Body / Chapter One: Introduction
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dichotomous cisgenders. The metanarrative instructs that there is an organic physical
disparity between sexed bodies which establishes and makes inviolable the boundaries of
male/female.

Simultaneously, the difference between the genders was pejoratively

construed so as to mean privilege and subjugation. Narratively, men and women are
different, and through no fault of their own; behaviors, emotional capacities, logical
capacity, and, above all, bodily physicality all naturally occur disproportionately between
the genders. Men are bigger and stronger where women are smaller and physically less
capable; women are empathetic and emotional where men are logical and calculating.
Our cultural metanarrative tells us that these differences are biological in origin and are
untouched by culture, and then uses them as the allegorical basis for the gender myth:
because men are bigger and stronger, they are more naturally suited to be the ones to
forge out ahead and perform the backbreaking labor necessary to subdue the earth in the
agricultural era; to initiate industry in the industrial era; to work outside the home and
serve as the provider and head of household in the modern era. Because they are smaller,
softer, and nurturing, women are naturally suited to make a home and rear children.
The metanarrative remains clearly attached to this idea: a proliferation of popular,
pseudo-scientific, psychological, and/or behavioralist literature bombards us with
insidious claims that the genders male and female are fundamentally and ontologically
discrete unto themselves -- from You Just Don't Understand: Men and Women in
Conversation (1990) by Deborah Tannen, to Men are from Mars, Women are from Venus
(1992) by John Gray, to Boys and Girls Learn Differently!: A Guide for Teachers and
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Parents (2000) by Michael Gurian and Kathy Stevens, to Why Men Don't Iron (2003) by
Ann and Bill Moir, to Why Gender Matters: What Parents and Teachers Need to Know
About the Emerging Science of Sex Differences (2005) by Leonard Sax, to The Female
Brain (2006) by Louann Brizendine.
The cosmogony of inviolable physical differences which segregate women from
men lends the metanarrative - and its patriarchal posturings - power and validity. The
physically different bodies and physically different brains said to exist between the sexes
"naturally" extend to create gender roles that mirror the stratification and difference
attributed to the bodies. What is rarely considered, however - by theorists and laypeople
alike - is that the causal link may occur not between physical bodies and gender (i.e., the
belief that physical bodies [specifically, sexes] 'cause' gender by natural extension), but
may instead occur as a result of the complex interaction between the body and the gender
metanarrative's prescribed, compulsory participation in the repetition of gendered actions,
behaviors, and choices in the body. While sex and gender are conceptually distinct, the
two are far from mutually exclusive and share a complex, interdependent relationship that
is contrary to the naturalized linearity inherent within the metanarrative model of
biological determinism.
In a series of theoretical works, Judith Lorber (2005), Judith Butler (1999 [1990]),
and Nancy Tuana (1996) each establish that individuals do gender; that the doing of
gender creates gender; and in so doing, also creates the (gendered) body. Gender is a
primary mechanism by which the construction, creation, and maintenance of sexual
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dimorphism between the genders occurs. It is gender, rather than sex, which dictates
actions (both physical and mental), diet, dress, grooming, exercise, body language, etc;
all of these elements in combination affect and contribute to the creation of our physical,
social bodies. All three theorists argue that essential to this understanding of "doing
gender" is the realization that doing gender differently results not only in different
genders (i.e., gender identities which somehow differ or depart from normative
conceptualizations of male and female), but also differently gendered bodies (i.e., bodies
which may no longer display sexually dimorphic attributes previously assumed to be
inherent and thus impervious outside influence). The theorists' acknowledgement of the
plasticity of both gender as a social construct, and of the bodies which simultaneously
interact with the social construct, subversively challenges the assumptions of ontological
difference which lay behind metanarrative gender boundaries.
Lorber, Butler, and Tuana each imply that imbued with their gender paradigm is
the potential for radical foundational change. Their understanding of the body as a
dynamic construction (i.e., an ongoing product of interaction and interrelation), rather
than a wholly predetermined ontology, renders the metanarrative construction of binary
and inviolable physical difference "nonsense" (Tuana 1996: 57). Tuana's discussion of
embodiment specifically engages the physicality of the gendered body as an ongoing
construction, a perpetual series of "intra-actions" which contain aspects both material and
semiotic (57). She argues that the body is not infinitely plastic (meaning that it cannot
take any form), but nor is it infinitely rigid, as the metanarrative's story of biological
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determinism suggests.

As all three theorists assert (and as the literature will also

establish), gendered behavior is a causal factor in the sexually dimorphic physicalities of
gendered bodies. As such, when the behavior changes, so does the body: what the body
does in part creates the body.
The theorists' arguments threaten to compromise the structural foundation of the
gender metanarrative. The sexual dimorphism of the human species has been used as a
primary justification for traditionalist gender roles - the very roles which are in fact
implicated in the creation of the selfsame physical differential in the first place. If the
myth of naturally occurring sexual dimorphism were to be debunked, so too would be the
mainstream justification for the gender roles which are considered to be its natural
extensions. On this basis, Lorber, Butler, and Tuana each argue that a new way to
discursively engage the sex-gender relationship is required, and, in turn, a new way to
engage the realities of sex and gender themselves.
The three theorists each argue that operationalizing gender in this way has
implications for feminist theory in particular. Feminist theory has been often criticized
(i.e., Butler 1999 [1990]) due to its assumption of a unified subject (i.e., unity across
women), when the 'members' of this imposed category may in fact have very little, if
anything at all, in common with one another when the complicating factors of race,
ethnicity, socioeconomic status, able-bodiedness, and sexuality, among others, are
considered. From the standpoint of intersectionality, feminist theory is also admonished
that it does little to achieve comprehensive, intersectional social justice (Butler 1999
S. K. Lewis - Gendering the Body / Chapter One: Introduction
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[1990], hooks 2000 [1984], Lorde 1984). Whereas the mainstream feminist agenda seeks
to achieve male-female equality at face value (that is, providing women with the same
benefits men have typically enjoyed), intersectional critics point out that this leaves the
larger social structure - which was built upon the foundation of the hierarchical gender
binary - without a ready architecture.

If not women, some other group will still

experience exploitation when women join the ranks of men without seeking to adjust the
classist, racist, and misogynist paradigm in which the institution operates. Audre Lorde
(1984) iconically invoked this idea: the master's tools will never dismantle the master's
house. Deconstructing the gender metanarrative from the bottom up as Lorber, Butler,
and Tuana prescribe - that is, addressing the faulty foundation of the sex/sexual
dimorphism/gender relationship - provides an opportunity for feminist theory to reengage
the nature of its membership and advocacy, perhaps prompting an imagining of a gender
ideology that could be beneficial to all sexes, genders, races, ethnicities, classes, and
sexualities.
My contribution to this ongoing theoretical discussion is a small-scale, close look
at the lived experience of bodily difference.

Through ten qualitative, open-ended

interviews with voluntary respondents who identified as transgender, genderqueer,
intersex1, or otherwise gender-transgressive (collectively referred to simply as "trans"), I
engage the theories of Lorber, Butler, and Tuana in an exploration of individual narrative
experiences of gendered bodily change.

My research explores the individual subjects'

1

It should be noted here that it is not the case that all - or even most - intersex individuals identify as trans,
but it happened that the two subjects I interviewed who identified as intersex also self-identified as trans.
S. K. Lewis - Gendering the Body / Chapter One: Introduction
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experiences of their identities in terms of their physical bodies. The data consists of
personal narratives which relate how these individuals experienced, created, and enacted
gender in spite of contrary sex – that is, their experience and consciousness of the
performativity of gender (Butler 1999 [1990], 1993), and the bodily changes they
subsequently experienced.
Transgender offers a uniquely relevant window into the study and discussion of
gender; by its very viability it suddenly reveals as transparent what previously appeared
to be opaque.

More specifically, most trans individuals have consciously engaged the

embodiment of gender in ways in which few cisgender individuals have. Rather than
entertaining the metanarrative's tacit notion of organic dimorphism, the transgender
narrative actively engages and acknowledges the available/possible ways to willfully
construct sexual dimorphism.
This research thus assesses two guiding hypotheses:
H1: Individuals who consciously engage gender via the desire to change or otherwise
transgress normative gender roles (e.g., trans people) gain a heightened awareness of the
physically performative aspects of normative gender roles, and are able to utilize this
awareness in the embodiment of the desired gender role.
H2: Trans individuals experience sexually dimorphic bodily change to be a direct result
of changes to their gender identity.

This research is an exploration of the social construction of sexual dimorphism as a
material-semiotic interaction and the ways in which it can be engaged by the study of
firsthand gender transgressive experiences.

It is my goal to produce an engaging
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analysis, to demonstrate support for the hypotheses, and suggest future avenues for
further research.
Chapter Two, Part I addresses feminist and social constructionist theories of sex
and gender; the (inter)relationship between them; and their interrelation with
embodiment. In particular, the theories of Judith Lorber, Judith Butler, and Nancy Tuana
are discussed.
Part II of the chapter discusses the production of the gendered body. I discuss
anthropological literature which documents gender difference across world cultures,
including the incidence and treatment of third genders, to establish the true fluidity of
gender that lurks behind culturally restrictive, narrative boundaries.

The history of

gender transgression in the West is presented to establish that neither biological sex nor
its correlating sexual dimorphism prevents the "successful" enactment of transgender.
The definition and social process of assigning sex are discussed in concert with the
writings of Anne Fausto-Sterling, Suzanne Kessler, and other theorists who engage the
social construction of the body. Anthropological literature on anatomical adaptation is
presented

in

concert

with

sociological

examinations

of

gender-prescriptive

personification to establish the impact behavior and other repetitive activity can have on
the body. This impact is considered epigenetically; that is, richly situated in the emergent
interplay among body, culture, and environment. I also specifically address the currently
popular metanarrative claim that sex differences, and thus gender, are "hardwired" in the
structure of the brain. I evoke feminist deconstructions of the biased epistemology used

S. K. Lewis - Gendering the Body / Chapter One: Introduction
10

in such neurobiological claims, specifically utilizing the works of Lise Eliot and Cordelia
Fine.
Chapter Three addresses the methodological process used for the primary
research. I discuss the rationale for selecting the interview population for this research. I
also discuss my choice to perform a qualitative study and examine the strengths and
limitations of both the general form and my particular study. My methods are described
in detail, including subject recruitment, the interview questions and process, the method
of data collection, and method of analysis.
Chapter Four presents the findings of the primary research. I explore the bodily
experiences of transgender, androgynous, and/or genderqueer-identified individuals
specifically as they relate to sexual dimorphism and consciously constructing a gendered,
or intentionally non-gendered, appearance. The interviews are quoted at length in order
to present respondents' gender experiences in their own words.
Chapter Five, Part I provides a discussion of the findings in synthesis with the
theory and literature discussed in Chapter Two. Part II of the chapter discusses the
implication of the findings, particularly in terms of feminist theory.
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CHAPTER TWO
Part I:
Theoretical Review

Gender is a fanatical cult.
KATE BORNSTEIN, MY GENDER WORKBOOK, 1998
Of all difficulties which impede the progress of thought, and the formation of well-grounded
opinions on life and social arrangements, the greatest is now the unspeakable ignorance and
inattention of mankind in respect to the influences which form human character. Whatever an
portion of the human species now are, or seem to be, such, it is supposed, they have a natural
tendency to be: even when the most elementary knowledge of the circumstances in which they
have been placed, clearly points out the causes that made them what they are.
JOHN STUART MILL, THE SUBJECTION OF WOMEN, 1869

The Western conceptions of sex and gender are located firmly within a
discursively naturalized metanarrative, which relies on a metaphysic of biological
determinism, sociobiology, and oppositional binarism. The theory engaged in this chapter
acknowledges, critiques, and departs from the Western canon of thought and its
assumptions therein.
Inherent in the Western canon is the assumption of ontological binary: two wholly
discrete factors posed in opposition, one of which preexists the other (Butler 1999 [1990];
Tuana 1996; Lorber 2005).

These binaries - between human/environment,

nature/nurture, body/culture, mind/body, sex/gender, male/female - are operationalized as
ontological opponents whose divisive, one-directional positionalities legitimate the
metanarrative status quo.

In this canon, differences in gender roles - e.g., social

inequalities - are attributed to a congruence with differences in anatomy, the former
springing from the latter. Freud famously put its deterministic view of gender into words
S. K. Lewis - Gendering the Body / Chapter Two, Part I: Theoretical Review
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when he wrote that anatomy was destiny: gender is framed as being created by, and
limited to, the biological capacity of sex.
Social constructionism: Simone de Beauvoir and Judith Lorber
By contrast, the feminist canon presents a model of social construction that
frames gender as a social institution located outside of the body. In her introduction to
The Second Sex, Simone de Beauvoir (1953 [1949]) addresses the metanarratively
presumed ontology of gender when she writes of “the extreme importance of social
discriminations which seem outwardly insignificant but which produce in woman moral
and intellectual effects so profound that they appear to spring from her original nature” –
that is, gendered effects so pervasive that they appear to spring from biology (1953
[1949]: xxxii).

The Second Sex's treatment of gender presupposes West and

Zimmerman’s (1987) breakthrough that gender, as separate from sex, is “done;" as
Beauvoir writes, "one is not born, but rather becomes, a woman" (281). Like Beauvoir,
West and Zimmerman make the distinction between sex as a physiological "fact," and
gender as a social process which operationalizes sex as a site of meaningful difference.
In this model, gender practices are framed not as the linear result of sex differences, nor
the result of biological determinism. Rather, they are the product of the paradigm of
social determinism that uses perceived sex differences as a site of primary societal
division. Through the manufacture of gender, a primary relationship which limits and
regulates behavior, labor, power, and agency is also created. It is thus gender, and not
sex itself, that is framed as the root of sex discrimination, oppression, and exploitation.
S. K. Lewis - Gendering the Body / Chapter Two, Part I: Theoretical Review
13

The social constructionist distinction between sex and gender has allowed
generations of feminists to articulate the metaphysical role of culture in the manufacture
of gendered difference, discrimination, and oppression. Nancy Tuana (1996) writes that
the conceptualization of gender as a social construct was central to feminist refutations of
the biological determinist model of male superiority:
At a time when feminists felt that we had to confront socially dominant arguments
for the biological basis of male superiority, "gender" was a useful tool to explain
male privilege as a result of complex structures of oppression and privilege that
were historically variable and culturally constituted. Along with Beauvoir we
gloried in arguing that women were made, not born. (55-56)
In the social constructionist view, women and men are "made" by the placement of
discursively legitimating marks upon otherwise neutral bodies and in their conformity to
discursively legitimating roles.

Thus, social constructionist feminists imply that

difference is often only the perception of difference, a result of the cultural production of
gender inequality.
In a series of articles and books that began in the 1990s, Judith Lorber began to
approach the social constructionist model of gender in a new way. Like other feminist
social constructionists before her, she invokes the inscriptive and regulating power of
gender on the body. However, rather than treat the body as a blank slate passively
receptive to the marks of gender, Lorber conceives the marks of gender not as superficial
obscurants of an ontological similarity between male and female bodies, but as actions,
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rituals, and practices that affect physical embodiment2 - truly creating gendered bodies
(1993, 1997, 2000). In "The Social Body," she and Patricia Yancey Martin (1997) write,
Members of a society construct their bodies in ways that comply with their status
and accepted notions of masculinity and femininity. That is, they try to shape and
use their bodies to conform to their culture's or racial ethnic group's expectations
of how a woman's body, a man's body, a girl's body, or a boy's body should look.
This point does not deny the distinctiveness of material bodies, with their
different physical shapes, sizes, strengths, and weaknesses. It does emphasize,
however, that members of a society, not genes or biology, determine the proper
shape and usage of women's, men's, boys', and girls' bodies, beyond dress, hair
style, cosmetics, and other adornments. (185)
They go on to elaborate that men's and women's bodies are shaped by both the intentional
and unconscious ways we pursue gender conformity; even though the physical
consequences of some actions - i.e., bodybuilding - are more obvious than others - i.e.,
choice of footwear - each have very real implications. While Lorber and Martin do assert
that there is a great deal of physical similarity between the sexes - a difference which they
believe is carefully and deliberately obscured by the social practices which regulate the
appearance of gender, to the benefit of the hierarchal structure found within the gender
metanarrative - they also believe there is more to the story (202). The ideas and practices
of gender have bodily outcomes, not just appearances: gendered bodies are not just
socially, but also physically, produced.
Lorber (1997; 2000) argues that virtually all social practices reinforce, make
salient, and in fact create physical otherness between the genders: the body is subject to
2

Throughout this chapter and the remainder of this text, the term "embodiment" is used to refer to gender
in a way that attends not only to the performative aspects of gender, but also to the physical, bodily
manifestations of gender and gender difference, which are inextricable from considerations of
performativity.
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transformation through gendered social practices. Upon critical observation, every aspect
of gendered society displays an investment in physical otherness while simultaneously
posing such difference as "natural." Lorber argues that the physical manifestation of
gendered difference is a deliberate social process, no matter how undeliberate it might
feel to individual actors. She writes that “the transformation of bodies that might be less
differentiable into bodies that are markedly masculine and feminine is typical of the
pressures of gender” (2000: 4).

In so framing the bodily consequences of social

construction, Lorber here invokes the concept of a pre-gender ontological body, which is
transformed into a socially intelligible body through the marks of gender.3

As the

physical difference between the sexes is one of the main arguments behind the
metanarrative's hierarchical metaphysic, Lorber argues that the limited extent of "true"
(i.e., ontological) sexually dimorphic differences are not enough to justify the systematic
assumption that women are so physically different than men that they are by their very
nature inferior.
Lorber and Martin (1997) engage the bodily consequences of gender semiotics,
gendered behavior, action, and ritual, perceiving that a life lived within culturally
prescribed gender boundaries does not occur without an effect on embodiment. They
argue that gender expectations and normative gender pressure affect virtually all social
and personal actions (sometimes in intersection with other prevailing statuses), and give
the example of military service in the Marine Corps. In addition to special requirements

3

Tuana and Butler will later criticize this reliance on the nature/nurture binary.
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regarding dress and cosmetics, female recruits are required to attend classes on makeup,
hair care, poise, and etiquette as part of a "feminization requirement." A female drill
instructor is quoted:
A lot of the recruits who come here don't wear makeup; they're tomboyish or
athletic. A lot of them have the preconceived idea that going into the military
means they can still be a tomboy. They don't realize that you are a Woman
Marine. (190)
Evident in this example are methods both superficial and insidious by which gendered
difference is produced: first, by rules requiring female Marines to appear different than
male Marines by use of dress and makeup; and second, by placing a limitation on the
definition of "Marine" to accommodate the presumption that women cannot perform the
role the same way (e.g., 'as good as') men can. Female recruits were also assigned lesser
physical challenges than male Marines, or given aids to obstacles, like a ramp or stool in
a wall-climbing exercise - though they were docked points when they used it. In addition
to setting up the women to underperform the men (by losing points), thereby reinforcing
a hierarchy of ability, this practice helps create the very physical difference it decries by
denying women the same physical experiences as the men. Lorber and Martin are quick
to note that this is not to imply that if the women climbed the walls without ramps, their
bodies would become identical to male bodies; but rather is an acknowledgement that the
enactment of gender expectations has a physical consequence. In discussing a four-yearold female who already "throws like a girl," Lorber and Martin write that,
The girl who experiences her body in such a limited way at an early age is a
product of her culture and time. As she learns to restrict her movements, she
simultaneously closes out opportunities to develop the fluid, whole-bodied,
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unconstrained moves that are associated with outstanding achievement in sports.
(191)
It is not just gendered movement which affects embodiment; Lorber and Martin point out
that gendered divisions in risk-taking behavior (including things like habitual drug or
alcohol use), dieting, breast enhancements, face-lifts, and hair transplants are all things
which affect embodiment, and perhaps in ways more than the sum of their parts: the
authors note that these practices may lead to addiction, illness, such as eating disorders,
infections, and systemic damage from leaking silicone implants (186). While these are
all choices made and actions undertaken for cultural reasons, they all have very real
effects on the body - in terms of not only observable gender conformity, but also ablebodiedness, health, and life expectancy.
Acceptable gender behavior changes over time, and Lorber and Martin
demonstrate corresponding changes in gendered physical embodiment:
Have female bodies changed in the last 100 years? Yes, they have. Women did
not run in marathons until approximately 20 years ago. In 20 years of marathon
competition, women have reduced their finish times by more than 1 1/2 hours.
They are expected to run as fast as men in the 26-mile marathon by 1998 and
might catch up with men's running times in races of other lengths in the next 50
years because they are increasing their speeds more rapidly than are men. ...
When the opportunities for competition are available, training begins when
athletes are young and it is more serious than has been in the past. The result is
more developed musculature, greater lung capacity, and increased strength, speed,
and stamina - for women and for men. (192-193)
The longitudinal nature of this particular example demonstrates that as gender
expectations gradually change (in this case, in terms of the acceptability of running
marathons), so do bodies change with them. Lorber and Martin invoke the body as
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plastic, as literally (physically) constructed by the enactment of prescribed gendered
action. In their theory, the body is receptive to the inscriptions of culture but at the same
time limited to the possibilities of material reality ("Bodies are born and bodies die"
(202)).
The material-semiotic intra-action: Judith Butler and Nancy Tuana
In Gender Trouble, Judith Butler (1999 [1990]) frames gender as a limiting and
regulative discursive construction which individuals engage through ritual performativity
in order to gain social legitimacy and intelligibility. Butler writes that
performativity is not a singular act, but a repetition and a ritual, which achieves its
effects through its naturalization in the context of a body, understood, in part, as a
culturally sustained temporal duration.
The view that gender is performative sought to show that what we take to be an
internal essence of gender is manufactured through a sustained set of acts, posited
through the gendered stylization of the body. …[W]hat we take to be an
‘internal’ feature of ourselves is one that we anticipate and produce through
certain bodily acts, at an extreme, an hallucinatory effect or naturalized gestures.
(xv)
For Butler, this performativity constitutes identity: "There is no gender identity behind
the expressions of gender; that identity is performatively constructed by the very
'expressions' that are said to be its results" (33). Butler argues that both sex and gender
are constructions, positing that the ostensibly natural facts of sex are discursively
produced by "various scientific discourses in the service of other political and social
interests":
As a result, gender is not to culture as sex is to nature; gender is also the
discursive/cultural means by which ‘sexed nature’ or ‘a natural sex’ is produced
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and established as "prediscursive," prior to culture, a politically neutral surface on
which culture acts. (11)
Butler believes the "prediscursive" conceptualization of sex to be fallacious and in fact
nonsense: we cannot perceive of one without the other; they are non-separable and thus
no one can preexist the other. Butler in fact protests the Western canon's at-large reliance
on a binaries, which she believes inevitably establishes a pervasive ontological bias.
Butler engages the metanarrative bias towards binarism in her deconstruction of
the conception of "a subject before the law" (4) - a phrasic cultural fragment Butler uses
to demonstrate the discursive construction of the universal human subject and external
phenomena as two whole, independently existent entities. "A subject before the law"
implies that the subject is an entity which autonomously pre-exists the law, when in
reality, the subject and the law are not mutually exclusive, but exist only as the result of
interaction. Butler writes,
[T]he subjects regulated by such structures are, by virtue of being subjected to
them, formed, defined, and reproduced in accordance with the requirements of
those structures. ... The performative invocation of a nonhistorical 'before'
becomes the foundational premise that guarantees a presocial ontology of persons
who freely consent to be governed and, thereby, constitute the legitimacy of the
social contract. (4-5)
Butler unpacks this phrase to reveal the binary notion of "before," using this example as a
microcosm of the foundational bias which pervades the metanarrative.

When we

perceive ourselves as subjects before the law, we understand that in our creation of the
law, we have consented to be governed. When we conceive of sex before gender, we
understand sex has created gender, and the ontological linearity between the two
legitimates gender difference and inequality.
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Nancy Tuana (1996) presents something of a synthesis between Lorber and
Butler. Like Butler, Tuana engages the ontological bias in metanarrative and social
constructionist notions of sex, gender, and identity, but Tuana extends and further
explores what she considers to be Butler's underdeveloped treatment of physical
materiality. Though Butler often invokes the "metaphysics of substance" (27), a phrase
she aptly borrows from Nietzsche, her analysis often fails to engage the visceral, fleshy
substance central to Tuana's material-semiotic intra-action (57).

Butler's discussion

alludes to the active and interrelated role of the body:
If bodies cannot be said to have a signifiable existence prior to the mark of their
gender; the question then emerges: To what extent does the body come into being
in and through the mark(s) of gender? How do we reconceive the body no longer
as a passive medium or instrument awaiting the enlivening capacity of a distinctly
immaterial will? (13)
However, she subsequently focuses almost exclusively on the discursive, non-material
construction of the legitimacy and intelligibility of bodies. Hers is a largely abstract
discussion that neglects the substantive reality of the body; Tuana writes that Butler is
"overly focused on discursive elements, which too often leads her to ignore or obscure
the materiality of the intra-action" (63, emphasis added). Whereas the metanarrative
operationalizes the body as a sexed (and sexually dimorphic) entity independent of and
before culture, and feminist theory constructs the body as a uniformly blank slate before
culture (which then inscribes its meanings on the 'passive' body), Tuana argues that the
body cannot be said to pre-exist culture. Butler argued this in the abstract terms of
legibility; Tuana brings it to the flesh: the material body and culture create each other in
complex and non-separable "intra-action" (57).
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Tuana argues against the social constructionist polarization of sex and gender
precisely because it relies on the same nature/nurture ontological bias as the theories
feminism seeks to refute, thus maintaining and perpetuating the idea of a sexed body that
pre-exists culture:
it is pernicious to simply critique theories of biological determinism on their own
terms, for doing so leaves the metaphysic underpinning them in place. ... Our
ongoing reliance on the dichotomy between sex and gender is also epistemically
irresponsible for we continue to make the distinction in a way that replicates the
metaphysic that provides the foundation for biological determinism. (54)
Tuana is quick to note that she does not completely deny the value of this distinction,
especially insofar as it has framed feminist inquiries into science and epistemology.
These inquiries were devoted to "exposing the ways in which theories of biological
determinism have been used to justify a range of sexist and racist practices" and
ultimately revealed the way theories concerning sex and race differences "both arose out
of and in turn reinforced socially held biases about women and about people of oppressed
races" (54). Tuana herself employed this construction in her work The Less Noble Sex
(1993).
Nevertheless, Tuana criticizes that many feminists, once having made the
distinction between sex and gender, feel compelled to minimize the body. Willing to
engage only the semiotic aspects of gender, when "[f]aced with the body, feminists too
often embrace meaning rather than flesh" (56). Tuana invokes both flesh and meaning
through the example of male body builders, demonstrating the complexity of the
interrelated factors which produce the body builders' hypermasculinized physiques,
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which are situated in and produced by the discursive constructs of power, strength,
heterosexuality, masculinity, and maleness. Body builders themselves see their bodies
"as a form of highly resistant plastic" that can be transformed at will. But as Tuana notes,
"[w]hen male body builders attempt to inscribe their bodies with the (currently) perfect
form of masculinity, the body has a say" (60). The body builders' prolonged use of
steroids often causes gynecomastia - essentially, breast tissue produced by the estrogen
the body produces to counteract the massive doses of what it perceives to be testosterone
- and a range of other bodily manifestations, including the shrinkage of the penis, sperm
count reduction or eradication, and the inability to have an erection. Tuana uses the
bodybuilders to demonstrate that masculinities and femininities are "performed - and embodied": "To say that the body is 'always already' culture is not to deny that it is
'always already' material; just do not make a dichotomy out of it" (60). As inaccurate as
it is to conceive of one factor pre-existing the other, it is just as pernicious to assume
there are only the two factors in play.
Tuana argues that the constructionist practice of embracing only semiotics and
denying materiality confines us to the incomplete and fallacious epistemology the
metaphysics of biniarism allows.
By keeping in place a fixed, biological given, feminist theorizing leaves itself
open to the critique that this biological body is more significant than we hoped,
that this body is our unchanging destiny. Unfortunately, the last ten years has
witnessed a dramatic increase in popular acceptance of the view that sex
differences and race differences are biologically caused and thus inevitable. I
believe that we feminists have been epistemically irresponsible in leaving in place
a fixed, essential, material basis for human nature, a basis which renders
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biological determinism meaningful. We have not attended sufficiently to the
body, to the ways in which it is formed and transformed by social institutions. We
must turn our attention to the sexing of the body and to fleshing gender to
understand both how the body is socially constituted and how its materiality in
turn informs the parameters of its configurations. Let me be clear. I do not
advocate disproving biological determinism. I advocate rendering it nonsense.
(57)
To depart from the insufficiencies of constructionism, Tuana formulates a feminist
epistemology of material-semiotic intra-action, which refers to the interminable process
of the interrelatedness among phenomena, both material and semiotic. She writes that
this intra-active process "will be mischaracterized as long as we attempt to understand it
through the false dichotomy of sex/gender or through the related binarisms of
biology/culture, essential/constructed" (57). The body is shaped in concert with the
effects of the environment, and the environment in concert with the effects of the body.
As Tuana writes, "we will never understand bodies fully without also attending to flesh,
and doing so in ways that do not render it separate from the discursive" - nor will be able
to approach the discursive as separate from the flesh (57).
The material-semiotic intra-action Tuana describes renders the idea of biological
determinism meaningless.

The essentialist constructs of pre-existing and/or

independently existing entities - whether they be body, sex, environment, culture, gender
- are nonsensical, as no one can be defined apart from its intra-actions with all the others
(and indeed, its entire positionality). There is no ontological material form that preexists
culture: such an construct is strictly a figure of the imagination. Culture and environment
have inexorable roles in physical embodiment, creating and transforming the body
materially as well as semiotically; and in turn, bodies have inexorable roles in the
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creation and transformation of the environment - and we cannot fully nor accurately
engage any of these phenomena without engaging an intra-active epistemology.
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Part II:
Literature Review - The Production of the Body
Notions of essential characteristics or fixed natures (Kantian noumena) are, on
such a metaphysic, nonsense. Although a dichotomy between nature/nurture or
separate genetic and environmental mechanisms is rendered inadequate by this
intra-active model of the dynamic relation between gene, environment, and
organism, a process metaphysic of phenomena does not preclude making
distinctions, even distinctions between the environment and the organism, or
between sex and gender. But the making of such distinctions must always be
richly situated and acknowledge the complexity of the developmental intraaction. What is rejected is the claim that these distinctions signify natural and
unchanging boundaries. But do not trip over that refusal into thinking that these
distinctions are then arbitrary divisions of a prior oneness. Revealing distinctions
and constructing boundaries between sex and gender are important, but they will
be time, situation, and value relative, and must re-fuse dichotomization. What
thus is needed is the adoption of a metaphysic adequate to a critical understanding
of the complexities of the material-semiotic intra-action of phenomena. (Tuana
1996: 62, emphasis added)
At the risk of reverting to the social constructionist model, this section addresses
the ways embodiment in particular (specifically, gender embodiment) is affected and
interactively constructed by social and environmental factors, utilizing Tuana's model of
distinctions which are made and utilized within an epistemological framework of
material-semiotic phenomenology.
The social construction of embodiment is invoked not to negate the agency of the
body, but rather in order to demonstrate that when the cultural content of gender changes,
so does the body.

This gendered bodily plasticity undermines the metaphysic of

ontological sexually dimorphism which legitimates the biological determinism of the
hierarchical gender metanarrative - in so doing rendering it nonsense.
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The inscriptive effect of the intangible
As Lorber, Butler, and Tuana have all argued, the cosmogony of inviolable
physical differences which segregate women from men lends the metanarrative - and its
patriarchal posturings - power and validity. As such, the metanarrative reflects a vested
interest in the maintenance and continued production of the nature/nurture,
culture/environment, and in particular, mind/body, sex/gender binarism, leading to the
policing and regulating structures that limit and rigidly define socially intelligible gender.
Butler (1993) believes that gender is discursively constructed through the compulsory,
ritual iteration of performativities that are located within the social matrixes of
intelligibility; but at the same time, she acknowledges the complex interrelationship that
nevertheless exists between the de rigueur of gender and the subjectivity of the body. In
Bodies that Matter (a title which is a subversive and well-thought-out pun), she writes,
'performance' is not a singular 'act' or event, but a ritualized production, a ritual
reiterated under and through constraint, under and through the force of prohibition
and taboo, with the threat of ostracism and even death controlling and compelling
the shape of the production, but not, I will insist, determining it fully in advance.
(95)
Tuana's writings take Butler's theory of performativity to the logical extension of
physicality: the discursively constructed realms of intelligible gender prescribe the
boundaries of possible (i.e., legible) identities, thereby regulating which actions,
behaviors, and activities are available to each gender. These restrictions thus define the
physical parameters available to sexed, gendered bodies, in so creating a gendered
subtext - and embodied consequence - to each and every action. So, even though Butler's
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theories of performativity initially seem to divorce the body from gender entirely for the
sake of demonstrating how sex and gender are discursively, not bodily, defined, the two
are in fact married again as the gendering discourse prescribes the performativity which
acts as a catalytic agent in the manufacture of the observable gendered body (which, as
Butler points out, does not necessarily need be sex-coherent).
The restrictive parameters of socially legible gender thus create performative
'scripts' of the actions, behaviors, and activities permitted within the boundaries of
intelligible gender, which are rigidly policed, as Butler suggests above, in ways that place
transgressors in great peril. The limits of intelligible gender are manifest in virtually all
social interactions. One example is found in common behavioral admonitions: if pressed
as to why one does not like a raunchy female comic, for example, a repulsed observer
may disdain that it's not funny when women are raunchy - it's not "ladylike." (Such
criticisms of comics like Jenny McCarthy and Chelsea Handler are rampant; although
both of these women are still successful and even "popular," I find it salient that the
content of the criticism they face is more often their perceived nonconformity to
expectations of femininity than it is statements about the complainant's sense of humor
[i.e., "I just don't find bodily fluids funny"], when criticisms of male comics typically
contain only the latter.) Women and girls are admonished to cross their legs at the ankle,
speak politely, accept chivalrous gestures, and the like. Likewise, men are advised to
"man up," "sack up," and to "be a man."

The normative pressure to perform

unambiguous gender legibility is similarly betrayed in many insults, especially for men:
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in addition to references of the testicles as a metonym for pulling yourself up by your
bootstraps ("have some balls;" "I thought you had a pair"), male insults are peppered with
references to being "pussies," "girls"/"ladies," or being "whipped." Each of these insults
calls the masculinity of the actor into question, suggesting in no uncertain terms that he
needs to become 'more' male. In their policing of masculinity and femininity, these
admonitions show how individual actors are compelled to consciously engage socially
constructed notions of maleness and femaleness in order to embody legible conformity.
The social constructionist model of gender is thus useful in explicating the real
role that intangible measures play in the regulation of gender performativity, and thus
gender embodiment. Another example of this is the way in which conceptualizations of
masculinity and femininity are applied to ideas of occupational prowess and ability.
Lorber (1994; 2005) points out that while women long ago proved themselves physically
and mentally capable of the work traditionally confined to the male sphere of work (e.g.,
women's employment in defense plants, steel mills, and other heavy industry during
WWII (1994: 9)), the gender segregation of jobs has subsisted on the basis of the
metanarrative stories of masculine- and feminine-appropriateness alone (e.g., the firing of
virtually all women employees at the end of WWII):
At the present time in the Western postindustrial world, the gendered social order
persists without much rationale. Women and men have legal equality, supported
by a public rhetoric of equal rights and equal responsibilities for family support,
household maintenance, and child care, as well as for individual economic
independence. ... There are still occasional claims for men's "natural'" domination
and women's "natural" subordination, ostensibly backed by research on brain
organization, hormonal input, or personality structure, but these claims are
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increasingly delegitimized by the presence of women prime ministers, governors,
and university professors.
Unfortunately, the rhetoric and legality of gender equality mask the underlying
structure of gender inequality. Modern machinery and computers even out the
discrepancy in physical capabilities between men and women, but jobs are
assigned as if upper body strength mattered. Women are often better educated
than men, but the postindustrial gendered social order still reproduces gender
inequality in the job market and in wage scales. Men can run vacuum cleaners
and change diapers, but women are still the main household workers and
managers and the primary parents. Heterosexual men still think they have a right
to women's bodies and exploit them sexually. Laws made by governments
dominated by men restrict women's procreative choices. (Lorber 2005: 18)
The prescriptions and limitations posed by the gender metanarrative, though intangible,
unquestionably have a real effect on the individual's experience in terms of the
accessibility, intelligibility, and legitimacy of possible personification.

As we will

continue to explore in this chapter, the cumulative emergent reality of ritualized
performance makes it clear that such prescriptions and limitations cannot affect
personification without also affecting embodiment.
-Threats of transgression: masculinity, femininity, and mixed messages
The limitations of legible gender are firmly situated in the metanarrative
cosmogony of ontological binary. There is at the same time, however, a confused and
foggy hypocrisy found in the metanarrative's tributary stories about gender. We
simultaneously receive messages of apparent contradiction: while the sexually dimorphic
gender binary is framed as an ontologically divisive intractability, popular culture
nevertheless meets us at every turn with references to the work required to upkeep one's
gender. From depilatory to podiatry, from facial cosmetics to body fragrance, we are
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reminded of everything one must do (and buy) in order to be a man/woman. All this begs
the question: if gender roles were naturally occurring, why would so much work be
required?
Our culture is rife with such contradictory statements, which inevitably surface
upon observation of actions that are considered to be gender transgressive. Though the
cultural chatter is at all other times full of exhortations of naturally-occurring gender, its
tenor changes notably when a gender subversive or transgressive act is perceived,
however mild. Beauvoir (1952 [1949]) aptly noted this narrative contradiction in The
Second Sex: women were instructed that the female gender role was simply an organic
manifestation of the sex's natural abilities - while they at the same time faced reproach
regarding the shortfalls of their performance as female. She writes, "And yet we are told
that femininity is in danger; we are exhorted to be women, remain women, become
women" (xli, emphasis added). She again raises the question: why would someone be
admonished to be something unless they were not that already? And if they were not
women before admonishment, what were they? Are we to understand that women are
born, or made?
The gender-policing uproar is especially righteous when children are the
transgressive actors. In March 2010, the perceived boy-like appearance of Shiloh JoliePitt (the daughter of celebrities Brad Pitt and Angelia Jolie), then aged three years, was
the cover story of Life & Style Weekly. On the magazine's website, the corresponding
article asserts that the child's appearance has caused "a firestorm of controversy" and
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quotes Glenn Stanton, director of Family Formation Studies at Focus on the Family:
"Little girls have never been women before. They need help, they need guidance of what
that looks like. It's important to teach our children that gender distinction is very healthy"
(Life & Style Weekly 2010). In a similar media outcry, a Spring 2011 J. Crew catalog
featured a picture of a five-year-old boy with his toenails polished in neon pink,
prompting Erin Brown of the right-leaning Media Research Center to refer to the ad as
"blatant propaganda celebrating transgendered children" (James 2011).
In his vehement criticism of the J. Crew ad, psychiatrist and Fox News blogger
Keith Ablow (2011) writes that the ad was "a dramatic example of the way that our
culture is being encouraged to abandon all trappings of gender identity." He goes on to
prosthelytize that
In our technology-driven world ... almost nothing is now honored as real and true.
... [E]ncouraging the choosing of gender identity, rather than suggesting our
children become comfortable with the ones that they got at birth, can throw our
species into real psychological turmoil—not to mention crowding operating
rooms with procedures to grotesquely amputate body parts. ... Why should we
hold dear anything with which we were born? What’s the benefit of non-fiction
over fiction?
Well, the benefit is that non-fiction always wins, in the end.
Ablow's essentialist refutation of the ad's "hostil[ity] to the gender distinctions that are
actually a part of the magnificent synergy that creates and sustains the human race" is rife
with contradiction; he at once admonishes us to honor what is "natural" while
simultaneously arguing for the coercive conformity to what he has just claimed was
ontological. It stands to reason that if gender were truly natural, children wouldn't need
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to 'become' comfortable with it, as they already would be; it would not need to be taught
or regulated; and there would be no such thing as a fictive gender.
The social construction of sex and the social construction of science
As previously discussed, Butler (1999 [1990]) argues that sex, like gender, is also
a concept subject to social construction. This is important to address, as the idealized
notion of non-ambiguous sex evident in the physical body is the site of polarizing
nature/nurture, sex/gender binarism.

Utilizing a feminist epistemology, Butler co-

conceptualizes body and culture, sex and gender: since neither pre-exists the other, any
one simply cannot be conceived (or "discovered," which implies a nonexistent objective
neutrality) without the other. She writes,
The task of distinguishing sex from gender becomes all the more difficult once we
understand that gendered meanings frame the hypothesis and the reasoning of
those biomedical inquiries that seek to establish 'sex' for us as it is prior to the
cultural meanings that it acquires. Indeed, the task is even more complicated
when we realize that the language of biology participates in other kinds of
languages and reproduces that cultural sedimentation in the objects it purports to
discover and neutrally describe. (139)
Butler's argument falls within an established canon of literature (Fausto-Sterling 1985,
2000; Fox Keller 1987; van den Wijngaard 1997; Kessler 1998; Dreger 1998; Kitzinger
1999) which similarly contests the discursively constructed notion of sex as an exclusive
category restricted to the two and only two "true" sexes of male and female. In How Sex
Changed, Joanne Meyerowitz (2008) writes, "We might think of biological sex as a
natural phenomenon, with unchanging categories, male and female, universally
recognized in all cultures and centuries. But like gender and sexuality, biological sex has
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a history. Humans have imagined it differently at different times and in different places"
(21).
Though ostensibly couched in the body, the narrative "story" of ontological sex
dichotomy is a socially regulating factor just as metaphysical in nature as any other
gendered construct, and like any other gendered construct, its interaction produces a very
real effect in the body. A frequently cited illustration is that of intersexuality: though not
wholly uncommon (Bloom 2002; Dreger 1998)4, is treated as anathema and a "mistake"
that requires an immediate intervention and correction to restore the "natural" order of
things. In the 1990 instructional film "Surgical Reconstruction of Ambiguous Genitalia
in Female Children, Dr. Richard Hurwitz intones, "The finding of ambiguous genitalia in
the newborn is a medical and social emergency" (Bloom 101). Intersexed babies are
often subjected to surgical intervention shortly after birth to "normalize" their genital
appearance.

The decision-making process utilized to determine which genitals to

construct is in fact rife with interaction between conditions of the body, medical ability,
gender bias, and the role gender bias plays within the medical model.

The decision is

sometimes made on the materiality of the body alone based on perceived medical
capability ("it's easier to build a hole than a pole" (Bloom 2002)) with no further testing
to evaluate chromosomal or other indicators of sex; at other times, the materiality of the

4

"Far from being an exceptionally rare problem, babies born with 'genitals that are pretty confusing to tall
the adults in the room,' as medical historian and ethicist Alice Dreger puts it, are more common than babies
born with cystic fibrosis. Or, to think of it differently, there are probably at least as many intersexed people
in the United States as there are members of the American College of Surgeons" (Bloom 102-103).
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body is filtered through the ideas of sex- or gender-appropriateness: if the penis is
perceived as "too" small, the child is deemed a girl; if the clitoris is perceived as "too"
big, the child is deemed a boy (Kessler 1998).

In writing about the anathema of

ambiguous sex, Bloom writes, "In modern America, we have done our own disappearing
act on hermaphrodites: we have turned a lot of baby boys into baby girls, and a lot of
healthy baby girls into traumatized ones" (111).
The example of intersex is given not to co-opt the subjective experiences of the
intersexed as a theoretical tool, but rather to show one particularly salient site of the
literal extent of the social construction of sex. While many have used intersexuality as an
argument for a "Third Sex," Tuana (1996) in fact argues that the introduction of a third
sex category would have the potential to be just as insidious as the existent two if it were
to still rely on the assumption of ontologically "true" sex: there would just be three
options for true sex, rather than two, and the essentialist underpinnings (nature/nurture,
body/environment, sex/gender) of biological determinism would remain unchallenged.
She writes, "we must reject the idea of difference as a lack, and replace it with an
understanding of difference that allows for ‘otherness’ without hierarchization – that is,
that one group of people can be different without that difference entailing superiority or
inferiority" (1993: 172).
-The social construction of science
In The Less Noble Sex, Tuana (1993) argues that science as a whole is not the
ontologically neutral and objective lens that the metanarrative makes it out to be; instead,
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it must be perceived within the situationality of time, place, culture - and, yes, gender.
She posits that culturally prevalent beliefs, such as woman's relative imperfection as
compared to man, all find their way into science as a priori ideas: "sexist biases permeate
the entire structure of science" (ix). Science is in itself social entity and is a site of the
production and reproduction of the sexist world, "both in supplying legitimating
ideologies and in enhancing material power" (Haraway qtd. in Tuana 1993: x). The
prevalent scientific epistemology leaves us with an incomplete and inaccurate
understanding of that which it attempts to measure due to its foundation in the restrictive
metaphysic of binarism. It is fallacious to conceive of sex as "natural," ontological, or
discrete, as is its meaning and embodiment are both obviously shaped by the social
realities of gender. In rejecting this conceptualization of sex, the nature/nurture binary is
rendered nonsensical, as is its location as the basis of the cosmogonic gender narrative.
The fallacy of gender universality: global gender variation, historical drag, and the
implications of "passing"
Logic would dictate that if gender roles were naturally occurring, then gender
roles would have to naturally occur identically across the globe. This, of course, is not
the case. The definitions of masculinity, or maleness, and femininity, or femaleness,
throughout the world show tremendous variation: what is in some cultures "obviously"
feminine is in another "obviously" male. The strict gender binary also proves to be not as
universal as the Western metanarrative would have us believe: the prevalence of "third"
genders across the globe is well documented, and the implications of cultures that depart
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from the binary gender model well-theorized (Herdt 1993; Ramet 1996; Totman 2003).
From this canon, Lorber (1994) extrapolates that
gender cannot be equated with biological and physiological differences between
human females and males. The building blocks of gender are socially constructed
statuses. Western societies have only two genders, “man” and “woman.” Some
societies have three genders – men, women, and berdaches or hijras or xaniths.
Berdaches, hijras, and xaniths are biological males who behave, dress, work, and
are treated in most respects as social women; they are therefore not men, nor are
they female women; they are, in our language, “male women.” There are African
and American Indian societies that have a genders status called manly hearted
women – biological females who work, marry, and parent as men; their social
status is “female men." They do not behave or dress as men to have the social
responsibilities and prerogatives of husbands and fathers; what makes them men
is enough wealth to buy a wife. ... These odd or deviant or third genders show
us what we ordinarily take for granted – that people have to learn to be
women and men. (17-18, bolding added)
It thus seems that an empirical observation of global gender variation would lead any
logician to conclude that the premise underlying the gender metanarrative - that gender
roles, as the Western world currently conceives them, are naturally occurring as a result
of ontological categories of sex - is at best an absurd construction, and at worst simply
untrue. Instead, the self-reproducing gender metanarrative here intersects with the social
construction of race and ethnicity. In concert with other notions of superiority and
privilege, the operationalization of gender co-created the Western anthropological
conceptualization of global peoples: rather than let encounters with differently gendered
cultures inform a new gender metaphysic, indigenous peoples' failure to demonstrate soperceived "natural" gender roles was likely a factor in the subsequent Western
construction of racial, ethnic, and cultural inferiority.
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-Historical drag and the implications of passing
Gender variance is nothing new: in The Riddle of Gender, Deborah Rudacille
(2005) writes,
Far from being a product of the modern world, gender variance has been
documented across cultures and in every epoch of history. Male-bodied persons
dressing and living as women were known in ancient Greece and Rome, among
Native American tribes prior to the arrival of Europeans, on the Indian
subcontinent, in Africa, in Siberia, in eastern Europe, and in nearly every other
indigenous society studied by anthropologists. According to historian Vern
Bullough, 'gender crossing is so ubiquitous, that genitalia by itself has never been
a universal nor essential insignia of a lifelong gender.' ... Moreover, the deathbed
discovery of a gender reversal is a far more common occurrence in Western
history than one might suspect. (3)
Particularly salient in historical literature is the not entirely uncommon phenomenon of
soldiers who were discovered to have female genitalia only upon injury on the battlefield
(e.g., Deborah Samson or Fa Mulan, the latter of which is the subject of the Disney film
Mulan). Such individuals show that female-bodiedness does not preclude successful
male embodiment, and a variety of other historical figures similarly show that malebodiedness does preclude female embodiment, even in the spheres that are constructed as
especially sex-restrictive (i.e., combat).
Drag, transgenderism, and transsexualism are the bête noire of the gender
metanarrative and its underlying metaphysic of ontological binary precisely because they
embody the "impossible": they reveal the very possibility of departure from the restrictive
cisgender model. In the discursive construction of difference, our culture is filled with
messages about the physically inviolable boundaries of gender.

This self-fulfilling
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prophecy simultaneously functions to justify the hierarchal status quo and naturalizes
conformity, thereby discouraging transgressive acts and eventuating in a materiality that
embodies those very boundaries.

Departures from cisgender conformity are rigidly

policed and punished as unnatural aberrations; as sick, wrong, or sexually deviant in
origin.
What is so striking, then, is the relative ease by which transgressive acts of
"passing" are accomplished. In addition to its prevalence in historical accounts, instances
of drag are found throughout the Western canon of literature and drama; gender
switching, per say, happens remarkably often in the works of Shakespeare, particularly in
his comedies.

Female transvestitism occurs in at least five comedies, and the

transgressors are never suspected until they ultimately reveal themselves. Situated almost
a half-century later, Norah Vincent's 2006 book Self-Made Man: One Woman's Year
Disguised as a Man presents a modern account of a rather Shakespearean situation. In
her one-year (part-time) embodiment as "Ned," Vincent was never once suspected of
being female: though often perceived as a gay male, she was nevertheless discernibly
male.

She passed flawlessly in environments which ranged from strip clubs, bars,

bowling alleys, and a monastery. At several points in the book, Vincent attempts to get
the people she's gotten to know as Ned guess her "real" gender. She describes this
interaction at the monastery:
We walked a little farther in silence, and then I turned to him. At this point, since
I was on the verge of leaving anyway, I wasn’t wearing my beard anymore. I
hadn’t been wearing it for several days. To me it should have seemed obvious
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that something wasn’t quite right. But this was the test of perception that
continually arose with Ned. People saw in him what I had conditioned them to
see. (116)
Even though she so easily slipped into the embodiment of a male, thus suggesting the
superficial and arbitrary nature of gender distinctions, Vincent still believes that her
"true" gender "should" be obvious. Her bewilderment is present throughout the whole
book, but she never critically engages its potential implications: that if gender is so easily
transgressible, perhaps its transgression could be - and should be - engaged so as to
destabilize the rigid masculinities and femininities she decries in the book.
More recently, situational transvestitism has infiltrated movies, notably in pop
culture films like Sorority Boys and White Chicks, much in the same manner: though
supposedly limited by indelible sexual dimorphism, men are shown to easily pass as
women once donning wigs, makeup, and falsies. How is it that our culture can hold two
such paradoxical ideas at the same time - one of the physically inviolable boundary
between gender, and one of the ease of drag?
In a roundabout way, this most recent treatment of drag provides a site for
interaction with the moralizing content of the social construction of gender. These
depictions of drag are in fact one method by which our culture "explains away" the
subversive potential inherent in the ease with which transgressive passing can occur. In
the end, all of these drag stories serve as allegories which reify the notion of "true"
gender identity, the location of which is posed as the cisgender embodiment. In showing
how transgenderism "just doesn't fit" the protagonists, the metanarrative message of
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ontological cisgender identity is reinforced. These narratives are pejoratively evoked in
ways that engage the moral operationalization of "natural," much as Keith Ablow does in
his criticism of J. Crew's pink toenails advertisement. When faced with information
contrary to the metanarrative story, we are admonished to continue believing it, not
because it is infallibly true, but because we should believe it.
In these films and other cultural artifacts, cisgender presentation is further framed
as a matter of trust, again evoking a moral subtext: as Lorber noted earlier, in our culture,
genitals are not generally socially viewable, and thus we rely on superficial marks to
convey our gender identity (which is presumed to be self-identical to one's sex). As such,
gender allows sex to hide in plain sight; the ambiguity or incohesiveness of the genitals is
invisible. When such an ambiguity or incoherence is revealed, then, it is framed a
personal affront that implicates the observer's own gender identity and sexuality. Like
the bio-men in the campfire scene in the film Priscilla, Queen of the Desert or the men
depicted in Boys Don't Cry who later beat Brandon Teena to death, the metanarrative is
superior, righteous, punishing, and sexually threatened.
Bodies: material-semiotic intra-action and gender embodiment
Though they must be understood in terms of their own positional bias,
anthropological and archaeological data provide a useful site to explore the ways material
bodies reflect their differing material-semiotic positionalities.

A wide range of

anthropological studies demonstrate the pervasive effects a lifetime of behavior have on
the body; this section addresses a select few examples.
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Ingold (2004)'s research explores the ways in which humans walk - and the type
of ground we walk on - can affect human anatomical evolution. He writes,
As people, in the course of their everyday lives, make their way by foot around a
familiar terrain, so its paths, textures and contours, variable throughout the
seasons, are incorporated into their own embodied capacities of movement,
awareness and response - or into what Gaston Bachelard (1964) calls their
'muscular consciousness.' (333)
Ingold frames his inquiry within a complex interrelation of factors and produces a rich
conceptualization of bodily muscularization, writing, "For my part, I wonder how there
could be a cultural history of bodily techniques when the technology of footwear is
already implicated in our very ideas on the body, its evolution and its development" (336337). This understanding of muscularity is particularly salient in a cultural environment
in which the genders are encouraged to wear radically different footwear, as will be
discussed further in the second example below.
Paleontologists are able to extrapolate the types of activities done repetitiously in
an anthropological specimen's life by studying the ways in which these activities - for
example, running or heavy lifting - affect the morphology of the bones. Molleson (2007)
documents the ways activities and behaviors are manifest the skeletal embodiment:
If an activity was time-consuming or arduous, especially when begun at an early
age and the bones still growing, the bone morphology can be modified [by the
activity] and techniques of production used in the past are recorded. The
predisposing requirements for bone morphology to be distinctively modified are
a restricted series of movements that are energetic and carried out for long periods
probably on a daily basis and from a young age. (5)
She goes on to note that
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[B]one is remarkably pliable and responds to stresses and pressures exerted on it
by muscular activity or weight loading. The growing skeleton is particularly
responsive. Pressure imposed on bone can easily distort the form and robusticity.
The muscles involved in repetitive movements carried out over a restricted range
can be greatly developed and their enlarged insertions distinctively imprinted on
the supporting bones. (6)
Molleson was able to observe the skeletal, and to some extent, muscular materialities that
occurred upon the ritualized production of labor-intensive activities, such as distance
running, load bearing, cereal grinding, horse riding, and acrobatics.
Neither Ingold nor Molleson specifically extrapolate their findings to gender, or,
in Molleson's case, even to the present day (she writes that she can imagine few situations
in modern life that would so alter the skeletal morphology); but I argue that these are
limitations self-imposed by their positionality within their discipline and their subsequent
lack of sociological imagination. Gender-compulsory footwear is just one example of a
ritual which has the great potential for bodily impact - in the feet, musculature, and
skeleton, since feet and thus shoes bear the entire weight of the body. We already know
that such footwear can cause nerve problems in the feet and legs, back problems, and
affect the likelihood and types of injures that can occur upon falling (high heels project
women forward or tip them sideways, the latter often resulting in ankle injuries).
Pointed-toe and high-heeled shoes have the potential to dramatically impact women's
embodiment, especially when children's use of these styles is considered: in any display
of children's shoes, a shocking amount of girls' shoes have an elevated heel - and virtually
all boys' shoes are flat-soled. Leaving the embodied aspects of such rituals unexamined
is both short-sighted and pernicious in that it obscures a site of production.
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- Epigenesis
Tuana (1996) evokes Beauvoir as the ultimate constructionist: one is not born, but
is made a woman. Tuana's argument, by contrast, is that all bodies are 'made,' just not in
the way we think - they are complex products of epigenesis5, made in ways that disregard
and subvert the strict biology/culture, nature/nurture, male/female binaries. In particular,
Tuana dismisses the conception of an ontological body that independently preexists
culture or environment. Approaching phenomena with any other epistemology results in
the infinite chicken-and-egg loop implicit in its fallacious linearity: which came first?
Even before sex or gender can be determined/assigned (i.e., by ultrasound in
utero, or observation of genitals at birth), the materiality of the fetus interacts with its
environment in ways which affect embodiment, both personally and in the production of
the endemic. Gender in fact interacts with embodiment to the extent that it can determine
whether or not the body exists at all, as evidenced by the history of female infanticide in
cultures which disproportionately value male offspring. This phenomenon continues
today; with the recent advent of the widespread use of ultrasound imaging during
pregnancy, it is estimated that India is "missing" more than 44 million girls as a result of
5

Epigenesis is a relatively new science (Rudacille 2005). While initially rather narrowly defined as "the
concept that an organism develops by the new appearance of structures and functions through the
interaction of gene and surrounding conditions" (Tuana 1996) - that is, how certain genes are switched 'on'
or 'off' due to specific environmental stimuli - it is now more broadly conceived as the interplay between
the human organism and the environment at large and is studied as the epigenome (as opposed to the
genome) (Eliot 2009; Fine 2010). Though Tuana argues that epigenesis "retains an additive model that
does not undercut the division between nature/nurture" - and while it is certainly true that many scientists
still retain the additive model of epigenesis - I think Tuana would find the recent ways the concept has been
co-opted, as it were, by feminist philosophers to be a useful site for the discussion of the material-semiotic
co-creation of phenomena (60).
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sex-selective termination (Sahni et al 2008). Feeding infants soy-based formula - itself a
phenomenon inexorably situated in the gendered contexts of medical authority and
capitalist industry - results in infant consumption of high levels of phyto-estrogens in the
form of soy isoflavones.

Infants who are exclusively fed soy formula are widely

estimated to consume quantities of estrogens equivalent to three to five birth control pills
per day. Emerging research links this exposure to a wide range of phenomena, including
age at puberty, the 'feminization' of male bodies, and increased risk of breast cancer
(Setchell et all 2011). Endocrine-disrupting chemicals are rife with our environments and
even in our foodstuffs (Rudacille 2005).

These are all sites of interrelated social,

environmental, and even economic phenomena, and all share their interrelation with the
materiality of embodiment.
The gendered differential in physical activity is also undeniably a method of
material-semiotic bodily production as notions of gender-appropriateness and gender
ability define and regulate the ways boys, girls, men, and women are encouraged,
discouraged, and prohibited to use their bodies.

Verbrugge (1997) addresses the

gendering of physical education in her research. She writes,
Through sex-coded activities, physical education marks and patrols the border
between 'masculinity' and 'femininity.' Boys play football, girls learn rhythmic
gymnastics; schoolboys perform 'regular' push-ups as measures of strength, while
girls do 'modified' push-ups. ... The primary and most durable concept by which
physical education has gendered the body is the science of sex differences.
Amidst the changing foci, even fashions, of the discipline, the principle of sexual
dualism has been notably constant. From the late nineteenth century to the
present, physical educators have regarded the structure, motions, and abilities of
males and females as being markedly and, in many cases, inherently different;
further, they have claimed that the social and psychological nature of physical
activity varies by sex - that is, that males and females have distinct motives and
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behaviors when they play. To understand the construction and meaning of
gendered bodies in physical education, then, scholars would do well to start with
the notion of sex differences, because physical educators themselves began there.
(275-276)
Gorley et al (2003) also study physical education and argue that there is compelling
evidence which suggests "many girls are underserved by existing provision" and found
that physical education, sports, and other physical activity was often framed in ways that
reproduced the dominant gender order, in particular hegemonic masculinity (429, 445).
The patterns of gender-appropriate physical activity, and the naturalization of notions of
gender-capable physical activity, are internalized when actors are children and then
replicated throughout their lives and adulthood, thus continuing the production of this
embodiment. In her research, Dworkin (2001) applies the concept of the "glass ceiling"
to the level of muscularity that may be acceptably achieved by women in fitness. She
found that many women found their bodily agency to be limited "not by biology but by
ideologies of emphasized femininity that structure the upper limit on women's 'success'"
(333). These women uniquely negotiated the glass ceiling by "avoiding, holding back on,
or adjusting weight workouts" (333). In ways both intentional and unconscious, the
cultural discourses on masculinity and femininity affect the embodiments of men and
women.
Engaging the materiality of the material-semiotic intra-action involves the
recognition of the potentiality of both bodily difference and bodily sameness. We know
from studies which manipulate, control, and/or account for both biology and the
environment that the body - in combination with these phenomena - has the physical
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capacity to perform and embody similarly regardless of sex. Newborns and infants have
been shown to demonstrate remarkable similarity across the board, in any conceivable
measure (Eliot 2009; Fine 2010). Even in adults, biological phenomena once thought to
be sex-specific (e.g., lactation and the maternal flood of the hormone oxytocin) can in
fact be observed in the "opposite" sex: though lactation rarely occurs spontaneously in
men, the glandular tissues which produce milk are present in both male and female
bodies, making it possible to induce male lactation under stimuli; male rats, when left
with newborn litters from which the mothers had been removed, were unsure at first but
soon embodied maternal rat behavior and were shown to have hormonal levels
comparable to maternal rats, versus the hormone levels in male rats who were in cages
with newborn litters and the mothers. Similar findings were observed when human males
who were the primary caretakers of infants were studied (Fine 2010). Even when they do
not have the same biological stimuli as female bodies (e.g., pregnancy and birth), these
findings suggest that male bodies are nevertheless capable of the same of producing the
same effects when prompted through an interaction of environment, culture, and the
body.
Rats aside, we must retain a similar acknowledgement with humans: male/female
bodies are different, but we must recognize that the difference is a material-semiotic
production which can never be reduced to pure forms - i.e., the "biological" and the
"social" cannot be considered separately in the extent of their effects, but must always be
perceived as an interrelation. Simply insisting on the capacity for bodily similarity, as
many social constructionist feminists have done in the past, not only relies on the
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ontology of the body but also dishonors the real subjectivity of the differently gendered
and differently situated body, and this can have dangerous consequences (for example,
using only male subjects in medical research and pharmaceutical trials, which was
common practice until only very recently). At the same time, it is important to note that
the metanarrative has a vested interest in creating difference rather than sameness; as
such, intra-actively produced similarity is a site of metanarrative subversion.
The gendered brain: 'hardwiring' versus plasticity
As individuals slowly but increasingly transverse the naturalized distance between
male and female which was purportedly a product of their disproportionate abilities - i.e.,
women's (slowly but steadily) increasing proficiency and accomplishment in sport and
the presence of women as supreme court judges, military officers, and Fortune 500
CEOs6 - the last ten years have seen a shift in the cultural framing of difference. Though
still firmly located in a metaphysic of organically different bodies, the cultural
imagination is now fascinated with the notion that the real gender difference lies with the
brain (Eliot 2009; Fine 2010; Fausto-Sterling 1985).
Several decades ago, Anne Fausto-Sterling determined that there had to be limits
to biological influence on the genders by discovering that the majority of neural pathways
and brain patterns are established after birth and during the process of cultural
assimilation. Her discovery, though, has had little effect on the subsequent propagation

6

This is not to imply that these positions are held by women in equal numbers to men, or that such
positions are common, easily accessible, or achieved without the presence of harassment and
discrimination; but rather simply to acknowledge their subversive, though rare, effect: in showing that
women can perform these roles, women "explode" the metaphysic of the inherent limitations of gender
(Lorber and Martin 1997; Tuana 1996).
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of "hardwired" difference in the brain as the authentic source of difference between men
and women.
Lise Eliot (2009) and Cordelia Fine (2010) have both recently published books
that survey the research and literature regarding how the brain develops, the study of
neurobiology, its implications, and the ways in which neurobiological findings have been
misappropriated by the popular media and charismatic individuals alike in ways which
justify existing prejudices, stereotypes, and beliefs. They each present a fascinating
synthesis of the scientific and social psychology literature surrounding the brain,
particularly in relation to the assertion that gender differences are ontological to the brain.
Both authors explain that until relatively recently, the brain was presumed to
develop according to the same additive model that was projected onto biological
development at large: that is, a model which inherently holds as ontological a uniform,
ideal, or essential body which pre-exists any other factor. The stages of development
simply add maturity and stimuli which 'awaken' and activate structures and pathways that
already existed in the brain and/or body - i.e., development followed a linear path of
biological determinism.
This model has proved fallacious, however, as avant garde scientists have begun
to recognize, prompting the studies of epigenesis in the body, and plasticity in the brain.
Eliot defines plasticity thusly:
Every physical feature of the human nervous system - the brain cells, or neurons,
that transmit information; their axons and dendrites that reach great distances to
connect with one other; the tiny synapses that are the actual sites of connection
and the supporting cells, or glia, that keep it all going metabolically - responds to
life experiences and is continually remodeled to adapt to them. The brain changes
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when you learn to walk and talk; the brain changes when you store a new
memory; the brain changes when you figure out if you're a boy or a girl; the brain
changes when you fall in love or plunge into depression; the brain changes when
you become a parent.
... Simply put, your brain is what you do with it. Every task you spend time on...
reinforces active brain circuits at the expense of other inactive ones. Learning and
practice rewire the human brain, and considering the very different ways boys and
girls spend their time while growing up, as well as the special potency of early
experience in molding neuronal connections, it would be shocking if the two
sexes' brains didn't work differently by the time they were adults.
So it's all biology, whether the cause is nature or nurture. Sex differences in
behavior must be reflected as sex differences in the brain. (6)
The plastic nature of the brain means it is a production, a constantly emerging synthesis
of all the factors in play (from the presence of sex hormones to socially enacted gender
roles). When combined with the observation that male and female brains are virtually
identical at birth in every way, the plastic nature of the brain suggests that the differences
we observe in adult brains are the result not of "hardwired," ontological difference, but
are rather the cumulative product of a lifetime immersed in gender. As Fine writes, "And
so, when researchers look for sex differences in the brain or the mind, they are hunting a
moving target. Both are in continuous interaction with the social context" (236).
It is in fact the similarity of the male and female infant brain that drew Eliot to
this research in the first place; she writes that she suddenly realized that all these popular
claims about neurological discoveries which "proved" hardwired difference were based
exclusively on adult, thirty-something brains. "Who's to say such differences are caused
by nature and not learning - by the thirty or so years of experience as a male or female
that any research subject invariably carries into the MRI scanner?," she wrote (9). If the
differences were truly hardwired, she deduced, they would be apparent from birth. But as
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her research soon showed, they were not; neither were they particularly salient after the
hormone storm of puberty, which many have theorized to have gendering effects on the
brain7.
Fine and Eliot engage the concepts of associative learning, implicit assumption,
and priming to demonstrate the ways gender and its accompanying scripts pervade the
brain. Amazingly, when researchers have manipulated these concepts - in ways as subtle
as placing or removing a male/female checkbox at the top of a math test, and as blatant as
telling outright lies to the research subjects - the difference in the performances between
women and men on any task is statistically negligible, and is in fact smaller than the
range of difference displayed within any one gender.

This includes tasks and

measurements of spatial reasoning and rotation, mathematics, empathizing and
perceiving others' emotions, and language, auditory, and visual processing - all areas
which have been claimed in times more recent than not to be "hardwired"
disproportionately into the brains of one gender and not the other.

What does this

imply? Fine writes,
the insight that thinking, behavior, and experiences change the brain, directly, or
through changes in genetic activity, seems to strip the word "hardwiring" of much
useful meaning. As neurophysiologist Ruth Bleier put it over two decades ago,
we should "view biology as potential, as capacity and not as static entity. Biology
itself is socially influenced and defined; it changes and develops in interaction
with and response to our minds and environment, as our behaviors do. Biology
can be said to define possibilities but not determine them; it is never irrelevant but
it is also not determinant." (177)

7

The differences observed between males and females after puberty was not "salient" in that assessments
of subjects before and after puberty did not show any difference in brain structure, etc, thereby measuring
the effect of puberty alone (Eliot 2009, Fine 2010).
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Fine and Eliot both ultimately land on the Butler-esque theory of performativity: within a
context of interrelation with other factors (notably, the biological and physical
environments), performance in fact creates the differences that are said to necessitate the
performance, and yet the cultural metanarrative misappropriates the directionality of this
relationship, holding up the difference as evidence of ontological disparity. Eliot engages
how the messages of gendered expectations are disseminated and internalized by
children, citing studies that measured parental assessment of their child's motor skills or
math abilities. In terms of the studies that measured gendered math performance, Eliot
notes that
parents in the United States, China, and Japan all stated that six-year-old boys
were better at math even though there were no actual differences in performance
at this age. Similar attitudes have been reported in other studies, and while things
have begun to change, there's little evidence we've reached an era of truly genderblind expectations.
This message is not lost on girls. As early as first grade, girls express less
certainty than boys that they can succeed in math. By eighth grade, girls are some
30 percent more likely than boys to agree with the statement "I am just not good
in mathematics" - even in countries such as Hong Kong and New Zealand, where
girls actually score higher than boys on standardized assessments. Many
researchers, including Beth Casey, have found that girls' lower confidence in math
is a significant factor in their scores on high-stakes exams, including the math
SAT. (236, emphasis added)
Eliot clearly asserts that a lifetime of receiving messages about gendered ability and
suitability cannot not have an effect on the brain, especially since the literature shows that
when gendered messages are manipulated in research settings, the performance of men
and women changes in relation to the positivity or negativity of the gendered messages
they were primed with. Over and over again, in the laboratory men and women have
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overcome the neurological divisions said to make male brains distinct from female
brains, and vice versa, resulting in remarkably similar outcomes. When outside of the
laboratory, however, the expectations continue to anticipate - and produce - the results,
and the cultural imagination perceives this to be hardwiring.
Fine notes that even well-educated and feminist-leaning parents fall back on
biological explanations for gendered difference with surprisingly little resistance, so
pervasive is it in our epistemological orientation. She cites Emily Kane, who "suggests
that the rapidity with which highly educated and privileged parents fall back on
biological explanations reflects their position at 'the vanguard of a limited sociological
imagination.' Harsh but, I think, fair" (231). Fine also provides the following anecdote:
The gendered patterns of our lives can be so familiar that we no longer notice
them, as this anecdote reported by legal scholar Deborah Rhode slyly makes
plain: One mother who insisted on supplying her daughter with tools rather than
dolls finally gave up when she discovered the child undressing a hammer and
singing it to sleep. "It must be hormonal," was the mother's explanation. At least
until someone asked who had been putting her daughter to bed. (216)
In the mainstream metanarrative model, the doing of gender is opaque and invisible, thus
obscuring the sites of production. As is typical of its binary bias, one factor - "nature" - is
positioned as the sole causation of phenomena and we are encouraged to ignore the
complex interactions and positionalities which contextualize its full meaning. As Fine
and Eliot both demonstrate, however, the brain is far from an ontologically linear entity;
it is in fact a product of richly situated epigenesis - its own material-semiotic intra-action
as it appropriates, internalizes, and utilizes the immaterial as well as the material. Fine
cites Harvard University psychologist Mahzarin Banaji:
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there is no "bright line separating self from culture," and the culture in which we
develop and function enjoys a "deep reach" into our minds. It's for this reason
that we can't understand gender differences in female and male minds - the minds
that are the source of our thoughts, feelings, motivations, and behavior - without
understanding how psychologically permeable is the skull that separates the mind
from the sociocultural context in which it operates. ... In other words, the social
context influences who you are, how you think, and what you do. And these
thoughts, attitudes, and behaviors of yours, in turn, become part of the social
context. (xxvi)

Conclusion
When the metanarrative holds up sexed bodies as evidence of organic, divisive
difference, it myopically addresses only the superficial materiality of embodiment,
spuriously attributing the physicality it sees to a single factor couched in biologically
determinist myths which posit sex/gender, mind/body, biology/culture, nature/nurture
against each other - when in fact, such factors are not opposites, but interrelated
phenomena that cannot exist separately. In their essential forms, they simply do not
exist.

The bodies we observe are in fact the material-semiotic sums of their total

experience: from the genetic history of its sperm and ovum, to its time in the womb, to its
current development, the body embodies its experience.
Due to the regulating structures of our gendered culture, some degree of bodily
similarity has occurred within normative sex and gender categories. But what we must
acknowledge before fallaciously concluding that such differences are ontological is the
presence of different bodies which are the product of different experiences - the outliers.
Transgender and genderqueer bodies, along with the multitude of individuals who fall
however slightly outside of the rigid metanarrative boundaries, are testaments to the

S. K. Lewis - Gendering the Body / Chapter Two, Part II: Literature Review
54

plasticity inherent in the material-semiotic intra-relationship that occurs when the
discursive norms are subverted.
Transgender and genderqueer individuals are integral to efforts to subvert and
destabilize the metanarrative and its biologically determinist, binary underpinnings
specifically because their identities acknowledge, subvert, and transgress the ostensibly
natural linearity between sex and gender, and sex and sexual dimorphism. While our
culture adamantly insists that the male and female sexes necessarily constitute
nontransgressable and

fundamentally different bodies, transpeople prove that

transgression of these sexually dimorphic roles is possible: bodies are not so
ontologically limiting, and bodies are not so static, as the metanarrative would have us
believe.
That it is not impossible for a man to become a woman or a woman to become a
man, and to then perform in those roles successfully in society, indicates the absurdity of
our culture’s sexually dimorphic, binary logic. The reconstruction of trans bodies makes
transparent the notion that while the concepts of sex and gender are indeed distinct, they
are far from being mutually exclusive and can nevertheless share a complex,
interdependent relationship, even when not cohesively aligned.

As I hope to show

through the analysis of in-depth interviews, trans people actively engage transformation
and reconstruction in a conscious appropriation of the material-semiotic model.
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CHAPTER THREE
Methods

Introduction
Everyone experiences gender.

Whether cognizant of it or not, every social

individual participates in the discursive, cyclic process of gender acquisition and
performance: as one receives and emulates, one is simultaneously perpetuating and
endorsing. And, as the previous chapters have argued, the perpetuation of gender has a
physical component; the gendered actions we undertake have real physiological
consequences and, over time, create gendered bodies.

Herein, the lived experience of

gendered bodily differences is explored.
In order to explore the construction of the physically gendered body for the
purposes of this study, I chose to conduct qualitative, open-ended interviews with a
relatively small sample of transgender, genderqueer, and otherwise gender-transgressive
individuals. Though every person is gendered, the experiences of transgender individuals
provide a unique lens through which to approach the discursive gender model and the
assumptions about physicality that lie within. Transgenderism and other forms of gender
transgression are emerging cultural visibilities (the visibility being the emergent factor,
not the existence) that allow a window, of sorts, into the minutiae of the external
acquisition and projection of gender. (This distinction - external acquisition - is made
because the vast majority of trans individuals never identified with their cisgender, and
always internally trans-identified.)

When critically engaged, the narratives of trans
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individuals provide the opportunity to explore lived experiences of the creation of
physically gendered (sexually dimorphic) bodies.
Research Design
-Population selection
The narratives of individuals who transgress gender invite an exploration into the
ways in which individuals can engage sexual dimorphism as constructed - and
reconstructed. Trans experiences engage sexual dimorphism as a plastic concept rather
than a rigid, naturally occurring fact. The transgender experience is key to the discussion
of the plasticity of sexual dimorphism precisely because transgender is in and of itself
subversion, recognition, and conscious construction (or reconstruction) of sexual
dimorphism. Transgender individuals and those who otherwise transgress gender have
rejected the gender role socially ascribed to their anatomical (or, in the case on intersex
individuals, medically assigned) sex and have thus also rejected the physical, sexually
dimorphic attributes/markers associated with that sex-gender association. Interviewing
the transgender population allowed the opportunity to capture personal narratives of
awareness of the physical construction of sexually dimorphic difference. Additionally,
the interviews provided an entrance to the viewpoint of people who did not let socially
prescribed boundaries limit them.
-Research Methods
My research used semi-structured, open-ended interviews with individuals who
self-identified as trans, transgender, intersex, and/or genderqueer, a population I will
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hereon refer to collectively as "trans." The label "trans" comes from my interview with
Kip (pseudonym), who described "trans" as having distinctly different connotations than
the terms transgender or transsexual, in that it is a more inclusive, generalized term:
"Some people define it really narrowly, and I don't ... trans, two-spirit, genderqueer,
gender bender, whatever. ... My definition is so broad it's almost hard to talk about."
The interviews, while semi-structured in that I used a prepared interview guide
(the complete version of which is found in Appendix A), were conducted in a manner
strongly influenced by grounded theory (Strauss and Corbin 1998). Grounded theory
refers to the practice of letting the information the respondent reveals guide the
subsequent questions and direction of the interview. My goal in the interview process
was to stick to a few common themes as identified on the interview guide, but to follow
each participant's lead when it came to discussing the specificities of those themes. This
was important in order to promote a conversational environment conducive to selfreflection, but it was also as a measure consciously elected so as to establish and maintain
respect of the respondent's narrative subjectivity. Culturally, we are often primed to
perceive interview situations as evaluative experiences in which an academic "expert"
measures a respondent's knowledge by quantifying answers as "correct" or "incorrect."
Qualitative research, and in particular feminist qualitative research, departs from this
traditional quantitative model. Rather than attempting to glean objective facts from an
interaction with respondents, or to evaluate a respondent against an objective ideal thereby creating an evaluative power dynamic between the researcher and the subject -

S. K. Lewis - Gendering the Body / Chapter Three: Methods
58

the "facts" that are sought in qualitative interviews are the experiences, perceptions, and
narratives related by the respondent. The respondents are the experts of their own lives,
and as such I designed the interviews to be respectful of each respondent's subjectivity.
As the interviewer, I made every attempt to maintain awareness of my role in the
collaborative nature of the interviews. Mindful of my position as an academic researcher
and as a cisgender, non-trans person outside of the queer and/or trans communities8, I
took measures to create an interviewing environment that was equitable and nonjudgmental, and to establish a rapport with each interview subject. Without a rapport
with the subject, I was aware that some of the interview's themes might invoke a
defensive, rather than introspective, response. It was imperative to avoid situations in
which judgment was perceived or feared, and to maintain an environment of trust. I
worked to employ a non-evaluative, friendly, empathetic, and deferential tone throughout
the interview process, and to avoid the notion of the 'academic-as-expert' (Wahab 2003).
In addition to the open-ended style of interviews, measures included an earnest
conversation with each respondent before the interview commenced; this conversation
began with a self-introduction, in which I consciously disclosed a degree of personal
information about myself to contribute to an atmosphere of camaraderie and familiarity.
A detailed description of the interview followed, including a discussion of the vocabulary
that would be used. Each respondent was invited to request specific usage of preferred
terminology and/or pronouns; to ask for clarification, examples, or for me to rephrase any
8

The positionality of my identity is further discussed in Limitations of the Research later in this chapter.
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question; to skip questions if desired, for whatever reason; to tell me if they felt they'd
already addressed a question; and to provide only the amount of information they were
comfortable sharing. At the end of the interview, each respondent was asked if they
thought there were any additional topics they would like to discuss.
Since the interviews were largely exploratory, it was not my intention to amass
quantitative generalizations across the subjects; but rather to use as data the subjects’
narrative fragments (both in the form of direct quotes and paraphrase) to engage and
elucidate the research's points and arguments. Used in this fashion, the narratives and
experiences of the subjects become pieces of qualitative ‘evidence,’ so to speak, in that
they provide real, raw data that can be qualitatively analyzed, dissected, and unpacked.
-Sample Selection
Subjects were recruited from a fairly broad and/or diverse range of gender
identity: individuals who practice or have experienced gender in nontraditional ways,
namely members of the transgender community. Specifically, the Call for Participants
(Appendix B) asked for individuals who identified as "trans, androgynous, or
genderqueer." Due to Human Subjects regulations, only adult subjects over the age of 18
were considered. However, there were virtually no other restrictions placed on the
demographics of the sample as far as age/generation, ethnicity, race, sexuality, or gender
(particularly because ‘gender’ as it is found within this sample tends to be fluid,
changing, or unable to conform to binary definitions). It was important that these criteria
for inclusion were so flexible in part because of the nature of this population; the
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transgender community can be hard to find, hesitant to participate, and sometimes
hesitant to reveal themselves to members outside of the community.

In addition,

demographic criteria like age and race, while important in that they will unavoidably
influence the subjects’ experiences, are not a primary concern of this research.
The subjects were collected through three methods: random sampling through
placing a Call for Participants in online classified ads; a small snowball sample through a
contact who had personal and professional ties to the trans community (a speech
pathologist who works primarily with transgender patients); and by directly contacting,
via email, a few visible members of the Portland trans community who are very public
about their trans identity due to the fact that they work in the fields of health care and
advocacy. The first method, random sampling through online classifieds, secured the
majority of my respondents; I placed online classified ads on the websites of the
Willamette Week and the Portland Mercury, and on the Portland page of Craig’s List.
Paper fliers were also posted in Portland State’s Queer Resource Center. Snowball
sampling through my contact resulted in two interviews, and my direct contact of public
members of the community resulted in one interview.
My contact maintained confidentially by supplying a letter I had written with a
description of my project and a contact information to her clients and acquaintances she
knew identified as trans. (As with the rest of this research design, this process and the
intermediary letter were approved by the Human Subject Review Board; a copy of the

S. K. Lewis - Gendering the Body / Chapter Three: Methods
61

letter is found in Appendix C). It was then up to the individual recipients of the letters to
initiate contact with me if they were interested in participating.
When I contacted two visible members of the trans community, I obtained email
addresses from each individual’s professional/personal website and then composed an
email that closely resembled the original Call for Participants, asking if they would be
interested in talking to me about their experience with gender transgression. These two
emails resulted in one response and one subsequent interview.
Two respondents to the original Call for Participants were unavailable for
personal, face-to-face interviews.

These respondents contacted me via email after

viewing one of my classified ads over the internet, even though they were not physically
present in Portland. Both of these individuals expressed desire to participate in my
research even though we would not be able to meet for a face-to-face interview. (Phone
interviews were ruled out due to lack of technology for phone recording/transcription.)
As a result, I created a questionnaire version of my interview guide and emailed it and a
copy of my consent form to these two individuals, and invited them to write as much or
little as they would like in response.

A copy of this questionnaire is provided in

Appendix D. Both returned completed questionnaires and invited me to respond with any
additional questions. I sent follow-up questions to one of these respondents, and these
questions were answered and returned in the same format.
Though both a phone number and an email address were included in the Call for
Participants, all potential respondents contacted me via email to express their interest in
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participating. All ten individuals who contacted me expressing interest in participating
were ultimately included in the study: eight via interviews and two via written
questionnaires.
Data Collection
-Interviews
Individuals wishing to participate in the study contacted me via email. When I
responded, I first verified they met the age criteria and then provided some additional
information about the study.

Upon confirmation that they were still interested in

participating, I scheduled interviews by inviting respondents to pick times, dates, and
locations that would be both convenient and comfortable to them. I conducted interviews
in respondents' homes, at restaurants, coffee shops, bars, and on the Portland State
Campus. A total of eight interviews were conducted.
The interviews ranged in duration from just under an hour to almost three hours,
with the average being about an hour and a half. The variation in length occurred due to
the respondent-led flow of the conversation and the general comfort level of the
interviewee. Prior to meeting for the interview, I emailed each respondent a copy of the
Cover Letter of Informed Consent (Appendix E) so they would be able to review it in
detail and present any questions before the interview began. When we met for the
interview, each respondent was given a hard copy of the Letter of Informed Consent,
which explained the nature of the research, the nature of their involvement,
confidentiality, and all other pertinent information. The letter was read and discussed
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verbally, and the subject was asked if they had any questions or concerns. None of the
participants presented any questions or concerns at this point. I then asked the subjects'
permission to audio record our conversation; all eight interview subjects gave me
permission to record the interviews. I then recorded the subject’s verbal consent to
participate and proceeded with the interview. No written consent was collected, per
Human Subjects approval. At the conclusion of the interview, I asked each subject if
they would like a copy of the research once completed.
-Questionnaires
The two respondents who participated via written questionnaire versus in-person
interview were asked their age to verify they met the study's criteria. Upon verification,
they were both emailed a copy of the Letter of Informed Consent and asked if they had
any questions. Both respondents replied via email that they gave consent to participate in
the study; neither had questions. They were emailed a questionnaire version of the
interview guide (Appendix D) and were asked to return it at their convenience, and to
contact me if they had any questions or concerns as they proceeded. Both respondents
returned the questionnaire within a few weeks, and both invited me to contact them again
if I had additional questions or required any clarification.

I sent the original

questionnaire with follow-up questions to one of the respondents; they in turn replied
with additional information.
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-Blogs
During the course of the interviews, two participants mentioned that they kept
online blogs, both of which specifically discussed and chronicled their transitions. Both
of these participants volunteered their blog URLs and invited me to use the blog content
in this study if desired. I accessed and printed and both blogs. For the purposes of data
analysis, these documents were treated as extensions of the interview transcripts.
-Interview Guide
The interview questions sought to connect several thematic areas that together
comprise our culture's gender paradigm through the narrative, lived experiences of trans
individuals.

The gender metanarrative attributes gendered bodies not to gendered

actions, which have their origin in social constructions, but rather to an innate sexual
dimorphism. This discursive construction presents a directionality of the cause-andeffect relationship between sex, gender, and gendered bodies in which the gendered body
is offered up the as evidence of an original, naturally occurring, sexually dimorphic
physical differential.

The ubiquitously "natural" physical differential is then

simultaneously used as the justification for gender roles which prescribe sex-segregated
actions and behaviors. The interviews were designed to test the directionality of this
logic in the context of individual lived experience: isn't it possible that, rather than sex, a
lifetime lived within the boundaries of gender - and thereby within gendered action and
behavior - is in fact the catalyst which produces the physically gendered body? The
interview questions thus primarily sought to elicit personal narratives of the respondents'
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everyday experiences of gender, gendered actions/behaviors, and any resulting bodily
changes.
The interview guide consisted of approximately fifteen main questions, and
several contingency questions for each to elicit more detail when initial responses were
brief, and to help direct the conversation to productive areas.

In keeping with the

grounded theory methodology, the guide was used as a frame, and its role varied for each
participant. The questions were not always presented chronologically, as I allowed the
interviewee's responses to direct the conversation; for the same reason, some questions
were omitted when I felt the interviewee had already volunteered that information as part
of a previous response. Several respondents led the conversation into topical areas that
were not addressed in the interview guide, but were nonetheless largely productive in
terms of both establishing rapport and in the data produced. In cases in which the
respondent seemed confused by or ambivalent towards certain topics, questions were
omitted or deemphasized. The complete Interview Guide is found in Appendix A.
As part of the research design, the guide was designed to oscillate between two
"scenes" - "general" and "personal." I chose to switch between questions of a personal
nature and those that were more general and theoretical in order to create rapport and an
environment conducive to disclosure. It would be unfair to expect an interviewee to
immediately (much less honestly) respond to a barrage of intensely personal, detailed
questions asked by a perfect stranger; as a result, the order of the guide was designed to
create periods of conversation about general, theoretical topics in between series of more
S. K. Lewis - Gendering the Body / Chapter Three: Methods
66

probing, personal questions, to give the interviewee a chance to feel like they knew me
better, and to form the impression that the interview was a safe and nonjudgmental place
to disclose personal information.
The guide began with a brief personal scene. The respondents were several topical
questions about current identity, past identities, and if respondents felt their current
identity conformed to mainstream gender expectations. I asked how the respondents felt
their gender was perceived by others, and asked if passing was important (some
respondents responded to this question in a general context, others in a personal context).
The second part of the guide moved to a general scene, including questions
designed to assess the respondents' personal operationalizations of some of the
terminology and larger themes utilized in this research: respondents were asked to define
masculinity, femininity, and transgender or genderqueer; sex, gender, and the difference
between them; and what they personally believed the differences between men and
women to be. I also asked if they felt that our culture at large projects a narrative of
naturally occurring difference between men and women, and if so, what their perception
of that stereotype was. As a transition back into a personal scene, I asked if they had ever
experienced socially-imposed limitations on their actions or behaviors based on others'
perceptions of their gender.
The third and final portion of the guide returned to a personal scene. The
questions attempted to assess the minutiae of the respondents' gendered experience. In
the case of the MTF and FTM transgender respondents, I asked the interviewees to
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describe their successful9 appropriation of the new and/or altered gender and the
embodiment of its corresponding gendered physicality (the aspects of which include body
language, body movements, diet, exercise, grooming, dress, etc). Respondents were
asked to self-report bodily changes and their implications. I asked if respondents felt
gender was performative in any way - in a general context, in terms of their current
identity, and in terms of any previous identities.
Data Analysis
All subjects were assigned pseudonyms. The interviews were transcribed from
the digital audio recordings. I analyzed the data manually through in-depth, critical
readings of the transcripts (or questionnaires). The first step of my analysis was to code
the responses into summation categories. I identified nine summation categories:
1. Identity
This category pertains to aspects of identity: current gender identity, past
identities, and how the respondents situate their identities in the context of the
mainstream metanarratives of masculinity and femininity. Several respondents also made
comments that addressed the stability (or non-stability) of aspects of their identity as they
went from pre-transition lives all the way through to post-transition.
9

The term "successful" is somewhat problematic in the context of this study, as it pejoratively implies the
"passing" of the trans subject - i.e., the average observer would assume the trans individual to be someone
who was in fact cisgender. Whether or not someone "passes" can be a source of contention in the trans
community, but it is not an aspect of trans identity concretely measured in this study. As noted elsewhere in
the thesis, no attempts were made to objectively verify the subjects' self-assessment of passing, or of any
other data provided, since the data elicited by this research was of a personal, reflective nature. When the
term "successful" is used, it is a reference to the subject's self-assessment.
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2. Conscious action undertaken to conform to cisgender expectations
Responses in this category reflected the interviewees' experiences of actions
intentionally taken in order to appear to conform to cisgender expectations.
3. Conscious action undertaken to conform to transgender expectations
This category contained responses that detailed the interviewees' experiences of
actions consciously taken to conform to their desired gender: in the case of the trans
subjects, their responses dealt with successfully embodying the "opposite" gender; in the
case of the genderqueer subjects, their responses dealt with actions taken with the specific
intention of departing from identification as either male or female, and presenting either a
genderless, ambiguous, or blended gender.
4. Experiences of social/peer pressure to conform
Responses in this category explored the respondents' experiences with pressures
to conform to normative gender roles, as found in a variety of social contexts, including
family, the workplace, and interacting with total strangers.
5. Passing
This category contained responses that describe the interviewees' thoughts about
whether or not they pass as their desired gender, and if they feel passing is important.
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6. Male and female gender roles
Responses in this category expressed ideas of male and female gender roles, both
in terms of what the respondents personally believed, and in terms of the stereotypical
models they felt were reflected in the mainstream culture.
7. Physical difference between men and women
This category contained responses that expressed the interviewees' views of
physical difference between men and women.
8. Sex and Gender
Responses in this category dealt with definitions for sex and gender, as well as
ideas on how they differ, and how they interact.
9. Bodily Change
This category contained responses that detailed and explored the physical,
behavioral, and superficial (i.e., style of dress, cosmetics) changes the respondents have
experienced as they have altered their gender.
After identifying these nine summation categories through in-depth manual
analysis of the interview transcriptions and questionnaires, I created a spreadsheet that
allowed me to group responses by both subject and category. This allowed me to view
the responses collectively to get a sense of the larger emergent themes across individual
experience. As part of this process, I revisited each interview transcript, audio recording,
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and written questionnaire to also maintain my sense of each as an individual, whole
narrative.
I identified four major themes that organized my findings: Sex, Gender, and
Male/Female Identity; Normative Pressure and Passing; Personal Experiences with
Engaging Gender for Conformity; and Gendered Bodily Change. In organizing my
findings, I worked to stay loyal to the intact narratives and personal nuances found in the
interview transcripts and questionnaires; I avoided molding responses so they would fit
more cleanly into any given category.

Instead, I was fascinated by the variety of

experiences apparent in the responses, and I have tried to accurately reflect the full range
of experience in my analysis of the findings.
During the final phase of analysis, I approached my findings in the context of
feminist theory and the larger theoretical framework of the study.
Limitations of the Research
As a small, exploratory study with ten participants, the findings of this research
are not generalizable to the larger trans population. The trans, genderqueer, and intersex
communities are extremely diverse and doubtlessly contain narratives and experiences
that are not necessarily reflected this small study. One particular limitation of this
research is found in the racial, ethnic, and socioeconomic backgrounds of the subjects; as
mentioned earlier, other than establishing a minimum age, no restrictions were placed on
the demographics of the sample as far as age/generation, ethnicity, race, sexuality, or
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specific gender identity. This was due to concerns over the ability to otherwise recruit a
full sample; because of the nature of this population; the transgender community can be
hard to find, hesitant to participate, and sometimes hesitant to reveal themselves to
members outside of the community. However, as it turned out, all ten respondents were
Caucasian and also indicated that they came from middle-class backgrounds during the
course of the interviews/questionnaires. While the limitations found in the racial, ethnic,
and socioeconomic identities of the participants in no way decrease the legitimacy of
their responses, they are important to acknowledge here in that these identities
unavoidably had an effect in shaping the subjects’ experiences, and that subjects with
different identities and backgrounds may have had radically different experiences.
The limitations posed by my identity as cisgender and heterosexual must also be
noted. They are both undeniably positions of privilege, and, because I was interviewing
individuals who were not imbued with such privilege, we were speaking across a
hierarchical status divide. This was a major concern as I approached the research design,
and is the reason so much thought was put into creating an interview environment of
personal disclosure, rapport, and collegiality, rather than an environment which could by
default engage the mainstream power dynamic that would posit me as a socially
intelligible actor (legitimate person) and the respondent as a socially negligible outsider
('freak').

I felt that the latent power dynamic was successfully diffused in my

interactions with the respondents, but there are still two caveats: 1) that is only my
perception, and the respondents may have felt very differently; 2) even if the respondents
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also felt the power differential had been diffused, its very ubiquity doubtlessly had an
effect on the interaction, even if unintentional.
Another limitation found in my identity as cisgender and heterosexual lies in my
own ability to accurately receive, interpret, and contextualize the responses of the
participants. Among others, Leslie Fienberg (2001) has written about how trans research
that is conducted by non-trans people is potentially problematic in terms of bias and
simple lack of experiential knowledge. My positionality had an affect both on how
interviewees responded to/interacted with me, and in my ability to accurately receive and
interpret their responses, and this must be considered in the apprehension of this research.
Lastly, I wish to again address an aspect of the research that is not necessarily a
limitation as such, but which must be taken into account in any interpretation of the
findings.

To assess bodily change, the study relied on the self-reporting of the

participants; in keeping with the principles of qualitative methodologies, no objective
measures were taken to measure, quantify, or otherwise verify the information
respondents provided in the interviews and/or questionnaires. The goal of this study was
to explore individual narrative experiences of gendered bodily change, rather than to
provide statistics or other quantitative "evidence." The subjectivity of the narrative
assessments of physicality, physical change, gender role conformity, and "passing" was
honored.
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CHAPTER FOUR
Findings
Introduction
In sharing their narrative experiences, the participants presented a series of
compelling portraits of gender engagement, performativity, and embodiment.

The

participants related how they as individuals experienced gender in cisgender, transgender,
and genderqueer contexts, and how these experiences have pertained to their own gender
embodiment and bodily change.
This chapter discusses the findings of the research. The discussion is organized by
four major themes: Sex, Gender, and Male/Female Identity; Normative Pressure and
Passing; Personal Experiences of Engaging Gender for Conformity; and Gendered
Bodily Change, informed by the nine summation categories laid out in the previous
chapter (identity, conscious action undertaken to conform to cisgender expectations,
conscious action undertaken to conform to transgender expectations, experiences of
social/peer pressure to conform, passing, male and female gender roles, physical
difference between men and women, sex and gender, and bodily change).
Sample Characteristics
Ten respondents participated in the project: eight by in-person interview and two
by written questionnaire. The participants identified as trans, transgender, transsexual,
and/or genderqueer. Within those umbrella terms, five respondents identified as female;
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two identified as male; and three identified as genderqueer10.

Additionally, two

participants identified as intersex. Though age was not specifically requested as part of
the study, all but two respondents disclosed their age during the course of the
interviews/questionnaires, and the other two respondents gave a general range.

As

mentioned earlier, race, ethnicity, socioeconomic status, and other structural locators
were not probed in this study, but much of this information was nevertheless disclosed
over the course of the interviews/questionnaires; all the respondents were white and
indicated they were predominantly from middle-class backgrounds (although they did not
necessarily retain that status; several respondents mentioned current poverty).
All the respondents had transitioned or were somewhere in the process of
transitioning at the time of the interviews/questionnaires except for one. The situation of
one respondent, Kerry (who was one of the subjects to participate via written
questionnaire), was unique from the other subjects for a variety of reasons, foremost in
that she self-identified is female, but felt forced to remain living as a male. (While many
of the other trans respondents reported having felt similarly trapped in their cisgender
contexts, they had all since overcome those feelings and gone through with transitioning.)
Kerry was born in 1949 with an intersex condition, probably either Congenital Adrenal
Hyperplasia11 or, given the era, DES or other synthetic-progestin exposure in utero.12

10

The gender neutral pronouns ze (he/she), zher (his/hers), and zhem (him/her) are used to refer to the
genderqueer respondents in this research.
11
According to the Intersex Society of North America, CAH is the most prevalent cause of intersex among
people with XX chromosomes (ISNA 2011). CAH is a condition in which a developing fetus compensates
for insufficient cortisone production by releasing other virilizing hormones, including testosterone. The
increased testosterone can then virilize XX fetuses, sometimes resulting in ambiguous or masculinized
genitalia.
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The doctor who attended the birth wrote in his notes that the newborn had a vaginal
opening and "an organ much like a penis." Kerry wrote,
the doctor took it upon himself, to do no further testing ... but instead proceeded
to surgically alter my labia [to look like a scrotum] ... and to close the vaginal
opening. My mother remembers nothing about any operation on me, or any
questionable organs etc.
Kerry was raised as a male and did not discover she was genetically female until
adulthood, when she and her spouse underwent fertility testing after failing to conceive.
Although she had always identified as a girl and was initially "thrilled" to learn of her
chromosomal sex, under pressure from her spouse she opted to retain her male role and
start a regimen of testosterone therapy. Kerry and her spouse ultimately went on to have
a child conceived through artificial insemination. Even though the marriage has since
ended, Kerry felt trapped in her decision to continue to live as a male:
After her mother & I divorced, I was afraid of going back to my natural state for
fear I would somehow be barred from seeing my daughter. I work for a state
government in an occupation that makes me very visible. This state has no
language to ensure job protection for gays, lesbians, transgenders etc, so I feel
kind of in a shadow in the closet. I realize even with my unique situation, that if I
try and "transition" back, my job likely would be taken away. Now that might not
be such an obstacle except that I have a rare blood disease that was caused by
taking testosterone, and without my job, I would lose my insurance and who
knows what would happen to me.

12

DES and other progestin-based drugs were intended to prevent miscarriage and were distributed widely
among those who received prenatal care in the 40s, 50s, and 60s, often without the patient's knowledge;
they were often referred to by doctors as "vitamins" (Rudacille 2005). While the drugs were ultimately
shown to have no effect on miscarriage, they did produce a wide range of birth defects and health problems
in women, and in the children whose mothers took the drugs, including predilections towards rare cancers.
In some cases, the progestin was converted into an androgen by the metabolism of XX fetuses, thereby
virilizing the fetus and producing ambiguous or masculinized genitalia. The children affected are now
collectively referred to as "DES Daughters" and "DES Sons," and studies are underway to determine the
drugs' effects on the third generation.
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In her questionnaire, Kerry wrote that it was her everyday goal to simply survive, but her
ultimate goal was to free herself from "the societal shackles that bind me and imprison
me." She hoped to do this upon retirement in only a few years. She wrote, "If I didn't
think it was doable in a fairly short time period, I'd probably do something drastic. And
I'm not into anything more drastic than what I've already felt forced to do." For the
purposes of this discussion, Kerry's cisgender will be referred to as male, because that is
the sex she was assigned (and which was constructed for her) at birth.
Selected characteristics of the sample are presented in Table 1.
Organizational Themes
-Sex, gender, and male/female identity
--Identity
The interviews began with a conversation about gender identity. Eight of the
respondents (Lindsay, Jamie, Devin, Jordan, Kerry, Sidney, Avery, and Stacy) reported a
lifelong and building unease with their cisgender identities, often invoking the concept of
doing "drag" to describe how they felt in particularly gender-salient situations, such as
dressing up for the first day of school (Devin), attending a baby shower (Jamie), or dating
(Sidney).

In each of their narratives, the extent of the dysphoria surrounding their

cisgender identities was clear; unprompted, five of the respondents disclosed that they
had been suicidal prior to making the decision to transition. Lindsay attempted suicide
and had been institutionalized as a result. It was shortly thereafter that she decided to
transition: "It finally got to a point where I couldn't take it no more. And...it was either
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this or die. So... I'm like, I don't want to die." Though fraught with fears of "letting
everyone down," familial alienation, and social unintelligibility (many of which were
realized for some respondents), choosing to transition was ultimately framed as a life or
death decision.
Table 1. Selected Characteristics of the Sample
SUBJECT

PSUEDONYM

AGE
13

GENDER
IDENTITY

HORMONE
USE

SURGICAL
ALTERATION

Yes:
Estrogen

SRS; facial
feminization
upcoming
No

A

Lindsay

47

Female
(MTF)

B

Kip

25

C

Jamie

27

Trans/Intersex Yes:
/Genderqueer Estrogen
Genderqueer
No

D

Devin

32

E

Jordan

56

F

Kerry

58

G

Sidney

30

H

Hawthorne

I

Avery

J

Stacy

13

Transgender,
queer male
Transgender
(MTF)
Female/
Intersex

Yes:
Testosterone
Yes:
Estrogen
Yes:
Testosterone

Trans Male
(FTM)
Mid- Genderqueer
20s
33
Female
(MTF)

Yes:
Testosterone
No

40s50s

Yes:
Estrogen

Trans Female
(MTF)

Yes:
Estrogen

"Top" surgery
(breast removal)
"Top" surgery
(breast removal)
SRS; facial
feminization
Genital
corrective
surgery as an
infant
No
No
SRS; facial
feminization
and breast
augmentation
upcoming
No

Age at the time of the interview/questionnaire. Interviews were conducted in 2007.
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Many of the participants framed their cisgender identities as a "mistake" of
biology, using phrases like "I always knew I was a girl;" "I should have been a boy."
Jordan, who is a medical doctor, referred to transgenderism as a birth defect: "throughout
the world it’s considered a birth defect, you have the brain of one gender and the body of
another. That's actually been found to be true, biologically."14 Operationalizing the
incidence of transgenderism as a 'mistake' or 'defect' was for some respondents a way to
legitimize and explain the need for a 'correction' or 'fix' to their cisgender identity,
especially in terms of surgical intervention. This was in fact the attitude the American
medical community and mainstream culture adopted when sexual reassignment surgery
came onto the popular radar in the 1930s; in her book How Sex Changed, Joanne
Meyerowitz (2002) writes that transgender was often considered a type of intersex
condition, and that the medical and popular literature
depicted sex-change surgery as unveiling a true but hidden physiological sex and
thus tied the change to a biological mooring that seemingly justified surgical
intervention. In this vision of sex, science could and should correct nature's "rare
blunders," creating an unambiguous sex, either male or female, from sexual
ambiguity15, a condition cast and contained as tragic but correctable. (33)
These respondents viewed transitioning (and, for those who could afford it, the
corresponding surgery) as the opportunity to correct the erroneous facade and as a
gateway to their true selves. As Lindsay said, "I mean, I always felt, I knew I wanted to

14

Jordan's assertion that "That's actually been found to be true, biologically" is, of course, up for some
debate.
15
As sex and gender were not yet perceived as distinct, "sexual ambiguity" was used synonymously for
gender ambiguity; transgenderism was often phrased - as it still is sometimes today - as having the body of
one sex, and the brain of the other (thus operationalizing transgenderism strictly in terms of sex and its
biological associations).
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be a girl. That was just a no-brainer. I knew…I should have been a girl. OK? Well, go
for a walk, look in the mirror, it’s like, well, (psst) that ain’t a girl." Now, the mirror
reflects an accurate sense of self.
These narratives indicate the importance of embodiment in the transgender
experience. For example, while the respondents reported an almost-immediate feeling of
release, ease, and freedom to act, behave, and move in ways intuitive to them upon
assuming their transgender identities (ways they felt had been restricted by cisgender
expectations), several respondents mentioned that they would feel more concretely
located in their identities once they were finished with surgeries. Avery said that while
she identified as trans female at the time of the interview, she hoped to identify simply as
"female" after undergoing facial feminization surgery and eventual breast augmentation:
"But eventually, I think, once all surgeries are finished, I think I would definitely identify
as female." Sidney, who is FTM and who stated he cannot afford surgery, approached it
similarly:
I'm kind of trans right now because I'm in the process, but ultimately male. ... I
mean, ultimately, I’d like to be just male, but part of me will always have to be
trans just because of, you know, social interaction and you know, if I ever want a
partner. I don’t see myself getting any surgeries any time soon, so.
Sidney explained that while he would like to be "just male," he didn't feel that identity
was attainable for him, and expected that his identity would remain transgender male
(which, although not ideal, he did not view as a negative thing; he went on to discuss the
many positive aspects of this identity, as will be discussed later).
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As Sidney's narrative suggests, the importance of embodiment was true even
when these bodily characteristics are not visible in social contexts.

Jamie, who is

genderqueer, had been dysphoric about zher breasts since puberty and bound them as an
adult prior to undergoing "top" surgery. Even though ze didn't think zher appearance to
others changed post-surgery (there wasn't much outwards difference between binding
plus layered, baggy shirts, and zher reconstructed chest in non-layered clothes), ze still
reported feeling strangely more comfortable and confident in zher social interactions,
even though zher surgery didn't explicitly resolve any awkwardness in frequently
encountered gender-salient social situations (for example, public bathrooms labeled
men/women). Jordon (MTF) stated, "You know ... in our society, people can’t see your
genitals. They have no idea what you look like. Nobody goes down the sidewalk with
their legs spread apart on a trolley. So, it’s what they see."

She acknowledged that

gender presentation is largely superficial in that no one is verifying the cohesiveness of
one's sex and gender - but at the same time, she spoke of having $25,000 worth of
surgery, a good portion of which concerned areas of the body invisible the common
observer.
Kip's narrative also focused on the role of embodiment in zher gender identity.
Kip identified as genderqueer and intersex due to acute Polycystic Ovary Syndrome
(PCOS), which, while a relatively common condition, can vary radically in its
presentation and severity across individuals. For Kip, PCOS meant severe hormonal and
metabolic changes upon the onset of puberty, including an influx of testosterone. The
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testosterone zher body began to release caused several physical changes, including
facial/body hair, fat redistribution, and the partial virilization of zher genitals. Ze said,
"Basically what's happening with the testosterone in my body is that I'm physically
transitioning in the slowest possible increments ... which is almost excruciating." Ze
directly related this physical experience to zher gender identity:
I feel like my gender is way related to my physical experience. I just think my
physical experience is not necessarily like your typical physical experience, but
my gender has very much fallen in line with the physical changes; I feel like the
gender just adjusts to meet the sex, you know, over and over. [Researcher: Do
you think you wouldn't identify as genderqueer if you weren't intersex?] I’d
probably still be – I mean, I’d still be, I’m still wicked queer so there probably
would be some gender bending just because I think that’s kind of part of being
queer in a lot of circumstances... But, probably not, I mean – probably I
wouldn’t. But, you know, I wouldn’t be surprised. For me, I think in that way it’s
been really, really different than all the trans people I know. Cause I don’t know
anybody else that just grows, that their body just starts changing, and they’re just
like, ‘kay. Everybody else I know made the conscious choice and are taking
synthetic hormones and are choosing their dose, choosing how much testosterone
they have, and it’s being monitored.
Kip also identified as fat, and spoke at length about zher belief that size is a
dichotomizing force in our culture similar in scope to gender; and, like race, ethnicity, or
able-bodiedness, it was a factor that intersects with and cannot be completely separated
from gender. "That’s body – and to me, that’s gender. Because my gender and my size,
are the same."
--Sex and gender
The participants presented a wide range of beliefs about sex and gender. Some
respondents presented a relatively typical model of sex and gender: sex is the biological
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body, either male or female, and gender is an extension of sex, either male or female.
(These respondents tended to be the same ones who framed transgender as an
error/mistake requiring correction.) The other respondents, however, described a gender
spectrum that included not only wide variation in what it means to be male or female, but
also the presence of genders in addition to male and female, which may or may not relate
to sex. For some, the spectrum included the genders of male, female, queer male, queer
female, trans man/boy, trans woman/girl, and genderqueer. Many respondents expressed
resentment that people are pressured to "pick one" of the two established genders, which
devalues and delegitimizes gender identities which lie outside of those boundaries. In
describing her view of the gender spectrum, Kerry wrote, "perhaps let folks know that life
isn't just black & white, but many shades of gray & pink & blue & red & yellow." Kip
also engaged the diversity of the gender spectrum in relation to social pressure when ze
joked, "I’ll take one of those, and one of those….the problem is not which one I want, but
that I can’t have all of them."
Jamie, who is genderqueer, used a metaphor to describe zher view of gender:
If you imagine that there’s a universe of genders, right – ok? So, there’s a
universe of genders, and there’s two boxes. Male and female. And, everybody
falls within the universe, but the universe is bigger than the two boxes. And
people can hang out in one box their entire life; they can sit in the middle of the
box, if they like. Some people choose to hang out kind of on the edges of the box.
Some people choose to go between boxes. However frequently they want. And
some people are kind of outside of the boxes. That’s how I see gender. And I find
myself outside of the boxes.
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Most respondents also imbued gender with a sense of non-permanence and fluidity in
terms of its ability to change. This view seemed at first paradoxical for some respondents
when considered in combination with their experiences of finding their own (trans)
genders to be crystal clear, a singularly true identity for them, and their cisgender to be
unlivable. But the picture became clearer as each respondent went on to describe their
belief that in real-life contexts, gender enactment always blurs the metanarrative
boundaries; all females have masculine traits and all males have feminine traits. When
speaking about masculinity and femininity, Jordan, who is MTF and a physician, said,
"Well, you know, we are all a blend." She related the anecdote of having her first posttransition portrait taken to hang in her practice's lobby (after successfully fighting to
return to the practice she had founded as a male twenty years prior). (As a condition of
her return, the practice's corporate attorney sent over twenty-four thousand letters to
current and former patients, disclosing that Jordan was transsexual [so "the rest of the
world wouldn't sue them"]; they also required all patients to sign letters of informed
consent and posted letters in the exam rooms.)
I let my staff pick the picture which now hangs on the wall in my office. And I had
people who came in and they would say, you know, I wasn’t sure I could see you,
and then I saw your picture and it was okay – and then I realized, was that most
human beings, they need a framework of gender; gender is the framework that
allows you to relate to another human being in our society. It dictates the rules, it
dictates the method of communication, it dictates the interactions, the accepted
and unaccepted behaviors, whether you’re sexually active towards them or not.
What’s interesting is, we think male – Tom, female – Susan; male – Robert,
female- Mary. When you take that away from people or disrupt it, they get very
uncomfortable. What I didn’t realize is transsexuals have no framework. We
glide back and forth – I mean, I see people change every day. I don’t think
anything of it, and neither do they. We’re as fluid as possible.
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For most respondents, the personal implications of "fluidity" were identified not as the
intention (or perceived ability) to literally go back and forth between male and female
identities, but rather the interrelationship of masculine and feminine traits, qualities, and
attributes experienced within a singular identity: "we are all a blend." This realization
was initially uncomfortable for some respondents; several stated that some days they
would wake up with a horrible feeling of being more male than female (or vice versa),
but that as time went on, they were able to expand their operationalizations of
masculine/feminine to accommodate a greater blend of characteristics. In sum, even
though these respondents framed the fluidity of gender identity to be one-directional in
their own cases, they nevertheless acknowledged the capacity for multi-directional,
sustained gender fluidity.
One interesting observation was that the two FTM and three genderqueer
respondents generally had more flexible views of gender than the five MTF respondents.
This was seen in terms of comfort with genders which lie outside of the boundaries of
male/female, and in the ways conformity to archetypical male/female roles was selfassessed.

Whereas all but one MTF respondent (Stacy) did not desire to retain

"transgender" as a permanent part of their gender identity (instead desiring to think of
themselves as "just female," versus trans female), being trans was important facet of
identity for the FTM and genderqueer respondents. To illustrate, Kip related something a
friend had told zher. This friend transitioned to a female body in her fifties after working
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as a lumberjack for thirty years and who Kip described as someone who "will never
pass."
She was like, 'I don’t think that the war between the sexes will be solved until
there are visible populations of people living outside of that.' She was like, 'I
think trans people are here to live outside of that and heal that kind of wound that
we have socially,' you know.
Kip went on to say about zher own experience,
There have been situations where I could have passed, it’s just that I think it’s so
fucked up that I would have to pass, that in those situations I typically just out
myself, because – you know? I just think it’s wrong. I mean, I just think it’s dead
wrong. I think it should have absolutely no bearing on how you treat people. No
bearing whatsoever. ... My argument is, you shouldn’t have to choose, and I’m
not the one who should have to change, and nothing changes if people don’t lay
their lives out. I mean, if people aren’t living their lives out – and trans and
whatever – if people that aren’t passing aren’t paving the way for all the people
who are passing and that do get that privilege – you know what I mean? Then it’s
not going to change.
Stacy, who is MTF and one of the questionnaire participants, wrote,
I work to belong in the world of women as a trans-woman. I want to be able to
talk about my past, without having to sensor it, so I “out” myself. I have a past
and I am proud of it. Also I lived many years hiding my secret, and to have to
transition and worry that the secret of my past will be found out, is more that I
wish to live with. I am out and proud. Being out enables me to be an activist.
By contrast, the remaining MTFs expressed great discomfort at the idea of genders
outside of male or female, genderqueer, or even of not passing (and thus being perceived
as a gender outside of male or female). Avery said,
In one world, I want it to be black and white, you know, male or female. That
would just make it so much easier. There are people can exist in this fluid state,
and be quite comfortable. I’m not one of those people. But, I know there are
many of those people out there, who exist in this third gender spot, and that’s cool
-- for them. It would be nice, to be able to be in that space. But – I guess – too
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much socialization from where I grew up, and there’s this role, and there’s this
role, and it doesn’t separate – like, there’s no middle. And that’s comfortable to
me. So, I guess I define gender as male or female.
This flexibility was also reflected in the ways the respondents characterized their
masculinity or femininity; while the MTFs characterized their femininity as conforming
to the mainstream - "vanilla" and "girly" were two adjectives used - the FTMs identified
primarily with non-mainstream masculinity, namely "fag masculinity." Devin said that
when he began to transition, he was often mistaken for a teenage boy - a gay one. And
while it was "kind of weird to go from being a lesbian to being perceived as a gay man,"
he soon embraced the diversity of experience and expression fag masculinity offered. He
found he was infinitely more comfortable with makeup and skirts when engaging drag or
glam as a queer male than he ever was as a female:
I’m much more comfortable being kind of sort of a flamboyant gay man than I
was ever being a feminine girl, like ever – like, I’m much more likely to put on a
skirt now just because I’m more comfortable with like being – like, I don’t know,
It’s confusing, like, I feel much more like, confident being a man and doing that
like kind of a drag queen situation or whatever as opposed to like, this gender that
doesn’t fit me.
Kip also identified fag masculinity as a gauge of zher maleness; ze said,
I identify more as masculine now, I think, [but] there’s a lot of pressure there,
there’s a lot of proving yourself. ... Like, I don’t know how to fix things, I’m not
mechanically minded, I’m way more on the artists center of the spectrum. So I
think I identify with kind of fag masculinity a lot of the time more than like hetero
man masculinity, just to gauge it, or whatever.
It is possible that the difference in conceptions of gender flexibility is attributable
to something else several participants noted: that in our mainstream culture, it is much
more acceptable for females (particularly girls) to adopt masculine dress, mannerisms,
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behaviors, play activities, or hobbies than it is for males (particularly boys) to adopt
feminine dress, mannerisms, behaviors, play activities, or hobbies. Though all FTM
respondents related extreme feelings of relief upon transition in that they could finally 'be
themselves,' it seems possible that a lifetime of male socialization - and the rigid policing
of gender boundaries that comes with it - still affects the ways they conceptualize gender.
They have committed what some would consider the 'ultimate transgression' in
transitioning, but it is relevant that they switched from one socially intelligible position to
the other rather than completely departing from the binary.

Even though they

transgressed the sex-gender correlation, they maintain respect for the dichotomous gender
boundaries by locating themselves firmly inside those boxes, never straying to the space
in between.
--Male/female gender roles
Many respondents acknowledged the dichotomized nature of male/female gender
roles in our culture, but felt the roles were largely artificially imposed and that real
gender experiences were more diverse, each person experiencing aspects that were both
masculine and feminine. Several respondents connected the rigidity with which these
roles were enforced to be directly related to their trans identity: Sidney said,
And ideally, gender wouldn’t matter, and nobody would have to transition, but
that’s not the way it is, so. [Researcher: So do you feel that you wouldn’t have
transitioned if there wasn’t a social pressure?] Yeah… just if, you know, gender
expression wasn’t such a strict black or white thing, you know, if men were female
minded, and females were allowed to be male minded without having to
transition, I think that would be awesome. I mean I just don’t think the
differences should be such a big deal. Even though there are some very
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fundamental, basic differences between men and women, I don’t think we should
be forced to live inside a specific box, that bothers me. But I mean, that is the
way it is, so if I want society to perceive me the way I feel myself to be, then this is
what I have to do, but it would be cool if I didn’t.
Sidney implied that the only way to personify the actions, behaviors, and personality
which were intuitive to him - which were deemed "masculine" - as a female-identified
person, and still be socially legible, was to no longer be female-identified.
When asked to define the archetypical female and male gender roles, the
respondents had no trouble painting a picture straight out of Leave it to Beaver. What
also emerged, however, was the feeling that many of the divisive qualities between the
male and female gender roles were the product of socialization. Even the respondents
who most strongly identified with traditional gender roles (Lindsay and Avery)
mentioned the influence of social context and the gender socialization of children.
Lindsay framed this in terms of how gender expectations have changed over time, first
evoking an image from her childhood in the 1960s: " most of the neighborhood moms
were all stay-at-home moms, you know. And the man went out and got the job, and the
man… you know…did all the manly things (laughs). ... Things have developed a long
ways since then." We draw from this the sense that the boundaries which define male and
female roles are socially negotiated, allowing them to change over time. Jamie also cited
the role of socialization in cultural gender assumptions:
The whole men are stronger thing… well, men take up more space. Uh, they have
different speech patterns. Men are aggressive. Girls are passive. I think that
most people assume that they’re biologically innate. I don’t think that. I think
it’s all related to the socialization.
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When asked about the difference between male and female gender roles, the
respondents answered exclusively in terms of socially allowable behavior and social
expectations (statements related to physical ability were conspicuously absent). Jordan
said:
As I went through all this, I came to the conclusion that men ‘do’ and women
‘are.’ Men are defined by what they do, women are defined by who they are and
who they’re married to. A man can be successful at business, go home, beat his
wife, abuse his kids, and nobody cares. A man who stays at home is a bum. A
woman who stays at home is a homemaker. A woman doesn’t have to do anything
if she looks good. If she’s beautiful – that’s okay with most people. A man who
succeeds is ambitious; a woman who succeeds is a bitch.
She also related how the social regulation of male/female roles was salient in her career.
You can cure a lot of people by hugging them, but you can’t do that as a male
doc. You can’t touch them. You can’t in the remote, be empathic. Because it’s a
kiss of death if someone accused you of indiscretion. I hug patients all the time
[as a woman]. No one cares. Maybe I’ll get sued someday, I don’t know.
[laughs] But as a woman doc, you have much more power to heal because you
are not threatening, you are viewed as being sympathetic, people can form
emotional rapport with you without fear – men cannot. You know, I had a guy
come into my office once, who was really upset, "my brother died and I was
crying in the funeral home." And I said, of course you have a right to be upset,
with your brother dying, and he says, no, you don’t understand, I cried in front of
my family – and that was the sin, and that’s what he was upset about. Yeah, not
that his brother died – what bothered him was -. ... There are things you cannot
do. You will not wear a dress. You will not wear makeup. You will not make
overtures to another male. To do so, could cost you your life.
Many respondents addressed the metanarrative image of the stereotypical stoic, rational
male in particular - calculating, logical, able to fix cars, but unable to empathize or
emote. This image was seen as artificial and fraught with socially imposed limitations in other words, the respondents did not attribute this image to an ontological difference
between the sexes, but rather to a lifelong saturation in a gender-policing culture.
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Both the FTM and genderqueer respondents invoked this treatment of the male
gender role, each stating that they did not want to conform to the traditional male image.
This was particularly striking in the case of the two FTM respondents, who explicitly
identify as male - but, as mentioned earlier in the discussion of masculinity, they
intentionally position their male identities outside of the severely limited traditional
model and instead invoke more subversive or countercultural forms, like fag masculinity.
On not desiring to conform, Devin said,
Oh yeah, the man is supposed to go and fix the car, or whatever, or be all macho
about it, or like when I get hurt or something, like – if I get hurt and it hurts, then
I’m gonna like fucking say something, you know. I don’t think it’s – I don’t like to
fit into the stereotypes as much as … maybe some other people do, because I
don’t like the stereotypes.
Devin's sentiment - "because I don't like the stereotypes" - was echoed by Sidney, Kip,
Jamie, and Hawthorne.

In their conscious nonconformity, the respondents'

male/masculine gender personification16 was simultaneously a reification and a
subversion of the dichotomous metanarrative gender roles - a reification in that
identifications of maleness/masculinity invoke and reference the metanarrative
construction, thus contributing to its ongoing production; and subversive in that the
male/masculine identifiers are aligned with potentially incohesive bodies and behaviors
in ways that approach the borders of social intelligibility.

16

Though the genderqueer respondents did not wish to pass as male (or be male), each identified with
aspects of masculinity, and it is the personification of that masculinity which I refer to here.
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Though addressed less frequently and with less vehemence than the male role, the
respondents felt similarly about the female gender role, noting what appeared to be
arbitrary limitations placed on individuals located within the role. Unsurprisingly, the
three genderqueer respondents extended this observation to an opinion that the
mainstream model of dichotomous genders should "blow up." When asked about the
archetypical gender roles, Kip said,
I think they’re largely irrelevant ... I feel that’s the conclusion everyone would
come to if they had a different lens to experience life, you know? I think that’s
one of the benefits and one of the pitfalls, I think of not fitting physically into one
of those categories, like not passing, you know? Because you see one side when
you’re passing that you never see when you’re not passing.
When asked about the physical differences between men and women, the
respondents were split: about half thought there were physical differences between men
and women, whereas the other half said while they felt pressure to believe that there were
such differences, they did not personally perceive them; found them to be the result of
social emphasis; or believed they were simply the result of hormones, which, in this
community, were seen as something one can have moderate control over. Sidney spoke
about the metanarrative of physical gender difference:
Does society see differences, physically, between men and women? Well, yeah, I
think it’s like blatant, I mean, if you just look at celebrities, the women are
always, the popular ones are always like skinny and big-boobed and do horribly
super feminine things, and the men were are always like muscley, and tall – and I
think it’s obvious that society sees men in one way and women another. And I
think, more so than they actually are different. I mean, they focus on physical
differences a little too much. [laughs] I think in general, like – I mean, society in
general, I just look at the way like, teenagers, dress, and the girls always have
these little tight-ass little jeans and these tiny little shirts, and the boys are like
always just completely drowning in just a sea of like, over-baggy clothing, you
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know. And it’s just like, that’s unfortunate that you guys are conditioned to dress
that way, because there should be no reason that girls have to show off their
bodies and guys get to completely hide theirs. Yeah, I think society sees way more
– too many physical differences – and they should focus less on that and more on
like, similarities. I don’t know, I just – I think there’s too much of a divide
between men and women. I don’t think there needs to be.
Sidney here expresses an opinion which many respondents echoed: while difference may
occur between individuals of the opposite sexes (for example, that which would be
observable if one was to pair a 5-foot-one-inch tall woman and a six-foot tall man), the
degree of difference does not hold when applied to the genders at large.

Physical

similarity, rather than physical difference, was seen as the ontological norm, but these
respondents at the same time noted the metanarrative of difference and the ways in which
normative behaviors - like Sidney's example of teenage fashion - seek to emphasize and
even create the perception of difference. As Kerry wrote, "society structures individual
conditioning based on its "norms" that PROMOTE an implied Need to be different - male
from female."
It was interesting to note that the respondents who did believe there was a
physical difference between men and women in general described this difference almost
exclusively in terms of the bodily modifications they themselves had engaged in the
process of transition: the shape of the brow, jaw line, and trachea (facial feminization
surgery); fat distribution (shifts with hormone use); and muscular strength (affected by
hormone use and exercise/intentional lack thereof) were all mentioned. The other major
physical difference noted was height, in the perception that men are taller than women.
While many respondents conceded that this was an overgeneralization, the reality of this
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social expectation was reflected across the board, causing several respondents to note that
it was palpably "easier" to be short as a transman than tall as a transwoman.
-Normative Pressure and Passing
All of the respondents spoke at length about passing, both in the cisgender and
transgender/genderqueer contexts. It became clear over the course of the interviews that
passing was approached in two distinct ways: passing in terms of the social pressure to
conform to an intelligible gender category, and passing in terms of the respondent's own
desire to present as an intelligible member of their gender. The former is discussed in
this section; the latter is discussed in Personal Experiences with Engaging Gender for
Conformity later in this chapter.
All the respondents reported first feeling pressure to conform to cisgender
expectations as young children; this pressure was described as more overt by the FTM
and MTF respondents, who all identified with the opposite gender at a very young age
and had "inappropriately" engaged in play, dress, and behavior that was associated with
that gender. Lindsay remembers being scolded to "sit on her hands" and told that "we
don't do that" when she used expressive gestures as she talked. Lindsay, Jordan, and
Avery all spoke of cross-dressing as children and of intuitively knowing it was an activity
full of shame that they must keep hidden. Kerry, Stacy, Jordan, and Avery all remember
being taunted by siblings and playmates about the perceived effemininity of the way they
walked, ran, carried objects, spoke, or used their hands. Kerry felt explicit pressure from
both her family and her peers; she wrote,
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When I was a child no one accepted me for a girl because they knew I was
supposed to be a boy. To stay alive I hid my girlishness as much as I could
(getting beaten isn't pleasant). ... Sometime after I started school, 2nd-3rd grade
it became apparent to me that if I were to survive, I needed to at least appear to
be that boy that my parents wanted. I became an actress.
Sidney also related school-age normative pressure from peers: "In school I got teased a
lot, you know, for being a tomboy, and people were like, oh are you a boy or a girl, and…
you know. I got picked on a lot at school." Hawthorne said that even though ze appeared
to be a very typical girl in high school, ze was often called a "dyke" despite zher feminine
appearance and heterosexual dating due to interests and personality traits that were
considered masculine.
Kip mentioned normative pressure in terms of trying to become employed when
living outside of the gender binary.
Like going to job interviews. I went to this job interview for a temp agency. And
I’m like, a 4.0 student, you know what I mean? ... And I’ve got like three years
of experience, and I type faster than they require, and you know – it was just
ridiculous. I went in there, and I was dressed professionally, and we had an
excellent interview, and it went on for half an hour, 45 minutes, completely
amicable. And then she was like, well, I really want to hire you, but… And I was
like, is there something I can do that would make me a more, a better-looking
candidate, or whatever? And she was just like, 'we just [sigh]… need someone
who looks more professional. Like this.' She does this to her face [mimics
stroking her chin/pulling on beard hair].
The other aspect of normative pressure the respondents universally addressed was
confrontation and, ultimately, concerns about safety. Jamie talked about how public
bathrooms were problematized, particularly for individuals who fall visibly outside the
gender binary. Though ze is often perceived as male, Jamie avoids male bathrooms when
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possible because it is zher impression that they hold greater physical danger. Women's
bathrooms were not without contention, however:
Women are very territorial about their bathrooms. And, feel the need to share
with me when they feel I’m in the wrong one. And actually, my first traumatic
gender experience was in a bathroom when I was eight. And uh, I was washing
my hands. This is why I stopped washing my hands in bathrooms. And this
woman – I was in a restaurant – and someone opens the door, and the door –
when you opened the door, the first thing you saw was the sinks. And I was eight
– you know, washing my hands, minding my own business – and this woman
opens the door and she kind of just stood there – for long enough to make me look
at her – and so I looked at her, and she was making this obvious, slow motion
look between me and the door, like the woman sign on the door – me and the
door, me and the door. And finally was like, you’re in the wrong room. Or
something. Stupid. And you know, I was eight – what was I going to tell her, shut
up? And then she said something to the effect of, if you don’t leave I’m going to
call the manager, or something? Which seemed a little bit harsh. I didn’t have a
lot of memories from childhood, but that one always kind of stuck with me
because it was very upsetting. And built a lot of anxiety around bathrooms.
Ze described the ways ze continued to negotiate bathroom situations, particularly at zher
workplace and in other public spaces, leading zher and zher partner, who is intelligibly
female, to enact a code which indicates when it is safe for Jamie to enter a bathroom.
During the course of the interviews, seven of the ten respondents described,
unprompted, measures they had taken to pass specifically for reasons of personal safety.
Jordan described going on a cruise in the Baltic and being treated increasingly
threateningly by the staff, who perceived her a male cross-dresser. After she returned
from that trip, she underwent facial feminization surgery, although it had been her
personal assessment that she passed "very well" without it. One of her first transgender
patients, a "beautiful two-spirited girl from American Samoa," had recently been
murdered and found in a ditch in Portland (at the time of our interview, the crime was
S. K. Lewis - Gendering the Body / Chapter Four: Findings
96

still unsolved). Of her facial feminization surgery, she said, "And I would have never
done it, but it became a matter of safety. You see, people like to murder you, they like to
kill you up close, they like to see you die."
Kip also presented a narrative fraught with the awareness of danger. As someone
visibly outside the gender binary, it was zher perception that ze was exposed to even
more threat than the passing trans population. Ze described being raped, having the
police decline to investigate the rape, several incidences of assault, and being verbally
harassed in a threatening manner, particularly when using public transportation. Ze said,
I mean, goddamn, it gave me post-traumatic stress for sure. I had anxiety and
all this stress and stuff and it was literally because I was being harassed every
day. I mean, that’s ridiculous. And I think that’s a health consequence you have
to take into account, too; I don’t think it’s just about taking testosterone or taking
estrogen, but what kind of mental health medications are you going to need if you
live as a non-passing person.
At the time of our interview, Kip's foot was in a walking cast, and at the beginning of our
conversation ze explained ze had been in a car accident the week before. Kip brought up
the accident again when we talked about passing. "Like after my car wreck, I went to –
my first response to getting in a car wreck, this is like sad but true, and I think it’s really
like a reality check – I was wearing a tie and I took it off before I called 911; that was the
first thing I did." Kip's perception of normative pressure was such that ze feared zher
gender unintelligibility would affect zher ability to get medical attention - a fear that is
not unwarranted, as there are numerous documented cases of transpeople being denied
life-saving treatment as well as routine healthcare (Stryker 2008; Davis 2001; Feinberg
2001). In fact, Jordan - herself a medical doctor - could not find a physician willing to
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treat her when she had kidney stones. She ultimately went to the surgeon who performed
her SRS and asked for treatment.
A final aspect of normative pressure identified in the participants' responses was
the regulation of the dichotomized gender model - specifically, the policing that occurs
when individuals are visibly outside of that model. The genderqueer respondents located
the source of this pressure in the mainstream culture at large, but - perhaps surprisingly also within the trans community, engaging once again the seemingly contradictory ways
transgenderism both reifies and subverts the metanarrative gender dichotomy. Faced
with what seemed like mounting pressure, Kip sought out the advice of a therapist and
was able to secure a session with a counselor who is a well-known, out transman. After
describing zher situation, ze was surprised at the counselor's response:
And he’s like, well, you’re going to have to make a choice. And I was like, what
does that mean? And he was like, you’re going to have to make a choice because
people that don’t pass – you’ll just never make it. You’re going either to end up a
total alcoholic abusing substances or you’re going to kill yourself. … That’s what
a counselor said to me in my first appointment. A trans counselor. Like, 'you’ll
never make it like this.' ... I was like, wow, you're a really bad counselor.
(Laughs.)
Hawthorne, who said zhe only came out as genderqueer relatively recently, relayed a
narrative with similar themes:
I’ve been told already, like, pick one. Like, that kind of – yeah, totally, pick one.
Like, 'oh, are you transitioning now to…?' It’s still easier to, people really want
one or the other, one or the other. And I even feel like a lot of people have been
… socially pushed into being transsexual, like going all the way because there’s
so much pressure going on there. And they over-embrace one set of stereotypes
and almost reject the other entirely because they need to fit in that one to feel
socially okay. More socially than internally, like, they might be like, well, I was
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still okay with that piece of me. And I feel the same way, like, I love my breasts,
but – I’m already feeling that – pick one or the other -- and I’m going to continue
to transgress as much as I - until I feel like I should pick. If I ever should.
These narratives were charged with a sense of frustration and the precarious situationality
of gender unintelligibility, both within and outside of the trans and trans-friendly
community (as discussed above, all were conscious of threats to their physical safety).
On zher blog, Jamie described zher experience with top surgery as a genderqueeridentified individual:
The diagnosis for surgery on my paperwork was female to male transgenderism
thus I was listed as male on all paperwork and on my wristband and was referred
to as such by the staff. Although recognizing the importance of this for many other
patients in these circumstances, it seemed to me another illustration of the idea
that if you are trans identified you still have to pick male or female.
In our interview, Jamie echoed Kip's feeling that genderqueer individuals, by nature of
their visibility, are at times subject to more discrimination and mistreatment than more
legible members of the trans community. Ze summed it up at one point, saying, "You
know, it’s really shitty to live in a society in which you’re kind of a second-class citizen."
-Personal Experiences with Engaging Gender for Conformity
Throughout the interviews, the respondents described their experiences of
engaging gender in both cisgender and transgender/genderqueer contexts.
Over the course of the interviews, the notion of gender "performativity" was
shown to be more problematic than I had anticipated at the outset of this study. When
used in the interview questions, respondents' initial reaction to the term "performative"
was slightly defensive; it was perceived as somewhat pejorative. However, the term was
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not meant to imply contrived action, just action - the actions, movements, behaviors, and
other attributes associated with the embodiment of any particular gender (the doing of
gender, as West and Zimmerman have termed it).

I operationalize the term

"performativity" as a way to refer to the actions of gender much in the way that Judith
Butler (1999 [1990], 1993) uses the term in Gender Trouble and Bodies that Matter. The
term's perceived implication of inauthenticity clashed with the respondents' gender
narratives, which framed their individual gender enactment as the expression of the
authentic self. All the respondents were clear that the personification of their selfidentified gender allowed them the lease to act, behave, move, speak, and play in the
ways that were intuitive or "natural" to them, letting them present the authentic self that
their cisgender identity had precluded. The unspoken but apparent mirror image of this
axiom was that none of these aspects of self were artificial, constructed, or inauthentic.
The notion of performativity is salient in this context because while the impetus
of the respondents' actions came from within, the respondents were still aware that most
actions,

movements,

speech,

and

play

interests

are

dichotomized

by

the

masculine/feminine division that regulates socially acceptable behavior. Regardless of
how natural or intuitive the action, the respondents were able to categorically gender (i.e.,
denote as male or female) each aspect of their embodiment, from "running like a girl" to
"eating salad like a man."

Once the intended use of the term became clearer, the

respondents warmed to it. Devin said,
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Performative? Yes, right. I think I’m very conscious of how I’m acting, but I
don’t think I try and go overboard. ... I feel like trans people, we just study
behavior so much, because we want to fit in, or don’t, or feel like there’s some
kind of thing we need to do better or different.
Hawthorne also related being very conscious of the balance of femininity and masculinity
transmitted by her personification:
I feel like I, just the way I feel like I have to portray more masculine is
performative a lot of the time... I do feel like I’m being performative of this, in not
wanting to be perceived as uber feminine and uber female and thus embracing
these things that are masculine.
Even though their actions were "natural" in origin, the respondents were
cognizant of doing them largely because they had been forbidden from doing so in their
cisgender identities. The awareness of the gender-exclusivity of such actions was what
these interviews ultimately measured. Because they were acutely aware of gendered
behaviors, the respondents were able to report those behaviors, giving insight into the
minutia of gendered being. (As will be discussed in the next section, the respondents
were also in a unique situation to report the ways in which gender embodiment became
embodiment - i.e., documenting the bodily changes which accompanied a shift in gender
identity.)

The respondents' initial list of actions done as part of gender enactment

included depilation (including shaving, waxing, electrolysis, and laser removal) of facial
and body hair; the lack of depilation (i.e., allowing body and/or facial hair to grow);
alterations to the length and style of hair; the use of cosmetics, including consultation
with professional makeup artists; voice and intonation lessons; binding breasts and/or
'packing'; nail hygiene (engaging in, or refraining from, buffing and/or polishing nails);
and surgical alteration (sexual reassignment surgery; double mastectomy and
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reconstruction; breast augmentation; tracheal shave; facial feminization surgery; and, in
Kerry's case, non-consensual genital reconstruction).
Each respondent also talked about the importance of dress and the 'right' kind of
clothes; many spoke of layering clothing, wearing oversized clothing, or otherwise
selecting garments based specifically on the characteristics they were perceived to
obscure or emphasize.

The genderqueer respondents described intentionally mixing

gender markers so that clothing, makeup, and facial hair (for example) would be
incongruous; Kip talked about favoring an outfit that consisted of zher beard, a shaved
head, lipstick and mascara, a corset (emphasizing both zher cleavage and zher chest hair),
a tie, fishnet stockings, and unshaved legs.
Several respondents described the ways in which they exercised. Devin, Sidney,
and Hawthorne all specifically mentioned that it was important to them to be "strong"
and "muscular," and all three designed their exercise with that goal in mind. Hawthorne
and Kip both mentioned that their predilections towards physical strength to have caused
considerable confusion in their cisgender contexts, and related stories in which recent
observations of their physical strength - setting up big tables or lifting heavy boxes often caused unintroduced observers to subsequently "he" them (that is, their
ambiguously presented gender was interpreted as male upon witness of physical activity).
Avery described changing her manner of exercise upon transition; while she frequently
lifted weights and engaged in other muscle-building activities while living in her
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cisgender (she was a college athlete), she stated that she now exclusively exercises
aerobically and no longer lifts weights at all, specifically to avoid building muscle.
The respondents also described behavioral aspects of gender embodiment, in
areas as far ranging as body language, posture, mannerisms, communication styles,
display of emotion or - alternately - stoicism, display of affection, and courtesy/chivalry.
Respondents described how transitioning allowed them to embody behaviors intuitive to
them, and often they described what those behaviors were in terms of how they differed
from cisgender expectations. Avery said that since transitioning to live as a woman, she
was
comfortable with my hands more, sitting cross-legged, um. I usually try to take
up as small amount of space as possible, and that just sort of lent itself to trying
pass – as a man, those were uncomfortable things for me, as a male.
Most respondents evoked the way they walked; most MTF respondents said they had
been harassed about "walking like a girl" or walking with a "wiggle" as children or
teenagers; and the FTM and two genderqueer respondents said they had been harassed
about walking in a masculine way, with a "swagger" or like they had "just gotten off a
horse." Kerry, who identified as female but felt forced to live as a male, wrote in her
questionnaire about the vigilance with which she monitors her walk (hers is the one with
the self-described "wiggle"), body language, and overall persona, particularly when it
comes to communication style and displaying emotions.
Normally I don't have the body language associated with males. In an "unsafe"
situation, I am so tense & stiff, and afraid of making the wrong move, saying the
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wrong thing, that I come across as just a tense controlled person. ... I hate
conflict & if I don't watch myself constantly, can become tearful immediately. I
have to rethink anything asked of me. My initial response to almost any subject
has to be scrutinized in my brain before I allow myself to answer. Why - well
because I have learned that males & females answer questions differently, they
think things out differently. I studied the behavior of males since I was small in
order to try and copy the ways they walked, run, spoke, laughed, used their hands,
the way they stood, how they ate, sat, interacted just so I could stay alive. I guess
it worked for the most part.
Jamie also spoke of zher awareness of the perceived masculinity of zher behavior, while
simultaneously noting that the masculine-ness was not necessarily intentional:
I have adopted the body language of men, you know, I spread out [gestures to
open legs while sitting in chair], which is more comfortable for me... And I was
always kind of more masculine, you know what I mean. But, no, it wasn’t a
conscious choice.
Unsurprisingly, the trans respondents had insight into the performative
expectations of their cisgender embodiments that was even more extensive than were
their observations on transgender embodiment. In context of cisgender, the respondents
embraced the terminology of performance, likening their cisgender personifications to a
kind of cis-drag or a "game." In fact, the respondents uniformly reported that - excluding
a period of overcompensation immediately following transition (which will be discussed
in more detail below) - they were much more actively aware of/concerned with passing
(and could more easily recall they measures they had taken to pass) in their cisgender
identities than they ever have been as trans. A female person trapped in an inauthentic
male embodiment, Kerry directly invoked the notion of performativity in the more
pejorative sense. She wrote,
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I am a very good actress. In my world, I spend more time onstage than offstage.
My situation dictates that I "appear" male, although people who know me well
and personally absolutely understand that the image I portray is just that, an
image and nothing close to who I really am.
Lindsay spoke about the limitations she felt in terms of embodiment:
I used to, [mimics noticing her own gestures] oh! You know, I’d catch myself
being all feminine or whatever and around the guys I’m like 'oh shit!' ... Living as
a male, I would occasionally pluck my brows, try to push the limits a little,
seriously? … It was like, 'ok, I’m getting a little too carried away here…' I would
shave, I mean, even you know, my legs, I would shave all the time, and then it was
like, now I gotta – can’t wear shorts for like four weeks or whatever it would take
for my hair to grow back, you know!
She also spoke about choices she made consciously in order to pass as male:
I mean, it was always there, I just thought I could do things to make it disappear;
I thought I could get married, have a child - grow a beard, get a construction job
- drive a big truck. ... I was like, ok, I’m doing all these manly things, look at me,
…you know?
Jordan's narrative was similar. When asked if she felt she had to be performative when
living in her male cisgender, she said yes.
Well, if you’ve been doing it all your life – it was pretty hard and I didn’t realize
it, and the way I coped with it, is I did stuff. I could never sit on the weekend and
not have 27 different things to do, and the day was judged by what I
accomplished. ... bought a house, had a child, trying to be a doc, trying to be a
dad – whatever that was, I had a pretty good example in my dad, but you know, I
kind of faked it.
Several respondents also evoked performativity in a professional capacity at several
points during the interview. Jordan related a story from her medical internship in which
she watched a female resident calm an elderly, hyperventilating tuberculosis patient by
embracing her and singing lullabies. Decades later, Jordan related the crushing feeling of
realization that male doctors were not allowed to touch or comfort their patients in such
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ways, even though it seemed to her to be a very intuitive way of healing. In this
anecdote, we see Jordon's realization that there was a qualitative difference between the
roles of male doctor and female doctor, and that she had to perform accordingly.
Devin remembered having to dress up in a skirt or a dress for the first day of
school all the way through high school and described this as a moment he became
particularly aware of the performative expectations associated with his cisgender:
And I just remember that first day being like, okay, this is the game, this is how
it’s going to be – this isn’t right, but I’m just going to have to play this game for
you know, as long as I can handle it – and then… It just never felt – accurate, I
don’t know. It just felt weird. And I felt like, somebody else’s body.
Sidney also spoke of divining 'the way things were supposed to be' and trying to act the
part, at least in situations in which he was socially observable, like P.E. class.
I did wear a bra for a few years, even though I really never had a need for one.
Because… I mean, I had to go to PE until sophomore year of high school, and
like, all the other girls have bras, and I was like, I guess that’s what I’m supposed
to do too. ... I just did it for a while because it was what the other girls were
doing, and I was like, well, if I’m a girl then I guess I’m supposed to do that. But
it just never really – I always kind of felt like I was drag, I guess, although I didn’t
really know that at the time – I knew I wasn’t comfortable, but I didn’t know why.
And now I’m like, yeah, because I felt like I was in drag and I wasn’t comfortable
that way.
Most respondents identified high school as a time during which they consciously made an
effort to really embody their cisgender and conform to its expectations, in doing so
satisfying familial, peer, and social pressure. Jamie, Devin, Hawthorne, and Sidney all
consciously engaged in very traditional, heteronormative behaviors and (uncomfortably)
invested in a corresponding appearance, cultivating long hair, applying cosmetics,
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wearing skirts, dating boys, and even (in one case) becoming a cheerleader. Avery said
that she went through something similar in high school and college: "I went through a
phase of being hyper-male [to kind of overcompensate]. Totally. ... I dated [girls] like
crazy. ... And the whole time, I was doing the whole cross dressing thing."
As stated previously, the participants identified their overall gender presentation
as a reflection of an authentic self. Even within that model, however, most respondents
identified attributes of their current selves that they associated with their cisgender, which
they consciously tried to eradicate; and attributes associated with their transgender which
they consciously tried to adopt, however small or inconsequential.

Lindsay

acknowledged this and the active role of choice during our conversation about passing,
saying,
You just start accepting, you’re like ok, I can make changes, I can choose to eat
healthier, I can choose to exercise, you know, I can choose to take care of myself
better, you know. … I can choose to go to voice lessons. You know, there’s a lot
of choices a person can make.
Devin described how he at times intentionally manipulates socially salient gender
markers (e.g., body language) in order to pass as a more traditional male:
Like if there’s some kind of situation where’s someone kind of – like maybe if
there’s a drunk guy in the bar and he’s kind of just being an ass or something and
there’s some kind of situation, then I’m going to be a bit, like more [flexes
muscles like the Incredible Hulk] a little bit, and definitely have better posture
and stuff like that – and it works, it’s really funny – like people will back away.
Avery subtly acknowledged the way gender expectations affect her when speaking about
gender that exists outside of the male/female dichotomy:

S. K. Lewis - Gendering the Body / Chapter Four: Findings
107

For me, I don't think [gender] is changeable in the essence of back-and-forth, it's
one direction. Um, you know, for others, it is, but not - I admire their ability to be
in that space. It wouldn't be so much about finishing this transition process, it
would just be about living out my life.
Implied in Avery's statement is the possibility that "just living out my life" could entail
difference from "finishing this transition process," which in turn indicates that concerns
about gender conformity (passing) have a conscious bearing, however small, on Avery's
personification, in that the gender-appropriateness of an action, behavior, or appearance
is gauged before it is enacted.
Although largely referenced in terms of small, everyday actions - from elevator
"performance" (men are supposed to hang back and let women exit before disembarking
themselves) to eating salad "like a woman" - this form of performativity was most often
invoked when respondents spoke about "overcompensation," which most identified as a
phase they went through when they first transitioned. Avery said that upon transitioning
to living as a woman (after taking estrogen for two years while living as a man), "[I] was
just hyper feminine, and over the top, and garish, to some degree. And now, it’s just –
this is me. In Gap. This is my style now. I shop at Gap and Old Navy, tee shirts and
jeans. And that’s me."
Sidney talked about this in terms of actively engaging "fag masculinity," which he
was attracted to but hesitant to embody because he was afraid he would be perceived as
female.
If I was more comfortable in my masculinity I might… you know, fag it up a little
bit, but I’m not right now. [laughs] I feel like a lot – there’s still some
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overcompensating, is necessary. I feel like I need to do things like, wear more
typically male clothing and cut my hair shorter, and…you know, a little bit of the
overcompensation because I don’t feel as masculine as I would like to be. I mean,
I do feel like there are certain things I have to do to appear more masculine. ...
Yeah, sometimes I feel like I'm trying -- trying – to act stereotypically male, like
making goofy – like making obscene jokes, or like joking around, like my
girlfriend should go make me dinner, or something like that, but I’m not really
serious, but.
Kip related frequently observing what ze perceived as overcompensation in the trans
community:
And then, as they start to pass, there’s some trans men that I’ve known – it’s like,
'I want to date a really feminine woman,' or they have more of a tendency to date
people that kind of make their gender seem more gendered, make them seem more
masculine, in comparison, or whatever. I hate to say it, but I feel like I’ve known
a lot of people who went through kind of a trophy phase, like, ‘I want a girlfriend
that makes me look more like a man,’ then they kind of get through that, and then
they’re like, 'oh actually, I’m interested in men.'
Kip here articulates a phenomenon that most of the other "overcompensating"
respondents also related: that the inauthenticity of complete conformity was often the
doorway to further realizations of authentic self. These and other experiences imply that,
although secondary to the model of identity that is defined by the authentic self, the
notion of performativity as a consciously elected enactment is still somewhat salient as
we approach transgender embodiment.

-Gendered Bodily Change
All respondents reported significant bodily change upon change in gender
identity. The bodily change most often noted by the respondents was the sense of being
at ease.

Whereas they reported being tense, awkward, rigid, and clumsy when
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cisgendered and having vigilantly policed their movements, mannerisms, behaviors, and
appearance; transitioning to their transgender identities freed them to relax and use their
bodies more intuitively. The respondents reported this freedom as altering their physical
relationship with space; each described the ways in which they took up more space
(particularly in terms of hand gestures and the accessibility of affectionate touch for
MTFs, and in terms of "spreading out" while sitting, style of walk, and general posture
for genderqueer and FTM respondents) and, alternately, less space (particularly in terms
of crossing legs, hunching shoulders, and posture for MTFs, and in terms of hand
gestures, emotive touch, and other social interactions for FTMs) than they did in
cisgender embodiments.
One of the ways Jamie addressed the physical effects of gender embodiment was
in terms of the unintended physical consequences of zher genderqueer embodiment namely, binding and/or obscuring the appearance of zher breasts, prior to undergoing
surgery. On her blog, she wrote,
The development of breasts was deeply upsetting to me and I tried to hide them as
much as possible through wearing baggy clothes, sports bras, and hunching over.
Unfortunately, this last technique to hide them has led to me having awful posture
and a weak lower back that often tires and hurts a great deal.
Avery, who likes to say she's "5-12" [five feet, twelve inches - or, in layman's terms, six
feet tall], described similar problems related to hunching her shoulders and stooping to
deemphasize her height, which she felt was an impediment to passing. Though not
necessarily in the traditional sense, both Jamie and Avery's actions were gendered and
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had very real implications on the body in terms of health and able-bodiedness as well as
gender presentation.
Five of the respondents reported physical change attributed to elective surgery
(not including Kerry, whose genital reconstruction surgery was done as an infant and was
non-consensual). Surgeries utilized by the population included MTF sexual reassignment
surgery, "top" surgery (double mastectomy and masculine chest reconstruction), breast
augmentation, and facial feminization surgery, which included alterations to the brow,
jaw line/chin, cheekbones, nose, and sometimes the trachea.
Eight of the respondents used either estrogen or testosterone; six respondents used
these electively as part of their transition, and two (Kip and Kerry, who both identified as
intersex) received them as treatment for a medically diagnosed condition. Though both
Kip and Kerry said the use of hormones as treatment was ultimately a decision they made
themselves, their decisions were framed in the contexts of medical diagnosis, medical
advice, and familial pressures. The authority our culture attributes to medical doctors in
particular cannot be ignored in assessing these respondents' choice to use hormones.
Kerry experienced great distress when the effects of the prescribed hormone
(testosterone) began to manifest. Upon discovery of her status as a genetic female, the
fertility specialist Kerry was seeing gave her a massive dose of testosterone (without first
explaining what was in the syringe), which catapulted her into puberty and started her
menstrual cycle at the age of 32. In light of health concerns and her own evident desire
to identify as female, subsequent doctors advised discontinuing testosterone, but Kerry
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ultimately elected to continue using it in order to save her marriage and her relationship
with her unborn child. Kerry experienced significant bodily change and wrote,
My whole body changed. I began growing from my height of 5'8" to 6'1". My
body mass shifted, my feet grew (and as they did caused me considerable pain).
My entire body grew and changed, and where I was almost hairless on my body
before, dark course hair began to appear. ... My beautiful hair (on my head)
began falling out. And facial hair appeared where there was none before. My
voice changed.
At the time of our interview, Kip had recently begun taking estrogen as treatment for the
hormonal "imbalance" attributed to PCOS (though ze mentioned ze had yet to start taking
testosterone-blockers as zher doctors wanted her to). Ze said that every doctor ze'd seen
since zher diagnosis at the age of 18 had pressured zher to take hormones and seemed to
think that dangling the carrot of weight loss would make Kip automatically jump onboard
with their proposed treatment. Kip did initially submit to treatment, taking a slew of
medications, and had an extreme adverse reaction in which ze hemorrhaged and loss
consciousness.
Like the whole thing was insulting. It was like, you’re on this medicine because
a), you’re not woman enough, b) you’re too fat, you know, it’s all about fitting
into some ideal that has nothing to do with who people are, that basically exists to
try and simplify things that aren’t simple, and sell you shit that you probably
don’t need, and I almost – died, you know what I mean?
Zher recent decision to take estrogen was tempered by zher mother's influence, which
Kip said wasn't about disapproval, but about her concerns for Kip's safety and ability to
make a living. However, Kip also mentioned being exhausted from the constant strife of
living outside the gender dichotomy as playing a role: "it’s fucking tiring, you know. So
part of it too is just kind of oppression vacation. I feel like I’m on oppression vacation."
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The term "oppression vacation" referred to the fact that the estrogen almost immediately
made zher appear more intelligibly female (in part because ze shaved zher face, having
been warned zher facial would likely fall out otherwise). Kip also noted changes to zher
weight, fat distribution, breast development, and subtle changes to zher overall silhouette.
Ze also talked about changes in zher skin and face:
The skin is more sensitive – the skin change is almost immediate, that’s probably
the most obvious thing. ... When your skin’s rougher, everything feels
completely – like your physical experience of touching things is completely
different. And how things feel in relationship to you – things that feel soft in
relation to your skin are different, you know. ... And my jaw line changes some –
in four months my jaw line has changed some. And my eye structure has
changed. And you can just tell, from pictures from before and from now, that
certain facial things have shifted. And it’s subtle, but it’s really noticeable if you
look at it over a period of time.
Many of these changes were echoed by other respondents. Also reported were
changes to the vocal chords; hair growth and/or male pattern baldness; weight gain,
changes in appetite, and changes in diet; changes in muscularity and subcutaneous fat;
increase in height and/or foot size; differences in facial bone and musculature; breast
development, and partial virilization of female genitals.

Sidney's narrative detailed the

changes he'd experienced:
Obvious things like facial hair, and … then there’s like muscle structure, just
noticing – I mean, looking at myself and looking at some of my MTF friends like,
our bodies change. They just do – I mean, like, you know, we, FTMs loose like
the subcutaneous layer of fat, and like our fat kind of redistributes itself – like, I
had kind small breasts to begin with, but now they’re like gone ... your hips kind
of slim out, you tend to get more of a, a little more of a gut if you’re prone to that
kind of thing. ... [And now] I just eat a lot. And I actually stopped being a
vegetarian. And actually, so did my roommate – like, my roommate actually used
to be vegan, and I used to be vegetarian. And he still doesn’t eat dairy because
he’s allergic to it, but yeah, we both started eating like red meat again and white
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meat, because like, we just weren’t getting enough protein, we just weren’t. Yeah,
hungry all the time. Yeah, lots of – I eat a lot of protein, and starch, and really
filling things – I mean, I ate vegetables and stuff like that too, but yeah, a lot more
protein than I used to eat. A lot more. Way more.
Many respondents listed appetite, weight change, and changes in diet (as related to
appetite); all but two respondents reported weight gain (both Kip and Avery both
reported losing some weight). The FTM respondents reported that their gain was mostly
muscle mass.
The two respondents who did not use hormones (only one of whom used surgical
alteration) also reported experiencing physical change, including increased muscle mass,
diminishing secondary sex characteristics, and a more ambiguous silhouette.

Jamie

related the changes ze has experienced in addition to zher surgery mainly to zher
relationship with space (and the freedom to use her body within it as is intuitive).
Hawthorne also related feeling a great deal of physical change:
I feel a little bit awkward, a little bit bumpy, like I said, the physical, like I feel
kind of awkward in my body, because of what’s been going on. My breasts have
calmed down, like, I have like 38 D breasts, and like, I’m wearing bras that I
didn’t used to wear because I’m feeling my chest has actually like gotten smaller.
It feels smaller, it feels like it’s not taking up so much space. And, that’s – that’s
definitely had to do with it, feeling where I’m at. Other than that, it’s things like –
I’ve noticed that because I’m not doing the things I used to do – like, I used to
wax my face – like, I have quite a bit of facial hair – I grow facial hair more so
than some men, and like —I’ve just taken note of it, and instead of reacting like I
used to, which was like 'oh my god I’ve got to go get waxed' – I don’t care. This
is okay. And that is a physical characteristic change for me. I’ve waxed since I
was in fourth grade. My mom started removing my body hair very young,
because I was very hairy – like, I was one of those girls with the mustache and the
side burns and so… noticing that again is a physical trait that has come with my
masculinity. ... Is it a physical manifestation or is it, is it this biological
acceptance of… [impersonates her body talking to her] ‘you’re not personally
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into that, so I can just be – more’ – like, I feel more stable in my identity as my
body kind of goes a long with it.
Even without hormone use, these respondents experienced bodily change in concert with
their gender identities.
Conclusion
The ten participants in this sample each provided deeply personal narratives of
gender identity, gender embodiment, and physical change. Respondents at times engaged
size, sexuality, and socio-economic status as factors which intersected with gender in the
formation of identity, but they each ultimately used the notion of an authentic sense of
self to frame their personal identities. The transgender respondents' narratives explicitly
framed their post-transition gender identities - and gender enactments - as the expressions
of this authentic self.
An extension of the phenomenon that the respondents were more cognizant of the
actions taken to pass as cisgender than as transgender, a fascinating theme emerged from
the respondents' narratives when asked about the differences they perceived in
themselves since moving from cisgender to transgender selves. Even though each had
felt suffocated and restricted by the expectations associated with their cisgender and now
felt 'freed,' the respondents often had trouble articulating exactly what was different about
their lives outside of the superficialities like dress, hair, mannerisms, and depilation.
Overwhelmingly, they expressed the sentiment that they were essentially "the same
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person," expressing a stability in aspects of identity across gender. Lindsay articulated
this by saying,
I just behave the way I behave. (Laughs) So I don't know how I act different, you
know? I like, do everything the same, pretty much. I do the same kind of work,
I’m pretty much the same person. So what’s different? I got an innie instead of
an outie. (Laughs). … I don't know how I'm different - I mean, back then, I used
to get up, get in my truck, and go to work. Now I get up, get in my truck, and go
to work. (Laughs)
Jordan also marveled at how her life was so much the same and yet so different at the
same time.
It’s always been intellectually fascinating to step back and marvel that
someone could be raised as a male, live as a male for 47 years, be accepted in the
community in a fairly commanding position, can so easily slide into being a
female, like they’ve been that way all their life. I mean, I don’t have any trouble
being a girl. I mean, I still do some unladylike things – I’ve been told I don’t eat
salad very well. But, no, it’s like I’ve always been this way.
Stability in identity across - or in spite of - gender identity invokes the absurdity of the
metanarrative gender binary, which posits that only one type of person is suitable in a
given gender.
This study refers to gender enactment as performativity (a term which, as
discussed earlier, was initially problematic, but eventually resolved). The use of this term
is not meant to imply that gender enactment is contrived or inauthentic; rather, it simply
refers to the doing of gender, as gender is done both when it is authentic and when it is
not. However, the doing of gender is usually so ubiquitous that the doers cannot identify
it. Due to the trans population's uniquely situated positionality in respect to the gender
binary, the respondents were aware that their actions, movements, speech, and interests
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are dichotomized by the masculine/feminine division that regulates socially acceptable
behavior, and thus constitute doing gender. The respondents' awareness of the gendered
content of such actions was what these interviews ultimately measured. Because they
were acutely aware of gendered behaviors, the respondents were able to report those
behaviors, giving insight into the minutia of gendered being. The respondents were
uniquely able to report the ways in which gender embodiment - the doing of gender became embodiment.
Chapter Five will examine the findings in terms of the theoretical lenses presented
in chapter two and will apply them in terms of the potential implications for feminist
theory.
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CHAPTER FIVE
Part I:
Discussion

It's a privilege to not have to think about how you are embodied ... in the same way that white
people never have to think about race.
SUSAN STRYKER, QUOTED IN THE RIDDLE OF GENDER, 2005
As far as I’m concerned, being any gender is a drag.
PATTI SMITH, 1998
My point is that every writer writes across gender. … When Danny DeVito writes dialogue for
Arnold Schwarzenegger, that’s cross-gendered.
KATE BORNSTEIN, MY GENDER WORKBOOK, 1998

The narratives of the trans individuals discussed in the previous chapters give
insight to the first-person, subjective experience of gender transgression and also provide
a site to engage the postmodern feminist epistemology of material-semiotic intra-action
(Tuana 1996). Throughout the interviews, the ten participants invoked the ways in which
they consciously and unconsciously constructed their bodily and metaphysical identities;
gauged notions and embodiments of masculinity and femininity; and did gender. Each of
these actions was richly situated in the complex and interdynamic situationality of the
respondents' lives; and in approaching the narratives with an inclusive, feminist
epistemology, a picture of the respondents' gendered, sexually dimorphic bodies as
material-semiotic productions emerged.
The first part of this chapter will assess the findings from the interviews in terms
of my hypotheses (below). Part II concludes by evaluating this assessment in terms of its
application to and implications for the feminist theory discussed in Chapter Two.
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The hypotheses follow:

H1: Individuals who consciously engage gender via the desire to change or otherwise
transgress normative gender roles (e.g., trans people) gain a heightened awareness of the
physically performative aspects of normative gender roles, and are able to manipulate this
awareness in the embodiment of the desired gender role.
H2: Trans individuals experience sexually dimorphic bodily change to be a direct result
of changes to their gender identity.
The goal of this research was to serve as an exploration of the role social construction
plays in bodily sexual dimorphism and the ways in which it can be engaged by the study
of firsthand gender transgressive experiences.

The interview questions sought to

examine, dissect, and deconstruct gender and how it was enacted by the respondents, in
turn leading to an examination, dissection, and deconstruction of the ways in which
sexual dimorphism was perceived, created/constructed, and reconstructed. The narratives
of trans subjects offer access to a unique perspective because they embody a gender that
may not typically correspond to their sex category; many have had experience living in
both genders, and even more importantly, have had the experience of changing genders,
or living beyond the gender binary. In the following analysis, I will discuss the findings
insofar as they demonstrate support for, or departure from, the hypotheses, and I will
suggest future avenues for further research.
Individuals who consciously engage gender
The view that gender is performative sought to show that what we take to be an
internal essence of gender is manufactured through a sustained set of acts, posited
through the gendered stylization of the body. …[W]hat we take to be an
‘internal’ feature of ourselves is one that we anticipate and produce through
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certain bodily acts, at an extreme, an hallucinatory effect or naturalized gestures.
(Butler 1999 [1990]: xv)

At the outset of this study, I hypothesized that trans individuals, through their
desire to change or otherwise transgress cisgender roles, gain an awareness of the
physically performative aspects of normative gender roles (H1). However, through the
course of the interviews, it became apparent that my initial conceptualization of
awareness was both undertheorized and situated in my own bias as a non-trans person
and academic researcher. My initial usage of the term implied that the desire to change
genders creates the awareness of genders (as if at that moment in time), when trans
narratives revealed that it is, in fact, the other way around: the awareness of the genders specifically, the awareness of the rigid boundaries associated with each - coexists and cocreates the decision (and perhaps even the desire) to change genders. Awareness is not a
separate entity from the decision; the awareness that one's intuitive identity is
incompatible with one's cisgender is an inextricable part of the impulse to transgress the
binary of sex-gender congruity.
Everyone in fact can be said to have an awareness of the boundaries - and thus the
contents - of normative gender roles; as Eliot (2009) and Fine (2010) demonstrate, all
brains and bodies are primed by immersion in the cultural metanarrative and a lifetime of
associative learning as to male/female gender roles, including embodiments. The male
and female scripts are imprinted in the brain by virtue of its immersion in them. (This is
not to say that each brain is socialized as both genders, obviously - meaning that while
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both men and women can identify a mannerism or an article clothing as 'male' or 'female',
it doesn't mean that a man knows not to wear a backpack with a skirt or that a woman can
gesture like a man on cue.) But as Eliot and Fine also point out, the implicit associations
that are the result of priming and associative learning are not the same as a conscious
awareness or recall of this information; we are often simply left with a sense of "it just is
that way." This is where my initial operationalization of awareness was half right: while
still finding it difficult to articulate, the trans individuals who participated in this study
displayed a greater degree of awareness of performativity than nontransgressive
cisgender individuals typically display. However, my assumption that trans individuals
would engage conscious performativity in their transgender embodiments - rather than in
their cisgender embodiments - proved to be false. The respondents overwhelmingly
framed their trans embodiments as expressions of an authentic self, and instead located
conscious performativity largely in the context of their pre-transition cisgender identities.
The notion of performativity proved to be salient in this context because while the
impetus of the respondents' actions came from within, the respondents were still aware
that most actions, movements, speech, and play interests are dichotomized by the
masculine/feminine division that regulates socially acceptable behavior. Regardless of
how natural or intuitive the action, the respondents were able to categorically gender (i.e.,
denote as male or female) each aspect of their embodiment, from "running like a girl" to
"eating salad like a man."
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And, as indicated above, cisgender performativity initially proved to be a much
more productive site of discussion than transgender performativity.

The trans

respondents had insight into the performative expectations of their cisgender
embodiments that was more extensive than were their observations on transgender
embodiment. In context of cisgender, the respondents embraced the terminology of
performance, likening their cisgender personifications to a kind of cis-drag, a "stage," or
a "game." In fact, the respondents uniformly reported that - excluding a period of
overcompensation immediately following transition, they were much more actively aware
of/concerned with passing (and could more easily recall they measures they had taken to
pass) in their cisgender identities than they ever had been as trans. Once it became clear
to the respondents that the operationalization of performativity did not necessarily imply
the inauthenticity, just the acknowledgement, of actions, the respondents were able to
engage the term in the contexts of their transgender embodiments as well (though to a
lesser extent).

While their trans-embodied actions were "natural" in origin, the

respondents were cognizant of doing them largely because they had been forbidden from
doing so in their cisgender identities.
As they approach trans embodiment, trans individuals are not approaching
difference for the first time. The differences are already crystal clear. Trans people are
always aware of the limits of gender roles because throughout their lives, it has been
made clear that their predisposition to certain behaviors, activities, or aesthetics are
permissible for one gender but not the other. Their performative awareness was thus

S. K. Lewis - Gendering the Body / Chapter Five, Part I: Discussion
122

forged through a deeply personal process of elimination, trial and error, and negative and
positive reinforcement.
The respondents' narratives are thus filled with clear-cut awareness of cisgender
doing and lesser awareness of transgender doing. Jamie, who is genderqueer and does
not identify with either male or female, felt incredibly restricted by the expectations of
zher cisgender and gave several poignant anecdotes of trying to fit in, evoking
performativity. But when speaking about the ways zher current identity is performed, ze
said, "it’s hard for to me to recognize the ways I don’t have gender, because it’s who I
am and it’s my everyday experience and sometimes I forget that it’s different." As Judith
Butler (1993) notes, it is exceedingly difficult to identify the doing of naturalized
performance. This does not mean, however, that we cannot assess the performativity
(again, in the non-pejorative sense) of gender in trans narratives: rather, we are given two
sites imbued with information. The cisgender performativity the respondents evoke is
stark, and provides the first site. By contrast, the full richness of trans performativity
must be read not only in the articulation of the respondents, but also in the negative
spaces left by the cisgender narratives of performativity that is intentionally not done.
As such, the findings in relation to H1 are mixed.

While the interviews

demonstrated that the respondents did indeed possess an awareness of gender
performativity, this awareness was engaged as an implicit rather than active agency in the
process of transgender embodiment. Subjectively, the respondents identified their trans
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embodiments as expressions of an authentic self free from the contrived performativity
experienced in their cisgender embodiments.
Nevertheless, there was evidence that performativity, in the more active sense,
still played a factor in trans embodiments, particularly in that the participants described
trans embodiment largely in terms of what they were told not do when in their cisgender
embodiments, and in what they perceived to be cisgendered remnants that they avoided
doing in their trans embodiments. Trans embodiment was thus largely described in terms
of what was not done rather than what was done. Though I was left to extrapolate the
active manifestations of trans embodiment from the negative space left behind, the
respondents' conceptualization of not doing still demonstrates their conscious reference to
and utilization of gender norms in terms of seeking intelligible conformity, and thus
constitutes the intentional - though relatively marginal - use of performativity, which
supports H1.
Individuals who experience sexually dimorphic change
The second hypothesis conjectured that trans individuals experience sexually
dimorphic bodily change as a direct result of changes to their gender identity (H2). When
engaged through a feminist epistemology of material-semiotic intra-action, I found strong
support for H2 in the narratives of the interview participants.
The respondents' narratives revealed their embodiments to be complex materialsemiotic intra-actions. The gendered body is a complex construction: we are often
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temped to attempt to separate the aspects that are bodily (i.e., sexual dimorphism) and
those that are superficial (e.g., style of dress, hairstyle, makeup, depilation, body
language/mannerisms, vocal cues, etc). The intra-active epistemology, however, argues
that it is in fact impossible - not just difficult - to separate factors, since neither of these
things exists in an essential form outside of its interactions with the others. As Butler
observes and Tuana later reprises, the body is "always already" informed by culture and
culture is "always already" informed by the body. As such, both bodies and culture are
always each other, and each phenomena must be considered an interaction rather than an
individually agentic actor. The narratives of trans individuals provide a richly accessible
site for the observation of material-semiotic phenomenon in that their changing identities
make the dynamic production of the trans body transparent, whereas the cisgender
production of the body is usually opaque. The respondents were uniquely able to report
the ways in which gender embodiment - the doing of gender and the not doing of gender became embodiment.
All ten interview respondents reported physical change upon transition to their
trans identities. They attributed their physical changes to the change in their identities in
a variety of ways: the respondents evoked changes in exercise, diet, and spatial
orientation; body language, posture, and mannerism; hormone use; and surgery. Each of
these measures may be seen as located within, and in fact co-produced by, a matrix of
complex interrelation with metanarrative gender expectations, subculture expectations
(i.e., the trans community), environment, socio-economic status, sex, sexuality, and body.
Hormone use is engaged as an example of material-semiotic intra-action below.
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Eight of the ten interview/questionnaire respondents used either testosterone or
estrogen.

Again, from the metanarrative perspective, it is tempting to attempt to

conceptualize the physicalities resultant from hormone use as separate from the
physicalities resultant from the active embodiment of gender, even though both of these
factors tend to commence simultaneously and unavoidably intersect. However, it is
precisely the intersection of factors that is engaged in this study's exploration of gender
embodiment. It is Tuana's (1996) argument that even if we could separate the influences
of the two factors - which we cannot, since they do not exist except in relation to each
other - we shouldn't want to, since addressing only one set of (artificially) binary factors
leaves us with an incomplete and inaccurate rendering of the actual interaction that has
occurred.

Furthermore, she implies that no one factor is more important or more

"natural" than another: since the concept of a pre-existing "natural" state with its own
agency and determinism has proved false, we understand that the body does not exist
independently of culture. Ergo, we cannot hold what we perceive to be bodily-driven
factors to be more important or more "natural" than factors wrought from what we
perceive to be strictly cultural constructions. The body's biological release of hormones
does not supersede in relevance or meaning an individual's choice to alter those hormones
based on ideations of gender conformity or physical change; both are factors in the
production and definition of identity and embodiment. Jamie addressed this when we
spoke about physical difference between men and women; ze stated ze did not see
physical difference as such:
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I think hormones – well, maybe, ok. It’s maybe not still a physical difference; it
manifests a physical difference. ... [G]iven, the main hormones that you’re on,
that manifests a physical difference, be it breasts or facial hair or voice or fat
distribution. But I wouldn’t - I make the qualification that [the physical
difference] is not between biological "men" and "women," because obviously, if
you do have somebody on hormones, they manifest that. It’s mostly biologically
related, but anyone’s who on hormones could, too.
Jamie here intuits the role of hormones as an agentic choice that interacts with the body:
it is a choice when cisgender individuals opt not to alter their hormones just as it is a
choice when trans people choose to take synthetic hormones; either way, the choice
affects embodiment.
Many critics dismiss the significance of transgressive passing on the basis that the
use of synthetic hormones or surgical alteration are somehow "artificial" agents of
change, thereby valuing "natural" as the sole factor in legitimate change. However, we
see that "natural" is also a construction: in fact, those very same methods - synthetic
hormone use and the surgical alteration of genitalia or facial features - are seen to
normatively restore naturality when given by medical professionals to patients with
hormone "imbalances" (like Kip, who felt like ze was told zher condition rendered zher
"not woman enough"), when used to treat and surgically reconstruct intersex babies (like
Kerry), or when individuals who do not conform to normative ideals of beauty undergo
plastic surgery. Hypocritically, when these methods are approached in ways that are
culturally legitimated, their "naturalness" goes uncontested. It is thereby evident that the
real issue with transgressive passing is not that it is not "natural" - since "natural" is a
culturally-specific construct just like any other - but that it is subversive to the
metaphysic that legitimates the entire metanarrative structure of gender hierarchy. A
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trans person's choice to use hormones or surgical alteration is no less authentic than any
of the other factors which together produce embodiment. The choice to use hormones
cannot in fact be separated from any other factor of gender embodiment; the gendered
body is a richly material-semiotic, epigenetic object that may only be considered in the
context of the intact narrative.
As such, the narratives provided support for H2. All ten respondents experienced
far-ranging bodily change (including, it is worth noting, the two respondents who did not
use hormones). Their narratives of personal embodiment were richly contextualized in
constructions of personal safety; their perceived locations on the continuums of
normative masculinity and femininity, and their fluidity within; authentic expression of
self and performativity; passing; and identity. The complex interaction of all these
factors - social, cultural, environmental, body - together form the ongoing production of
the gendered body.
Kip's presentation of identity is in itself a salient illustration of the materialsemiotic interaction in the way ze explicitly frames zher gender identity as an interaction
with zher intersexual body. While the perpetual, everyday plasticity of the body is
usually opaque to most people due to what is at times the excruciatingly slow nature of
change, Kip's PCOS and its dramatic bodily changes brought zher conceptualization of
bodily agency into focus. Kip was queer-identified prior to the virilization of zher
disease and stated that though nonconformist, ze was not sure if ze necessarily would
have come to the genderqueer identity if zher body had stayed within the range of
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"normal." But it did not, and Kip largely embraced zher emergent embodiment; zhe said,
"That’s body – and to me, that’s gender." Thus, Kip considered zher body the primary
informant in the construction of her gender identity, though she acknowledged the
interplay of other factors, including zher sexuality and her corresponding social position
as queer.
Kip's presentation of identity frames the material-semiotic in precisely the
subversive light Nancy Tuana intends: Kip's emergent identity relied not on the binary of
purportedly ontological boundaries of nature/culture, mind/body; sex/gender, but called
out the binary metaphysic for what it is: nonsense.
If you had asked me when I was seven if I was a girl, I would have yeah, but I
think that’s also kind of misleading if you haven’t really been presented with
anything else at that point. … I think if children were given more options about
how to identity, they’d choose more things, but because you’re just sort of
ingrained, girls act like this and boys act like this, and they’ve got cooties, and
you know? … because your gender, your sex shouldn’t be determining anything
about your personality or how you behave in the social realm. ... I would much
prefer it if it just – I would just like to see it all blow up. ... But that’s probably - I
mean, I feel that’s the conclusion everyone would come to if they had a different
lens to experience life, you know? I think that’s one of the benefits and one of the
pitfalls, I think of not fitting physically into one of those categories, like not
passing, you know? Because you see one side when you’re passing that you never
see when you’re not passing, and there are more people offended across the
board when you don’t pass.

Kip's position outside of the binary of intelligible gender allowed zher to reapproach the
metanarrative constructions of male/female, nature/culture, sex/gender as constructions
themselves - ones that have very harmful implications, as ze addressed later in the
interview in terms of normative pressure and personal safety. Zher understanding of the
metanarrative construction as incomplete and incorrect led zher to the desire to see it all
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"blow up."

Nancy Tuana argues that such material-semiotic interactions, when

subversive to the metanarrative's cosmogony of ontological difference, "explode" the
binary metaphysic upon which it is based (65).
In "Fleshing Gender, Sexing the Body," Tuana (1996) actually argues that
transgender individuals, while nevertheless sites of the material-semiotic production of
identity, do not constitute the same subversive intra-actions as do productions of
identities that lie outside of the gender binary entirely, like the travestis of Brazil or, I
would imagine, genderqueer Americans.

Her argument is based in the transgender

reliance on the metanarratively constructed gender binary and its inherent posturing of
"true" sex - a notion which, when deconstructed, belies its situationality within an entire
matrix of one-directional, oppositional binaries which, purportedly ontologically,
hierarchically position identities and disproportionately benefit some over others.
Conceptualizations of "true" sex or "true" gender imply pre-existence, discrete agency,
and the valuation of "natural" as an untouched-by-humans dictum of righteous biological
determinism, and in relying on the notion of "true" sex or "true" gender, transgender
individuals reify the binary metaphysic that restricted them in the first place. She argues
that even adding a third sex/gender category does not subvert the underlying binary, as it
preserves the nature/not nature binary: "To add to the number of sexes reinforces the
view that there is some sort of biological truth to sex, that there is behind the confusion
truly a true sex. But such a position also eradicates the complex intra-action involved
here" (65).
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I argue, however, that Tuana has severely undertheorized and underestimated the
transgender identity. Tuana makes the distinction between the travestis and transgender
individuals based on an abstract understanding with no grounding in the narrative
subjectivity of trans individuals - nor a sociological examination of the phenomenon of
transition and its implications to metanarrative notions of ontological linearity and
cohesion. As Lorber (2001) writes, "Treating passing transgenders as unproblematic
members in their new status masks their past history and on-going strategies of careful
gender construction, data that is rich in the practices of how we all do gender" (126).
Tuana, however, fails to realize the ways transgenderism subverts the discursive
construction of sex-gender congruence even when located within the normative identities
of "male" and "female." While some trans individuals do resolutely honor binary
sex/gender (and male/female as "true" genders) in their personal philosophies, they
nevertheless subvert the linearity and biologically determinist underpinnings of the
metanarrative, just as effectively exploding its underlying metaphysic. Judith Butler
(1999 [1990]) acknowledges this site of resistance in Gender Trouble in the context of
heteronormativity:
The repetition of heterosexual constructs within sexual cultures both gay and
straight may well be the inevitable site of the denaturalization and mobilization of
gender categories. The replication of heterosexual constructs in non-heterosexual
frames brings into relief the utterly constructed status of the so-called
heterosexual original. … The parodic repetition of ‘the original’ … reveals the
original to be nothing other than a parody of the idea of the natural and the
original. Even if heterosexist constructs circulate as the available sites of
power/discourse from which to do gender at all, the question remains: What
possibilities of recirculation exist? Which possibilities of doing gender repeat and
displace through hyperbole, dissonance, internal confusion, and proliferation the
very constructs by which they are mobilized?
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If repetition is bound to persist as the mechanism of the cultural reproduction of
identities, then the crucial question emerges: What kind of subversive repetition
might call into question the regulatory practice of identity itself? (42)
The transgender embodiment of "male" or "female" is parodic in Butler's estimation in
that it demonstrates the constructed nature of those categories which are ostensibly
naturalized; embodying while at the same time subverting the categories by denying their
basis in the ontological and congruent linearity of sex and gender.
Tuana lacks an understanding of the ways transgender individuals subtly
destabilize and provide pushback to the normative conceptualizations of "maleness" and
"femaleness." Though framed in reference to the metanarrative's rather Leave-It-ToBeaver-esque gender archetypes, this study's trans respondents nevertheless displayed a
wide range of diversity in their particular embodiments of masculinity and femininity.
As discussed in the findings, most respondents related undergoing a period of
"overcompensation" immediately following transition in which they attempted to
personify either hypermasculinized or hyperfeminized caricatures, "like Barbie," but also
reported their ultimate discoveries that a truly authentic expression of self was not served
by rigid conformity, even to the gender role they'd long desired to embody. Rather, they
found the authentic self to be comfortably located in the "blend," in the fluidity between
things masculine and things feminine. Lindsay described this realization by way of an
anecdote in which she described her post-transition "obsession" with passing:
It used to drive me nuts. …Up until probably, I don’t know… a year ago, we’ll
say, somewhere in that area – I would not leave the house without putting makeup
on. Then it finally got to the point like …’this is a lot of work!’ you know,
seriously. So, I’m going to the store, I’m putting on sweats, tee shirt, and that’s it.
Sandals… you know. And then get called ma’am. You know, it’s like …wow.
S. K. Lewis - Gendering the Body / Chapter Five, Part I: Discussion
132

You know? Yeah. Sweet. (laughs). It’s like one of my biggest accomplishments,
seriously, you know?
When Lindsay realized she could pass without engaging in the performativity she felt
was prescribed by metanarrative expectations, she felt freed to include in her
personification of femininity aspects of herself she did not initially operationalize as
such, including her profession (plumber) and preferred wardrobe (tee shirts and jeans,
rather than the skirts and dresses she felt were compulsory on an everyday basis before).
In this unique negotiation of identity, trans individuals thus subtly alter the range of
acceptable behaviors, actions, and embodiments located within traditional definitions of
masculinity and femininity - in so doing, implicating the ongoing production of
"traditional" itself.
The transgender appropriation of masculinity is a particularly salient site of
subversion.

As noted in the findings, all FTM respondents expressed a lifelong

compulsion to be male-identified and male-embodied, but each also stated they had no
desire to conform to the metanarratively normative male gender role, as did the
genderqueer respondents. As Sidney said, "I don't want to conform to the stereotype
because I don't like the stereotype." Each noted how limiting and repressed they found
normative masculinity; "closed-off," "stoic," and "emotionally repressed" were all terms
used. As an expression of their desire to be male and yet still destabilize the traditional
operationalization of masculinity, the respondents engaged the countercultural
embodiment of "fag masculinity": as Devin said,
Um, I don’t think [I conform the male gender role] – and that is kind of confusing
as well, because -- I think in some respects like, if you want to get real
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stereotypical, I like camping and fishing and I do construction work, but, you
know, when I got out, I’m kind of gay in the respect of like flaming or something –
like, I like to like dress up and wear skirts in drag kind of stuff, and do kind of
performance stuff, and I write poetry, and stuff like that. And I feel like it’s really
important to be this kind of male person that I am, that is a little more expressive,
cause I don’t want to get locked into that, like, how men are brought up to not
express their emotions and not you know, express themselves and be whole human
beings; because I think we all have a little bit of everything, you know?
Everybody does, so it’s just not – I’m just fighting against it a little bit. It kind of
puts me at risk, like, maybe not fitting in, or not like passing all the way, or not
like, whatever. I just can’t – once you get to this point of trying to be yourself, it’s
not worth it to tuck things away, I don’t think. It’s too hard.
In pushing the boundaries of intelligible gender by engaging constructs like fag
masculinity, these trans individuals opened the previously dichotomized genders to new
operationalizations and embodiments, and in so doing subversively "exploded" the
hegemonic structure of binary exclusivity.
Transgenderism and the metanarrative
Our cultural metanarrative identifies "ontological" sexual dimorphism as naturally
occurring evidence and justification of the differential abilities and thus differential
gender roles of the sexes.

The inequalities between the gender roles are largely

legitimated by the physical (non-genital) differential said to exist between the sexes. If
this sexually dimorphic physical difference could be demonstrated to be in itself a
production, rather than a naturally occurring "fact," the metanarrative which prescribes
stratified gender roles loses its justification and thus its validity.
In the theoretical sphere, the discussion of transgenderism demonstrates that while
sexual dimorphism is in fact a construction and can be reconstructed, it also renders the
conceptualization sexual dimorphism as a limiting and exclusive structure of ability
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irrelevant and subverts the underpinnings of the entire cultural metanarrative.

If

individuals are able to either re-construct or visibly subvert sexual ("natural")
dimorphism, obviously, categories of natural sex (and sexual dimorphism) do not
function as ontologically restrictive to the sexes' corresponding genders, and in fact
demonstrate the construction of what was ostensibly "natural." Sexual dimorphism is in
fact irrelevant to individuals' potentialities. The precept that there are inviolable physical
differences that separate the male and female cisgenders is shown to be a construct rather
than a biological "fact" - a construct which then becomes subject to the actor's ability to
reconstruct or deconstruct it.
Bodily sexual dimorphism, however, has the same cyclic nature that is noted of
the gender metanarrative itself: as males and females engage in actions segregated due to
beliefs about sexually dimorphic physical ability, those actions in themselves affect the
body and its abilities. If men are always asked to lift big items and women to sit it out,
men develop muscle mass and women do not. If women are always asked to nurture, the
will be attuned to others' emotions and men will not. As Butler noted, the presumed
difference is in fact manufactured by our anticipation of it. Trans people disrupt the
metanarrative of restrictive cisgender materiality in their appropriation of gendered
embodiment: as they construct the transgender appearance and change the gendered
aspects of their behavior, even those who do not use hormones or surgery found that as
they ceased cisgender performativity, their bodies began to lose explicit gender
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intelligibility; and as they adopted transgender actions, their bodies began to conform to
the physical expectations the metanarrative holds as "natural" only to cis-sexuals.
From the theoretical standpoint, in trans bodies, the material and the semiotic
meet in the expression of identity and the conscious construction of embodiment. In
making the ontologically "impossible" shift, transgenderism demonstrates that
embodiment is a complexly negotiated and interwoven interaction.

Bodily agency

presents no universal physical limitations which would prohibit the embodiment of either
gender, regardless of the sex (or sexual dimorphism) of the body. Through intentional
sculpting and the exponential accumulativity of gendered action, among other factors, the
manifestation of sexual dimorphism is produced. This study explored the lived bodily
experience of this manifestation in the narratives of ten individuals.
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Part II:
Conclusion
I deny that anyone knows, or can know, the nature of the two sexes, as long as they have only
been seen in their present relation to one another. If men had ever been found in society without
women, or women without men, or if there had been a society of men and women in which the
women were not under the control of the men, something might have been positively known about
the mental and moral differences which may be inherent in the nature of each. What is now called
the nature of women is an eminently artificial thing — the result of forced repression in some
directions, unnatural stimulation in others.
JOHN STUART MILL, THE SUBJECTION OF WOMEN, 1869
And if you want to be free, be free / Because there's a million things to be.
CAT STEVENS, IF YOU WANT TO SING OUT, SING OUT, 1971

-Summary
I approached this research with the primary goal of exploring the lived experience
of the construction of sexually dimorphic bodies through the narrative experiences of
trans individuals. Narratives were gathered through in-depth qualitative interviews, in
which the participants shared deeply personal and richly situated stories, touching on the
themes of identity, conformity, performativity, difference, subversion, and the authentic
self. I hypothesized that trans individuals participated in an active performativity of
gender in order to achieve gender conformity in the transgender context, and that this
performativity played an active role in the physical production of the sexually dimorphic
transgender body.
I utilized Judith Butler's (1993; 1999 [1990]) terminology of performativity and
Nancy Tuana's (1996) epistemology of material-semiotic intra-action as lenses with
which to approach the trans narratives. My findings suggest that trans performativity is a
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somewhat polemical concept that must be approached with respect for each respondent's
subjectivity. Trans embodiments of gender were framed as the expression of an authentic
self, rather than evoked performativity; nevertheless, it was found that trans individuals
do possess a more extensive performative vocabulary, as it were, and were thus able to
articulate the ways negotiations of embodiment were engaged, both in terms of what is
done and what is not done. Further, the findings suggest that trans individuals experience
sexually dimorphic bodily change in concert with changes in their gender identities as a
result of the complex material-semiotic intra-action that negotiates identity and
embodiment.
Throughout this research, it was my goal to honor the subjectivity of the
respondents' narrative experiences while still negotiating the significance of
transgenderism in the larger theoretical sense.

Too often, academics use marginal

identities, particularly the intersex and trans identified, as theoretical "pawns" without
first grounding their operationalization in the reality experienced by those individuals.
Nancy Tuana (1996) in particular is guilty of this in her under-theorization of transgender
identity in "Fleshing Gender, Sexing the Body." Judith Lorber (2001) also addresses this
balancing act:
The lives of transgenders can be examined from the standpoint of transgendered
people and communities, but they also provide grist for a critique of the gendered
social order. Those who successfully construct their gender against their sex
assignment, whether through cross-dressing or surgical alteration of genitalia,
may reaffirm the conventional categories of man and woman, but their own
behavior has sabotaged the solidity of the categories. In Garber's words, anyone
who passes successfully (by crossing the boundaries) possess an 'extra-ordinary
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power ... to disrupt, expose, and challenge, putting into question the very notion
of the 'original' and of stable identity.' ...[S]uccessful passers subtly undermine
the gendered social order. (126-127)
It can be problematic to discuss transgender as a larger concept without negating the
autonomous experience, but hopefully I have proved it possible.

Herein, transgender

narratives provide the deep richness of subjective identity while also allowing a treatment
of transgender as a larger concept insofar as it can push and test the boundaries of the
discursive gendered model.
-Can Gendered Behavior Be Reasonably Understood to be a Factor in the Production of
Sexually Dimorphic Bodies?
In Pink Brain, Blue Brain, Lise Eliot (2009) describes the way neuroscientists
now conceive of the brain: while the brain was previously believed to adhere to an
"additive model" of biology (a concept which relies on the valued binary of natural, preexistent ability), it is now evident that the brain actually functions on a model of
plasticity. Eliot writes, "the brain actually changes in response to its own experience. ...
Simply put, your brain is what you do with it" (6). She goes on to write, "So it's all
biology, whether the cause is nature or nurture" (7). Everything we do, see, say, or hear
is inscribed into our brain, thus becoming our brain. I argue that we must apply this same
understanding of plasticity to the body as well as the brain.
As it is in neuroscience, engaging the concept of plasticity does not imply infinite
capacity for transformation in the sense that the brain nor the body cannot take the form
of anything; its materiality is still an agentic actor in the production. Plasticity is infinite,
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however, in that it never ends: each day, each moment, each minute action contributes to
the ongoing and perpetual production of embodiment. When we do gender inherently in
every action, behavior, gesture, movement, and choice, how could we believe it wouldn't
have an effect on our embodiments?
Tuana (1996) asserts that phenomena approached with anything other than an
epistemology

of

material-semiotic

intra-action

essentially

leaves

us

with

misunderstanding: when viewed through the rigid structures of binary ontology, we
restrict ourselves to only a myopic and perhaps nearsighted conception of the object. I
find this true in relation to our culture's attitude about the physical difference between
men and women, which is resolutely framed strictly in terms of the "natural" side of the
nature/culture, male/female, body/mind, sex/gender binary system: refusing to consider
any factors other than the ontological and so-perceived biological determinism of the
body in the production of sexual dimorphism is short-sighted and betrays a severely
limited sociological imagination. In doing so, we delegitimize our contributions and
deny our own agency in the construction of our experiences and identity.
Like in the body, the manifestation of embodiment in the brain is subject to the
interpretation of those situated in the cultural metanarrative of ontological difference; and
like the body's sexual dimorphism, differences found in the brain are often held up as
"evidence" of that selfsame ontology. Fine addresses the conflation that often occurs
between differences that may be result not of ontology, but rather the imprinting of a
lifetime of gender, and difference that is held up as "natural": people are all too ready to
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equate "actual nature" with "brain." But really, when you think about it, where
else but in the brain would we see the effects of socialization or experience? As
Mark Liberman puts it, "how else would socially constructed cognitive
differences manifest themselves? In flows of pure spiritual energy, with no effect
on neuronal activity, cerebral blood flow, and functional brain imaging
techniques?" (170)
I argue one should also apply this to the body: how else would a lifetime of gendered
action be manifest but in the body?
The findings concur, suggesting that gendered behavior, as a major actor among
phenomena in the material-semiotic production of identity, can indeed be reasonably
understood to be implicated in the manufacture of embodiment in the case of the
respondents.
-Implications for Feminist Theory
When such categories come into question, the reality of gender is also put into
crisis: it becomes unclear how to distinguish the real from the unreal. And this is
the occasion in which we come to understand that what we take to be ‘real,’ what
we invoke as the naturalized knowledge of gender is, in fact, a changeable and
revisable reality.
…no political revolution is possible without a radical shift in one’s notion of the
possible and the real. (Butler 1999 [1990]: xxii)

A critical engagement of gender transgression and its implications invite new
theory and new options to feminism and other agendas that seek to alter or abolish the
discursively gendered patriarchal model.
Both Judith Butler (1999 [1990]) and bell hooks (2000 [1984]) identify the
mainstream feminist agenda as a movement to achieve male-female equality at face
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value: that is, to provide women with a share of all the benefits men have typically
enjoyed in this society, rather than to redefine the gender binary in a way that would not
still rely on the maintenance and perpetuation of racism, classism, and other exploitative
hierarchies (hooks 46). Unfortunately, the expression of feminism as women finally
wanting their share of the privilege men have always taken for granted necessarily pits
the two genders against each other: in the fight for finite hierarchical, phallocentric
privilege, men stand to lose out if women gain, and are therefore automatically threatened
by and opposed to feminist movement. Due to its ingrained ontological bias, mainstream
feminism is not phrased or operationalized in a way which posits that both genders - and
indeed, all people - have a tremendous amount to gain from feminist movement and
revision.
The material-semiotic operationalization of bodies provides both a point of
departure from the fallacious metaphysic of binary opposition (within which feminists are
forced to attempt to dismantle the master's house with the selfsame master's tools), and in
particular the downright subversion of the metanarrative gender cosmogony.

The

material-semiotic examination of trans bodies holds the potential to demonstrate that the
genders nor the sexes are ontological in origin, nor are they nontransgressable. Trans
bodies have the potential to demonstrate that sexual dimorphism is not a manifestation of
biological determinism, but a product of bodily plasticity formed out of the interrelation
of the enactment of gender, the environment, and the body, et al. If the physical basis for
the gender metanarrative's mythic gender hegemony is destabilized by such examinations
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of trans bodies, feminists would have the opportunity to use the knowledge gleaned
therein in ways which engage further subversion to the extent of explosion.
In turn, explosion provides a site for a feminist revisioning of gender
epistemology. Tuana envisions a destabilized reimagining of gender which understands
the interplay of body and culture to be both "material-and-semiotic," thus avoiding
determinist dichotomies: "we should not treat inscriptive and phenomenological accounts
as an either/or choice, but rather as different approaches for creating embodied
philosophies"

(59, emphasis added).

Judith Lorber (2001) in turn recommends

destabilizing the gender categories; she writes,
In short, because it includes men, attends as well to other subordinating social
statuses that also have to be undermined, but most of all, because it directly
challenges the structure and framework of women's oppression and inequality, a
degendering movement is what I would like to see as the feminist politics of the
new century. (132)
Understanding the body as an agentic actor in the production of embodiment, rather than
a site for divisive biological determinism, provides feminist theory and feminist action
with a point of departure from the metanarrative model of ontological binarism. In its
ability to subvert the binary metaphysic and engage the construction of embodiment so as
to reduce, rather than emphasize, difference, feminism has an opportunity to advocate for
new model of gender - or degender - that can account for intersectional justice and move
beyond its current limitations.
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APPENDIX A: INTERVIEW GUIDE
(Distributes and discusses Letter of Informed Consent.) In addition to the consent
information, there are few other points I wanted to emphasize. Most of these questions
are going to be open-ended and are not the kind that have right or wrong answers, or
yes-or-no answers - it's more like having a conversation, and I’m interested in whatever
you have to say. Take as much time as you like thinking about the questions before or
during answering them, and feel free to talk as much as you want. These questions are
going to vary from the general to the personal, so feel free to ask me to clarify, rephrase,
or to decline any questions. Some of these questions might get a little repetitive, so feel
free to point that out and say, well, I think I already covered most of what you’re asking,
etc. If there’s ever a point at which I misspeak or say something that makes you feel
uncomfortable or (hopefully not) offended, please feel free to bring that to my attention
so that I can resolve and avoid such transgressions in the future. I might also be taking a
few notes to remind myself of things I need to come back to; please let me know if it’s
distracting at all! (Introduces self and asks for permission to audio-record the interview;
verbal consent to participate is recorded.)
Scene (Personal)
How do you identify, in terms of gender?
Do you identify with a specific gender?
Do you consider yourself transgender/transsexual/androgynous/transgressive?
Do you feel like you ‘conform’ to or ‘fit in with’ a stereotypical/ archetypical/
”normal” gender role?
Is it your goal to ‘conform’ to or ‘fit in with’ an archetypical/”normal” gender
role?
Can you give me examples of the ways in which you feel like you conform/do not
conform to the gender archetype?
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Have you ever identified differently than you do now?
Do you identify with the adjective “masculine” (in any way)?
In what ways (specifically)?
Do you identify with the adjective “feminine” (in any way)?
In what ways (specifically)?
If you had to guess, how do you think others perceive your gender? (Do you think
you ‘pass’)?
What are the reasons you guess that?
What do you think about the idea of “passing”? Is “passing” important?
What actions do you take to ensure that you pass?/What do you think you would
have to do to ensure that you would pass?
Scene General.

How do you define the term ‘gender?’
Is gender a strict binary? Are there only two genders?
Is gender changeable? Is it plastic or static?
How about ‘sex’ – how would you define that word/concept?
Are sex and gender different things/concepts?
(And so, sex and gender are different in that … lead them into an explanation)
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What do you see as the relationship between sex and gender?
Scene (General)
In general, do you believe that there is a physical difference between men and
women (that goes beyond genitalia)?
What are those physical differences, specifically?
How would you say that this difference occurs? (Is it natural, biological?)
In your opinion, what are the implications of this (physical) difference?
Do you think that the mainstream culture believes, or assumes, that there is a
physical difference between men and women?
What are the differences that the stereotype assumes? /Are these differences the
same as the ones you listed?
Can you think of any examples of these differences?
Have you had any experiences that come to mind in which you or someone you
know participated, or declined to participate, in an activity due to the physical
assumptions made (by themselves, or others) about their gender (role)?
What stands out to you about that story?

S. K. Lewis - Gendering the Body / Appendix A: Interview Guide
151

Can you think of an example in which a person whose sex traditionally
corresponded with their gender was belittled due to inadequate
presentation/embodiment of sexual dimorphism?
Scene (Personal)
Have you ever felt that you needed to alter your body (in any way – surgery to
tweezing) so that you could conform to the physical stereotype of a specific gender?

Can you describe the process of changing your gender/ not conforming to gender?
What was the first thing you did in order to change your gender?
Do you consider your gender to be performative? How so?
Did you consider any former gender identities to be performative?
What did those performances entail, specifically?
What aspects of your body were affected or changed (when you changed your
gender)?
Were these changes more the result of conscious alteration or were they spurious?
What are ways in which you consciously changed your body?
Were there any physical affects that you did not anticipate?
Do you personally experience difference in the ways the genders treat ____ (diet,
exercise, body language, body presence, dress, primping, etc), either within your
own change or simply by observing others around you?
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Specifically, what are the differences you notice? (Examples: diet, exercise, body
language/mannerism, dress, body modification/grooming, style/fashion.)
Is there a difference in the way that you exercise now than you did before your
transition/change in identity?
Is there a difference in the way that you eat now than you did before your
transition/change in identity?
Are there any other ways that you feel physically different now than you did before
your transition/change in identity?
Has your relationship with your body changed at all?
Do you / How do you think about gender in your everyday life/on a day-to-day
basis?
Do you / How do you think about sex in your everyday life/on a day-to-day basis?
Is there anything that I’m missing – can you think of any other questions that I should ask?
Do you want to add anything more to anything we’ve talked about?

Would it be ok to contact you if I find I have any more questions for a short follow-up
interview?

(Thanks.) Would you like a copy of the finished product? If so, one will be provided
electronically via email or in hard copy through regular mail.
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APPENDIX B: CALL FOR PARTICIPANTS

GenderQueer?
*do
*are

you identify as trans, androgynous, or genderqueer?

you interested in talking about your experiences with gender?
*are you over the age of 18?

If so, please call or email me! I’m a trans ally and master’s student in
Sociology/Women’s Studies at Portland State seeking volunteers to interview during the month of
April. The interviews are for my thesis, which is a project exploring the ways individuals who
identify as transgender, transsexual, or genderqueer define and experience gender in their
everyday lives.
All information and identifying markers of individuals who choose to be interviewed will be kept
strictly confidential and will be destroyed after the completion of the project. (For questions or
more information about confidentiality, please feel free to contact me.) Each interview should
last between 30 and 90 minutes and can take place in a location of the interviewee’s choice.
If you are at all interested in being interviewed, or would simply like more information, please
contact me either by phone or email. Thank you!
Sarah Lewis / Portland State University
sklewis@pdx.edu, (503)515-3142
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APPENDIX C: INTERMEDIARY SCRIPT AND COVER LETTER
Intermediary Script
“I have a friend at PSU who’s doing a project on gender and how people
experience it in their lives. She’s looking for people to interview and I was wondering if
you might be interested in talking to her.” (If they are interested, it would not be her
responsibility to explain the project in more depth – she would simply refer them to me.)
“If you’d like more information about the project, here’s a cover sheet with her email,
phone number, and a brief description of the general project.”
Cover Letter for Intermediary Distribution
Hello,
I’m a graduate student at Portland State University working on a thesis for the
Department of Sociology. I am currently looking for volunteers to interview for a project
about gender and how people experience it individually in their lives. I’m specifically
trying to locate people who identify as trans, queer, butch, androgynous, drag, or anyone
whose beliefs, values, lifestyles, or experiences allow for room to experience gender in
nontraditional ways (and whom are over the age of 18).
The project will result in a theoretical paper that discusses gender and the
different ways it can be experienced by individuals, specifically focusing on the
experiences of altering, changing, switching, or living beyond gender. If you would like
a more detailed description of the project, please contact me.
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All information and identifying markers of individuals who choose to be
interviewed will be kept strictly confidential and will be destroyed after the completion of
the paper; pseudonyms will be used to refer to interview subjects in the body of the
paper. For questions or more information about confidentiality, please contact me.
If you are at all interested in being interviewed during the month of April or
would simply like more information, please contact me either by phone, email, or mail.
(Interviews should last between 30 and 90 minutes.) Thanks so much!
Sincerely,
Sarah Lewis
sklewis@pdx.edu, (503)515-3142
PO Box 9084, Portland OR, 97207
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APPENDIX D: QUESTIONNAIRE
Here it is: the interview!
Thank you again so much for taking this on!
In addition to the consent letter you read earlier, there are few other points I
wanted to bring up and/or re-emphasize:
Please feel free to skip questions! Please feel free to note if and when the
questions seem repetitive and to refer back to previous answers. Likewise, please let me
know if any part of this interview makes you feel uncomfortable or offended. The
questions range from really broad, like the definition of terms, to really personal. One
thing I’m particularly interested in exploring is the relationship people who identify as
trans or genderqueer have with their bodies, so you’ll notice some questions that
definitely pertain to that.
These questions are TOTALLY open ended. Please feel free to write as much or
as little as you want for each question. Any format is great – please don’t worry about
grammar or spelling, etc. As we discussed via email, please feel free to email me with
any questions or clarifications; if at any point you would like to set up a time for us to
instant message, either just to ask questions or to finish the ‘interview,’ just let me know!
Feel free to take your time with this, too – no deadline!
The Questions
1. I don’t know if you’re familiar with Kate Bornstein – ze is the author of several great
books, including My Gender Workbook, in which ze published a great little
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exercise. Ze put up a post in the cyber community and asked people to define
themselves in 25 words or less. (Most respondents did not stick to 25 words
exactly.) Which 25 words would you choose?
2. How do you identify, in terms of gender?
3. Do you feel like you ‘conform’ to or ‘fit in with’ a stereotypical/ archetypical/
“normal” gender role, and why? Is it your goal to ‘conform’ to or ‘fit in with’ an
archetypical/”normal” gender role?
4. Have you ever identified differently (in terms of gender) than you do now?
5. Do you take hormones?
6. Do you identify with the adjective “masculine”?
7. Do you identify with the adjective “feminine”?
8. If you had to guess, how do you think others perceive your gender? Do you think you
‘pass’?
9. What do you think about the idea of “passing”? Is “passing” important?
10. What actions do you take to ensure that you ‘pass’? OR What actions do you think
you would have to take in order to ‘pass’?
11. How do you define the term ‘gender?’
12. How do you define the term ‘sex?’
13. How do you define the term ‘transgender?’
14. How do you define the term ‘genderqueer?'
15. How would you define ‘stereotypical/mainstream gender’?
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16. Do you believe that there is a physical difference between men and women (that goes
beyond genitalia)?
a) What are those physical differences, specifically?
b) If there is a difference, how would you say that this difference occurs? (Is it
natural, biological?)
c) In your opinion, what are the implications of this (physical) difference?
17. Have you had any experiences that come to mind in which you or someone you
know participated, or declined to participate, in an activity due to the physical
assumptions made (by themselves, or others) about their gender (role)?
18. Can you think of an example in which a person whose sex traditionally corresponds
to their gender was belittled due to inadequate presentation/embodiment of sexual
dimorphism?
19. How have you dealt with ideas of gender-appropriate physical difference in your
own life? Have you ever felt that you needed to alter your body (in any way –
surgery to tweezing) so that you could conform to the physical stereotype of a
specific gender?
20. Can you describe the process of changing your gender/ not conforming to gender?
21. Do you consider your gender to be performative? How so? What are physical
considerations you have taken in your performativity?
22. What aspects of your body were affected or changed when you changed/departed
from your gender? Were these changes more the result of conscious alteration?
Were there any physical affects that you did not anticipate?
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23. Do you personally experience difference in the ways the genders treat
a) diet,
b) exercise,
c) body language/poise,
d) body modification/grooming,
either within your own change or simply by observing others around you? If so, what
are the differences you notice?
24. Is there a difference in the way that you exercise now than you did before your
transition/change in identity?
25. Is there a difference in the way that you eat now than you did before your
transition/change in identity?
26. Are there any other ways that you feel physically different now than you did before
your transition/change in identity?
27. Is there anything that I’m missing – can you think of any other questions that I
should ask?

Thank you so much! The whole project should be completed relatively soon, and I will
more than happy to send you a copy.
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APPENDIX E: COVER LETTER OF INFORMED CONSENT
Cover Letter of Informed Consent.
“Social versus Biological Determinism: Sexual Dimorphism, Gendered Dimorphism, and
the Patriarchal Model.”
Principal Investigator: Sarah Lewis, Graduate Student, Department of Sociology at
Portland State University.
Phone: 503-725-3958
Email: sklewis@pdx.edu
You are invited to participate in a research study conducted by Sarah Lewis, an
M.S. candidate at Portland State University, Department of Sociology. This research is
part of the researcher’s master’s thesis, a requirement of the degree. This project is
supervised by Grant Farr, the student’s advisor and a faculty member at Portland State
University. He can be reached via email at farrg@pdx.edu or via phone at 503-725-3908.
The researcher hopes to learn how subjects’ individual experiences with gender
and gender transgression have affected their everyday lives, including how they think of
and view gender roles, how gender affects their everyday decisions and actions, and how
their potential experiences regarding change, fluidity, or rejection of gender have
similarly affected them.
Your participation is voluntary. You do not have to take part in this study, and
it will not affect you nor your relationship with Portland State University if you do not.
You may also stop the interview at any point.
If you decide to participate, you will be asked to take part in one interview
conducted by the researcher. The researcher will ask your permission to tape record the
interview. (If you do not agree to be tape recorded, you can still be interviewed if you
wish.) If you consent to being tape recorded, you are also welcome to withdraw that
consent and turn off the recorder at any time.
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All information will be kept strictly confidential, including names, phone
numbers, email addresses, other identifying markers, etc. In all drafts, notes, and in the
finished project, pseudonyms will be assigned to all interviewees and no real names will
be used. All information will be destroyed after the completion of the project, including
the tapes of the interviews. The interview will consist of open-ended questions about
your personal experience and opinion. You may decline to answer any or all questions at
any time. No one else will be present during the interview, and the location of the
interview will be determined by the participant. If you do not have a suggestion for a
location for the interview, the researcher will suggest several locations for your selection.
The duration of the interview will range anywhere from 30 to 90 minutes.
While participating in this study, it is possible that you may experience some
discomfort or embarrassment from the questions asked due to their controversial nature.
The researcher will do everything possible to remain tactful, respectful, and sensitive. In
addition, you are invited to decline to answer any question that makes you
uncomfortable. You may not receive any direct benefit from taking part in this study, but
the study may help to increase knowledge, which may help others in the future.
Any information that is obtained in connection with this study that can be linked
to you or identify you will be kept confidential.

This information will be kept

confidential through the use of pseudonyms, which will be used for the duration of the
study and in any subsequent document or publication. This confidentiality is limited only
by mandatory reporting requirements, such as instances in which subjects might reveal
imminent harm to one’s self or to others.
If you have problems or concerns about your participation in this study or your
rights as a research subject, please contact the Human Subjects Research Review
Committee, Office of Research and Sponsored Projects, 111 Cramer Hall, Portland State
University, (503) 725-4288. If you have any questions about the study itself, please
contact Sarah Lewis at (503) 725-3958 or sklewis@pdx.edu.
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Your verbal consent indicates that you have read and understand the above information
and agree to take part in this study. Please understand that you may withdraw your
consent at any time without penalty, and that, by giving consent, you are not waiving any
legal claims, rights, or remedies. The researcher will provide you with a copy of this
form for your own records. If you would like a copy of the finished research, the
researcher will be happy to provide one either through physical mail or email.
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